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Informed consent procedures are an essential part of the ethical conduct of research, including 
clinical trials. The principle of autonomy justifies this process. However, it is clear that 
conventional assumptions about autonomy offer limited guidance in many countries where 
clinical research on non-Western populations is conducted by Western researchers. Beginning 
with a brief review of conventional approaches to autonomy, the present research explored 
feminist alternatives to this principle, drawn from self-in-relation and care theories.  
 
This study aimed to determine whether there is an association between an individual‟s gender, 
autonomy, self-construal and ethical orientation. Based on the literature, it was hypothesized that 
men would exhibit a more conventional sense of autonomy, independent self-construal, and a 
stronger tendency towards an ethic of justice.  Women were expected to demonstrate a more 
relational sense of autonomy and more relational self-construal, as well as a stronger tendency 
towards an ethic of care. Racial differences were investigated as a secondary hypothesis.  
 
The Relational Being Scale, Relational Interdependent Self-Construal Scale, and the Moral 
Orientation Scale were administered to a sample of tertiary education students comprising 188 
women (100 Black and 88 White) and 158 men (95 Black and 63 White). Women scored 
significantly higher than men on Relation, but there was no significant difference between men 
and women‟s scores on the Autonomy subscale. Women scored significantly higher than men on 
the Relational Interdependent Self-Construal Scale, indicating a more relational self-construal in 
women. The Justice scores of men were higher than those of women; the Care scores of women 
were higher than men‟s Care scores. These differences were not statistically significant. Analysis 
of racial differences yielded somewhat contradictory results.  
 
The findings suggest that although there are gender differences in the experience of autonomy, 
self-construal, and ethical orientation, these differences may not be as discrete as current theories 
suggest. It may be that race significantly influenced the results. Further research is required to 
determine the exact nature of the association between gender and autonomy, self-construal, and 
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1.1 HIV/AIDS and Clinical Research in Developing Countries 
 
Of all the people in the world who are HIV-positive, two thirds are living in sub-Saharan Africa 
(UNAIDS, 2004). Seventy seven percent of the global burden of HIV infection is now carried by 
sub-Saharan African women, while South Africa‟s epidemic, one of the largest in the world, 
shows no sign of relenting (UNAIDS/WHO, 2005). These statistics highlight the urgent need for 
preventive HIV research to be accelerated, and elucidate the attraction of Africa as a site for such 
research, where the greatest number of people at risk for becoming HIV-infected can be included 
as research participants. As early as 1988, HIV vaccine trials were identified as the “next major 
ethical challenge in South African research circles” (Barry, 1988, p. 1083). In view of the 
urgency to find a cure for this devastating syndrome, some have maintained that the ethical 
issues involved in this area of research are given too much attention, both in theory (Coovadia & 
Rollins, 1999) and in practice, and consideration of such issues is seen as a hindrance to urgently 
needed research to avert the catastrophic consequences of HIV/AIDS (Ngu & Tangwa, 2000). 
This line of reasoning implies that there is a point at which the importance and urgency of 
scientific and humanitarian goals justify certain ethical compromises. This is despite widespread 
awareness of the immense complexity of ethical issues involved in even the earliest stages of 
clinical vaccine research (Abdool-Karim, 2000; MacQueen, Shapiro, Abdool-Karim & 
Sugarman, 2004; Medical Research Council, 2004; Slack et al., 2000; Slack, Lindegger & 
Vardas, 2002; UNAIDS, 2000). Others have maintained that researchers who neglect or ignore 
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the ethical dimensions of their work do so at their own, as well as their research participants‟ 
peril. And nowhere is this risk greater than in developing nations (Benatar, 2002).   
 
Parallel to the growing number of clinical research trials occurring in developing countries, there 
is a growing body of research on the ethics of research involving human subjects in developing 
countries, (see, for example, Abrams, 2004; Costello & Zumla, 2005; Farmer & Gastineau 
Campos, 2004; Hyder et al., 2004; Killen, Grady, Folkers & Fauci, 2002; Koski & Nightingale, 
2001; Pace & Emanuel, 2005; Pitler, 2002; Schüklenk, 2000; Slack et al., 2005; Strode, Slack & 
Mushariwa, 2005; Upvall & Hashwani, 2001) that is highlighting the complexity of ethical 
issues that need to be considered. Among the motivations to keep ethics at the forefront of HIV-
AIDS research – particularly when that research is being conducted in developing nations by 
researchers from developed nations – is that bioethical concepts developed and interpreted in the 
developed world cannot be directly imported into the developing world. Context may affect the 
meaning or application of Western bioethical principles such as autonomy, beneficence, and 
justice. Standard applications of the concept of autonomy and the requirements of informed 
consent, for instance, present ethical difficulties in cultures where personal autonomy is already 
extremely limited (Barry, 1988).  
 
The dominant ethical framework and principles that are universally applied in research contexts 
have historically been upheld as gender-neutral and influenced neither by context (Campbell, 
2003; McGrath, 1998; Meslin, Sutherland, Lavery & Till, 1995) nor by individual particularities 
(Carse, 1998). This routine and unconscious application of Western bioethical principles is, 
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however, increasingly being called into question. Some probing questions have been asked about 
developed-world researchers conducting research in developing countries:  
To what extent have researchers tried to understand the mind-set of potential research-
subjects? Does the way in which their subjects see researchers and the privileged world 
matter to them…or do researchers merely want to get on with the study as quickly and 
economically as possible? How does this square with respect for the autonomy of 
research subjects? (Benatar, 2002, p. 1133).  
 
This highlights the importance of attending to the circumstances into which developed-world 
researchers enter when conducting research in developing world contexts. In South Africa, not 
only is the rate of HIV infection particularly high, it parallels the broader infection rate in Africa 
by falling disproportionately on the shoulders of some of the most vulnerable citizens: poor, 
illiterate, unhealthy Black women and children. Within this context, as (Western) researchers 
design their studies, formulate their informed consent procedures, and relate to their research 
participants, they must continually consider the local meanings of principles such as autonomy, 
beneficence, and justice, in cultures whose social and moral languages and priorities differ from 
their own.  
 
Furthermore, in South Africa, as in many countries around the world, the rate of HIV infection in 
women is rising faster than in any other group, a vulnerability that is linked to biological factors 
and deeply rooted in social and behavioural issues (D‟Adesky, 2001; Mills et al., 2006; 
Wassenaar, Barsdorf & Richter, 2005) as well as in a cycle of poverty and economic 
disenfranchisement (Kahn, 2001). The gender-based physical, emotional, and psychological 
violence, as well as the social and economic deprivation that women are frequently subjected to, 
are symptomatic of the wider gender inequity that further increases women‟s lack of personal 
autonomy, as is the case in many of the African communities in sub-Saharan Africa (Jackson, 
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2002). Women living in these circumstances are thus extremely disempowered on a number of 
levels. One of the goals of feminism in general and feminist (bio)ethics in particular, is to make 
the voices of these women heard. The epidemics of HIV/AIDS and of sexual domination of men 
over women are paralleled and exacerbated by another pandemic: the lack of freedom, justice 
and basic human rights within male-female relationships and within larger society. The high 
incidence of HIV/AIDS among vulnerable women is not an accident; rather, it can be viewed as 
influenced by misshapen male-female relationships that violate women‟s fundamental human 
rights and that weaken moral notions typically identified as female. When ubuntu
 
(the notion that 
one is a person in relation to other people)
 
and care for one another are overshadowed by power 
and domination (Mkhize, 2004; Rakoczy, 2001), the disempowerment that women experience in 
both the public and private spheres is exacerbated. It is for these reasons and within this context 
that the current study attempts to present a re-conceptualization of women‟s autonomy within the 
real-life experiences of the women who are most affected by HIV, and who are likely to be the 
target of much of the clinical research carried out in developing countries like South Africa.  
 
1.2 Gender and the Limits of Conventional Approaches to Autonomy in Ethics and 
Bioethics 
 
The complexity of the ethical issues associated with clinical HIV/AIDS research, coupled with 
women‟s vulnerability, warrants special concern and challenges the adequacy of conventional 
informed consent procedures in the contexts described above (Wassenaar & Richter, 2000). Just 
as no facet of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is gender-neutral, no research conducted in this arena can 
be presumed to be so. However, this aspect of ethics is frequently neglected. Amid claims of 
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scientific neutrality, attempts are made to factor out the role of gender in the practice of ethics 
and research (Rosser, 1992; Wolf, 1996). As a result, the special dilemmas or requirements 
involved in research with women in developing countries are not paid the attention they deserve. 
This continues to be the case despite the unavoidable fact that women, as the pivotal axis around 
which HIV/AIDS turns, are vulnerable as a research population, and the fact that gender is 
hardly ever a neutral factor – neither in the multitude of factors that propel the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, nor in the ethics of research that is conducted in this field, the first principles of 
which remain inherently masculine (Crosthwaite, 1998; Lindemann Nelson, 2000; Sherwin, 
1996), as argued below.  
 
Adhering to the traditional ideal of “principled” autonomy in informed consent practices is 
neither sufficient nor appropriate in developing countries, for at least two reasons. Firstly, the 
majority of women in these countries are prevented from making fully autonomous decisions 
because of political, economic, social, and cultural constraints on their freedom. Even the most 
careful adherence to conventional informed consent requirements may not take into account the 
fact that, in most developing countries, women‟s choices are historically, culturally and 
structurally limited (Nyika & Wassenaar, 2006). Secondly, many non-Western cultures tend 
more towards relational concepts of self (Fagan, 2004; Guisinger & Blatt, 1994; Mkhize, 2004) 
than the isolated, independent ideal embodied within the mainstream principle of autonomy 
(Adshead, 2001; Fishbane, 2001; Tangwa, 2000). Similarly, the traditional ideal of “principled” 
autonomy is fundamentally gender- (and culture-) biased, and fails to accommodate women‟s 
conceptions of their own relational agency. Although neither the research nor the ethics of 
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research are gender-neutral, for the most part they are still developed and applied as though they 
are (Hoosain, Jewkes & Maphumulo, 1998; Mahowald, 1994; Rothenberg, 1996).  
 
The neglect of women in biomedical research has been widespread (Kass, 1998; Macklin, 1993). 
Men continue to dominate at all levels of biomedical research practice: at decision-making levels 
of international research; in the design and prioritizing of research studies; in the presentation of 
results; and as providers and recipients of research funds (Campbell & Wasco, 2000; Hoosain et 
al., 1998). Furthermore, implicit in much of the clinical research that is carried out on both men 
and women is the assumption that the application of research procedures and ethical guidelines 
during research, as well as the research findings following research, apply equally to men and 
women. Consequently, gender differences in the experience of, for example, health, illness, 
selfhood, and personal autonomy, are usually ignored (Kass, 1998). In sub-Saharan Africa,   
…it is not only HIV prevention which is failing women; access to treatment and 
initiatives to mitigate the impact of the epidemic are also failing because the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic is fuelled by existing inequalities…There is a need to highlight the importance 
of taking gender inequality seriously at all levels and addressing the resulting 
inequities…(and yet) it is apparent that „gender‟ analysis and subsequent interventions in 
Africa…have changed little over the years (Seeley, Grellier & Barnett, 2004, p. 88).  
 
In South Africa, too, much of the work published on HIV/AIDS research has been described as 
being predominantly “gender blind” (IJsselmuiden & Jewkes, 2002, p. 11; Kahn, 2001). In these 
settings, ethical principles founded on Western concepts of abstract rationality, de-personalized 
obligation, procedural autonomy, and universality may fail to protect already disempowered 
women (Richter, Wassenaar & Abdool-Karim, 2000). It is clear, then, that in research 
undertaken to address the HIV/AIDS devastation in developing countries, a gender-sensitive 
ethics must be developed and actively applied.   
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From the above discussion it is starkly evident that approaches to ethical research practice in 
developing countries cannot simply be transported from those formulated and applied in the 
developed, Western world. This would not merely be an ethical oversight but may amount to 
gender and cultural injustice and ethical malpractice and harm. Mechanical application of 
Western ethical principles in the context of clinical research in developing nations is not simply 
insensitive - it is potentially harmful and unjust. It is unjust when it fails to respect participants, 
many of whom are extremely vulnerable women living in circumstances that severely limit their 
personal autonomy as this concept is understood in the dominant Western ethical framework. 
Thus, Western researchers should consider the impact that the combined effect of an individual‟s 
gender, culture, and daily circumstances has on her or his autonomy and on her or his ability to 
make truly voluntary decisions about whether or not to participate in a clinical research study. In 
the interface between the goals of science and the unique vulnerability of poor women in 
developing countries, researchers embarking on clinical research that is fraught with ethical 
dilemmas owe potential research participants their fullest engagement with the broader struggles 
of women‟s lives and contexts (Wassenaar et al., 2005).  
 
Consequently, approaches to ethical practice applied in these contexts may need to be adapted, 
with particular emphasis on feminist, cultural and community issues. It can be argued that this 
entails meeting the ethical obligation of truly respecting individuals while actively ensuring that 
their decisions are fully autonomous within the context of their lived realities. This would require 
blurring many of the existing boundaries that are in place: boundaries between atomistic selves 
and society, between individuals and those to whom they are voluntarily or involuntarily 
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connected, between researchers and research participants, between research institutions and 
participant communities (the necessity of which is widely recognised in many non-Western, and 
especially many African cultures). Ultimately, this would involve blurring the divide between 
science and society, as well as between scientific and ethical practice. In particular, it requires 
researchers grounded primarily in principlism, the dominant approach that has governed Western 
bioethics, to considerably expand their moral horizons. Although this poses a greater challenge 
to researchers in these contexts, it should not be sacrificed for any goal of science.  
 
It has been argued thus far that conventional definitions of and approaches to informed consent 
and autonomy need to be supplemented with equivalents from feminist approaches to bioethics, 
where care and the inter-connectedness of individuals are primary concerns. The fundamental 
ethical question is not which brand of autonomy, if any, we should endorse, nor is the aim to 
replace one “type” of (male-oriented) autonomy with another. Rather, as is argued here, the 
principle of autonomy – the central tenet of ethical consent - should be subjected to both 
ontological and epistemological revision to be rendered less individualistic and more gender- and 
culture-sensitive. Thus, the aim of this study is to combine these alternative approaches with 
traditional approaches to “principled” autonomy in order to present a re-conceptualization of 
autonomy, and its implementation in informed consent procedures, that maximizes consent 
capacity, and ensures that potential participants in developing countries are assisted in making 
fully voluntary decisions that are in their own best interests. 
 
This work adds to feminist challenges to mainstream, male-dominated bioethics and its concepts. 
It aims to outline fundamental flaws in the mainstream approach, particularly when it is applied 
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uncritically to women and, more specifically, in countries different from those in which 
mainstream bioethics has been developed. This study presents alternative approaches to some 
key concepts in bioethical theory that are crucial components of the informed consent process in 
human subjects research, in an attempt to overcome some of the neglect of women in 
contemporary philosophy and the bias in underlying conceptualizations of the self. Because 
“autonomy is a key issue for the theoretical project of affirming women‟s subjectivity and 
agency” (Meyers, 2000a, p. 8) – a project that is essential in the context of much of the research 
that is currently conducted in the developing world – the current investigation focuses on the 
reconceptualization of principles of autonomy to make them more applicable to the experience of 
women. Concepts closely related to autonomy have also come under scrutiny because they 
reinforce – like self orientation - or are reinforced by – like moral orientation - notions of 
isolated and detached autonomous individuals. In other words, we should not only be asking 
what it means to respect a person (autonomy), but what it means to be a person and if they relate, 
how they relate. These are the questions that this study attempts to address: how individuals 
might approach ethical dilemmas, coming from a position of an independent, autonomous self, 
which would imply a justice approach, or from a position of a relational, connectedness self, 
implying a care approach.  
 
Essentially, a critique of these concepts entails a critique of the individualism that underscores 
the current notions of autonomy that are employed in mainstream bioethics. This individualism 
inherent in Western society has also to a large extent dictated the dominance of independent, 
individualistic concepts of the self, as opposed to the relational, interdependent self that is more 
typical of non-Western cultures and, more significantly for this study, more typical of women. 
 10 
“The individualism defined by the idea of the autonomous self reflects the value that has been 
placed on detachment in moral thinking and in self development” (Gilligan, 1990, p. 483). As 
such, the focus on individual rights and responsibilities is central to the justice moral orientation 
that has to a large extent governed ethical decision making. Using more relational concepts of 
autonomy and relational notions of the self, feminists and others have recently pitted an ethic of 
care against the dominant justice ethics – an ethic that, they claim, has more value for women 
and individuals from non-Western groups. Essentially, “the patriarchal social structures that 
relentlessly undermine women‟s autonomy must be changed, and women‟s selfhood and agency 
must be legally and culturally affirmed” (Meyers, 2000a, p. 9).  
 
By linking the concepts of autonomy, self and moral orientation together as variables, this study 
hopes to demonstrate that these concepts are so closely inter-related that transformation of one 
inevitably requires or leads to the reformation of another. Ultimately, the individualism that 
dominates these concepts in mainstream bioethics is challenged and analyzed so as to 
demonstrate the value of introducing different, more relational ways of examining the same types 
of ethical situations, by more connected, relationally autonomous selves. This will be done by 
examining the association between concepts of autonomy and relation, independent and 
interdependent selves, and the justice and the care moral orientations in a mixed race sample of 
women and men. In particular, the study will examine whether there is a distinction along the 
lines of gender between individualistic concepts of autonomy (men) and more relational forms of 
autonomy (women). This study aims, in this way, to contribute to efforts to fill the gendered gap 
between the rejection of a metaphysical individualism and the embrace of a metaphysically 
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relational conception of the self (Christman, 2004), and, in turn, more relational conceptions of 
autonomy within bioethical theory and practice.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Conventional Approaches to Autonomy in Philosophy, Ethics and Bioethics 
 
“Perhaps nothing has so exasperated me over the years as the deference given in bioethics to the 
principle of autonomy” 
(Veatch, 1996, p. 41). 
 
2.1.1 The “Four-Principles” Approach and the Principle of Autonomy 
 
The field of bioethics, which evolved from conventional philosophy, is currently one of the 
powerful forces shaping the practice of health research. Over the last three decades, bioethics has 
attracted great public and scholarly interest and has yielded considerable social influence as an 
applied discipline primarily because its efforts to ground moral theory in the real world have 
been congruent with the liberalist ideology prevailing in Western society (Chambers, 1999; 
Jennings, 1998). The dominant approach that has governed Western bioethics itself, and 
continues to be applied largely in clinical research throughout developed and developing 
countries, is known as the four-principles approach or, pejoratively, as principlism. Principlism is 
based on the idea that common morality contains sets of moral norms which include particular 
principles that are connected to models of moral responsibility and have prima facie status as 
moral principles (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). These normative moral principles are included 
in most classical ethical theories in some form, and serve as abstract starting points for reflecting 
on and resolving moral and ethical dilemmas (Beauchamp, 1999). Prominent proponents of this 
approach include Ross (1930) and Frankena (1973), while the most influential principlists in 
contemporary bioethics are Beauchamp and Childress (2001).  
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The four principles which serve as the most common ethical guides are autonomy, beneficence 
(doing good), nonmaleficence (not doing harm) and justice (fairness in distribution). The appeal 
of principlism is that it is grounded in a longstanding tradition of philosophical and ethical theory 
and makes use of the aspects of these theories that have attracted the most support (Danner-
Clouser & Gert, 1999).  Because of these foundations in philosophical thought, the normative 
ethics that has evolved into contemporary bioethics reflects the philosophical traditions initiated 
by, respectively, Immanuel Kant (1785) and John Stuart Mill (1867): Kantianism, or deontology, 
and utilitarianism (Crisp & Slote, 1997). In proposing the principle of beneficence, for instance, 
bioethical theorists acknowledge the value of Mill‟s concern with the consequences of an 
individual‟s actions for society and its members. In proposing the principle of autonomy, 
bioethical theory incorporates Kant‟s emphasis on the categorical importance of the individual 
person. The basic tenets of these two schools of thought are outlined later in this section.  
 
Despite the insistence of advocates of principlism that the four basic principles presented in their 
approach – autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice - are equally weighted 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001), within standard applications of principlism, “autonomy has 
become the default principle…the principle to be appealed to when principles conflict” (Wolpe, 
1998, p. 43). Amongst standard texts, for example, Beauchamp and Childress (2001) give 
emphasis to autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice; Gillon (1994) offers a similar 
list; Downie and Calman (1987) also emphasize autonomy and add utility; while Engelhardt 
(1996) presents respect for individual autonomy as the fundamental condition of ethics itself 
(Shildrick, 1997). The principle of autonomy owes its esteemed position at least in part to the 
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growing concern with the protection of individual human rights following the atrocities 
perpetrated by Nazi doctors during the Second World War, and the subsequent formulation of 
the Nuremberg Code (1946). The first principle of the Nuremberg Code is particularly important 
for introducing the concept of voluntary, informed consent, and has been described as absolutely 
essential in research with human subjects (Kimmel, 1996). 
 
The word autonomy is derived from the Greek: autos (self) and nomos (rule or law).
 
Autonomy 
is thus self-government or self-determination,
 
and “personal autonomy” may be defined as “self-
determination in the quite general sense of choosing how to act and to live one‟s own life” 
(Friedman, 2000b, p. 206). An individual is thus considered to have diminished autonomy if she 
or he is controlled, manipulated or coerced by others, or if she or he is in some way incapable of 
deliberating or acting on the basis of her or his desires. By appealing to the spirit of liberalism 
embodied in conventional philosophical and ethical perspectives, autonomy has thus been 
constructed and widely accepted as one of the essential – indeed, ideal - principles for recourse 
in (bio)ethical quandaries. Wolpe (1998) and Tauber (2003) provide some explanation for the 
prioritization of autonomy over other bioethical principles. As the censure of beneficence made 
way for autonomy, organic trust between patient and physician in the paternalistic era converted 
into rituals of trust (Wolpe, 1998), which were more easily expressed, applied and codified in the 
contractual procedures of informed consent. Wolpe also suggests that because autonomy is more 
frequently framed and presented as a negative right, i.e., a choice to refuse rather than a positive 
right of demanding alternatives, autonomy may actually reinforce, not corrode, the authority of 
health care professionals – they still hold the power of being the experts who filter and translate 
information to their patients.   
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Tauber (2003) argues further that as health care has evolved into a market commodity, so 
autonomous, informed patients have been turned into consumers – resulting in a somewhat 
different interpretation of patient rights and responsibility which removes the focus of critique or 
reform from the assumptions underlying health care. As in many other developed liberal nations, 
South Africa‟s democratic constitution has a marked human rights focus, emphasizing the 
primacy of individual rights, despite differing views of personhood amongst many of the diverse 
cultures in the country (Mkhize, 2004, 2005; Motsemme, 2003). Thus, it is not surprising that 
current ethical reflection and review in South Africa also place high value on autonomy, and 
upholds patients‟ and research participants‟ rights to self-determination (Henley, Benatar, 
Robertson & Ensink, 1995). Human rights discourse, while morally lauded in developing and 
developed nations, assumes individual autonomy as a prerequisite, whereas such autonomy is 
likely to be compromised or not desired in certain non-Western contexts.  
 
2.1.2 Informed Consent and the Principle of Autonomy 
 
Autonomy is also the most frequently mentioned moral principle in the literature on informed 
consent (Faden, Beauchamp & King, 1986). Informed consent is one of the critical issues in the 
ongoing debates around the ethical conduct of medical practice and biomedical research. Like 
the bioethical field in which it is applied, it has its foundations in multiple disciplines and social 
contexts, including law, moral philosophy, the health professions, and the social and behavioural 
sciences. The history of informed consent is well-documented (Katz, 1972). From the time of its 
formulation in the Nuremberg Code (1946), informed consent has remained the foundation of 
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ethical research and practice, as articulated in the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical 
Association, 1964), the Belmont Report (1979), the Guidelines of the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (1993), the UNAIDS Guidelines for HIV Vaccine Research 
(2000) and the Medical Research Council (MRC) of South Africa‟s Guidelines on Ethics for 
Medical Research: HIV Preventive Vaccine Research (2004). Inherent in both the early and more 
recent ethical guidance documents is the assumption that respect for individual autonomy is 
universally applicable and of utmost importance. This is evident in the way in which informed 
consent has been defined: an informed consent is a particular kind of autonomous choice or 
action - an autonomous authorization or an autonomous refusal by patients or research 
participants (Faden et al., 1986). 
 
Autonomy has thus achieved pride of place in applied principlism in part because it can be 
“formalized, administered and ritualized as informed consent” (Wolpe, 1998, p. 50). Respecting 
autonomy, in this conventional sense, amounts to ensuring that participants are capable of 
meeting some measure of informed consent. Thus the standard conception of autonomy tends to 
be focused quite narrowly on various criteria of the capacity for making particular decisions or 
choices, such as adequate information and understanding, sufficient competence, and freedom 
from undue inducement and explicit coercion. Beauchamp and Childress (2001), for example, 
propose that the two essential conditions for autonomy on which most theories of autonomy 
agree are liberty (freedom from controlling forces), and agency (capacity for intentional action). 
They equate voluntariness with autonomy if the former holds under the conditions of 
autonomous action, namely, the presence of adequate knowledge, the absence of psychological 
compulsion and the absence of external constraints.  
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2.1.2.1 Components of informed consent 
Definitions of informed consent (Locke, Spirduso & Silverman, 1993; Meisel & Kuczewski, 
1996; Shore, 1996) have tended to focus on the different components of informed consent: the 
conditions or criteria that must be met if consent is to be considered real, valid or informed. 
Informed consent requirements in biomedical research and practice generally include the 
following five components: 1) disclosure of all the information relevant to the treatment or 
research procedure; 2) comprehension of this information by the patient or prospective research 
participant; 3) voluntariness, or freedom from all undue pressure or coercion, of the patient or 
prospective participant; 4) competence or capacity of the patient or prospective participant to 
understand, and make decisions based on, the information provided; 5) the explicit or formal 
expression of consent, usually in written form (Benatar, 2002; Kent, 1996; Lindegger & Richter, 
2000; Meisel & Roth, 1983). However, while many recognize the importance of obtaining 
consent from patients and research participants (Lidz et al., 1983), there is considerable debate 
about whether these conditions are met in practice, whether consent can ever really be truly 
informed (Smith, 1999), and how clinicians and researchers should go about obtaining and 
guaranteeing such consent (Ubel & Lowenstein, 1999).  
 
2.1.2.2 Barriers to obtaining informed consent 
Even when there is agreement on what constitutes informed consent, the possibility of meeting 
each of the criteria identified above has been disputed by research identifying barriers to 
obtaining truly informed and truly autonomous consent. Illiteracy, language barriers, different 
explanatory models of disease, differing cultural perceptions of personhood, and limited 
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resources are among those factors identified as obstacles to obtaining informed consent (Henley 
et al., 1995). While some researchers have provided more generic overviews of the barriers to 
informed consent (Lidz et al., 1983), as well as of empirical literature on informed consent 
(Verheggen & van Wijmen, 1996), others have focused on identifying the specific factors that 
affect informed consent conditions. Some have identified the factors affecting comprehension in 
informed consent procedures (Bergler, Pennington, Metcalfe & Freis, 1980; Fitzgerald, Marotte, 
Verdier, Johnson & Pape, 2002; Sreenivasan, 2003), while others have focused more specifically 
on the disclosure of information and the impediments to comprehension and interpretation of this 
information (Ferguson, 2003; Helgesson, Ludvigsson & Gustafsson Stolt, 2005; Kent, 1996; 
Meisel & Kuczewski, 1996; Raich, Plomer & Coyne, 2005; Simon & Kodish, 2005; Stead, 
Eadie, Gordon & Angus, 2005). Studies of the information component of informed consent have 
found that, in many cases, consent falls short of being truly informed (Cassileth, Zupkis, Sutton-
Smith and March, 1980), while Faden and Beauchamp (1980) discovered that information is not 
necessarily the primary basis of “informed” consent decisions, but rather that such decisions are 
often made based on factors outside of the informed consent process. Other research has 
identified impediments to the voluntariness requirement of informed consent (Agrawal, 2003; 
Abdool-Karim, Abdool-Karim, Coovadia & Susser, 1998; Barsdorf & Wassenaar, 2005; Grisso, 
1996; Kass, Maman & Atkinson, 2005; Meisel & Roth, 1983; Sears, 2005), and to the formal, 
written consent component, where it was found that even this “signature” requirement can have 
unintended negative consequences (English, 2002; Wendler & Rackoff, 2001). These and other 
studies highlighting the flaws contaminating the informed consent process are behind the 
contention that informed consent is a complex, somewhat idealized process, with formalistic 
requirements which are almost impossible to meet (Lindegger & Richter, 2000).  
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2.1.2.3 Challenges to autonomy in informed consent: paternalism versus “mandatory 
autonomy”  
The limits of the informed consent process in meeting its ethical goal of preserving and 
protecting the rights of individuals illustrates that research ethics can no longer be conceived of 
as a set of abstract rules to be applied in the detached and “value-neutral” manner of scientific 
practice. Rather, conducting ethical research essentially amounts to conducting relationships with 
research participants – relationships that should embody respect for the dignity and welfare of 
others (Stark, 1998). The doctrine of informed consent was developed as a legal mechanism to 
guide the conduct of physicians with respect to their patients (Kaufman, 1983). Indeed, one of 
the central concerns within the ethical spotlight on medical practice and research is the informed 
consent procedure as it is played out within doctor-patient and researcher-participant 
relationships. Here, the ethical focus falls on the tension between paternalism and autonomy. 
This classic power struggle between the patient‟s right to autonomy and the physician‟s 
benevolent responsibility has been characterized in the bioethics literature as the moral conflict 
between the basic principles of autonomy and beneficence (Sherwin, 1992b). The paternalism-
autonomy tension is paralleled in biomedical research trials, where key ethical questions 
concerning how to obtain informed consent, how much information researchers are ethically 
required to provide, and the moral obligation of researchers to protect their research participants 
(reflected in the principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, and autonomy) are embodied 
in the researcher-participant relationship.  
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Opponents of the paternalistic authority of practitioners and researchers advocate autonomy as 
the alternative, arguing that patients‟ and participants‟ rights to make choices that are self-
determined, independent and free from external influence is primary (Engelhardt, 1996; Katz, 
1972; Veatch, 1995). Veatch (1995) locates the problem in the language of “consent” which, he 
argues, is too loaded with paternalistic baggage and does not adequately reflect the shift in 
biomedical research and practice towards a greater respect for the patient‟s needs and values. 
Recently, however, ethicists have begun to realize that this “mandatory autonomy” is not 
necessarily in the best interests of the patient, nor necessarily what patients themselves want. 
One study of patient participation in medical decision making found that nearly half of the 
patients interviewed preferred that the clinician make the therapeutic decision, rather than having 
to play any role in the actual treatment decisions or choices themselves (Strull, 1984). More 
recently, Schneider (1998), Tauber (1999), and Hanssen (2004) considered the question of 
whether patients really want autonomy to be fundamental in guiding the direction that bioethical 
practice should take. Regardless of how noble the ideal of patient autonomy may be, enforcing in 
practice the principle of autonomy at all costs is sometimes experienced by patients as 
abandonment (Corrigan, 2003).  
 
These arguments are supported by recent research on informed consent in clinical contexts which 
points to the limited capacity of humans for making independent, autonomous choices, and the 
relatively contextual (O‟Neill, 2000) and non-rational (Ashcroft, 2000) nature of all human 
choices. Empirical research in health care contexts indicates that patients “desire both more and 
less than autonomy” (Schneider, 1998, p.  xiii). Less, because many patients indicate that they do 
not want to be responsible for their own treatment decisions; more in that they want more of 
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what Schneider calls “personal concern” (Ibid, p.  xiii). Others have argued that the ideal of 
individualized autonomous decision-making should not be imposed on members of certain ethnic 
and religious sub-populations, who have been found to place greater value in shared communal 
and familial decision-making (Andersson, Mendes & Trevizan, 2002; Blackhall, Murphy, Frank, 
Michel & Azen, 1995; Blustein, 1993; Fagan, 2004; Kuczewski & McCruden, 2001). 
 
2.1.3 The Principle of Autonomy: Conceptual Challenges 
 
As the most frequently mentioned moral principle in the literature on informed consent (Faden et 
al., 1986), the importance of autonomy in modern moral and political philosophy cannot be 
disputed. When it comes to the conception of autonomy, however, agreement runs out. 
Autonomy has been criticized for being a catch-all term that lacks clear definition and that is 
mainly deployed for purposes of gaining approval or authorization (Mendus, 2001). The concept 
of autonomy is founded primarily on philosophical conceptions of the person. It follows from 
this that the proper application of the principle of autonomy in health care and health research 
ethics to some extent depends on an adequate understanding of its philosophical foundations. 
The application of autonomy is impeded, however, by extensive disagreement about the very 
conception of autonomy and by debates about whether it makes sense to attempt to explicate a 
single meaning of personal autonomy at all (Takala, 2001).  
 
As mentioned above, the principal philosophers associated with the concept of autonomy are 
John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant. Within these two opposing conceptions there is 
convergence in the acknowledgement of autonomy as an ideal feature of persons who are in 
 22 
some meaningful sense independent, rational and capable of self-control (Launis, 2001). The 
point at which these two philosophers diverge is in the assumptions that each makes about the 
essential conditions that enable the realization of autonomy. While Kant understood autonomy as 
freedom of will, Mill conceived of autonomy as freedom of action (McNeill, 1993). Kant (1785) 
located autonomy or free will within individuals as independent beings of unconditional value in 
and of themselves. Mill (1867), on the other hand, developed a conception of respect for the 
autonomy of others, following from his primary concern with the liberty of the individual in 
action and in thought, and with the potential restriction of this liberty by the majority in society 
which has the power to impose its values and beliefs on others. Thus, Kant equated self-
determination with reason, deeming that “to be fully autonomous is to be a fully rational agent” 
(Launis, 2001, p. 280).  In contrast, Mill‟s conception of respect for autonomy is based primarily 
on consequentialist reasoning: both human reasoning and happiness within society depend on 
each person being allowed to act on his or her own opinion of what is right (Gauthier, 2001). 
This is where the conflict between, for instance, the principles of autonomy and justice arises in 
contemporary bioethical debates. Because of this conceptual uncertainty, it is evident that the 
concept of autonomy should be subjected to critical, sustained analysis and review. 
 
Although the principle of autonomy has perhaps been the most important concept within 
bioethics, it is no longer commonly accepted that personal autonomy should be considered an 
absolute value (Brody, 1998; Frank, 2000; Levine, 1991). Autonomy is also no longer 
considered to be a sufficient criterion of care and protection, either in ethical practice or as an 
ethical ideal (Schneider, 1998) and many have argued that the autonomy model is currently in 
crisis (Elliott, 1999; Shildrick, 1997).  
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…autonomy is inadequate, by itself, to account for medicine‟s moral calling because of             
two failings. First, from the patient‟s perspective, the notion of autonomy is frequently 
distorted in the clinical setting…Second, autonomy as a construct cannot account for the 
ethical responsibilities of the care giver (Tauber, 2003, p. 486).  
 
Even those who put forward a “principled” approach to autonomy now acknowledge a tendency 
to overemphasize, overextend and overweight respect for autonomy (Childress, 2001). Indeed, 
the most influential proponents of principlism contend that they have always aimed “to construct 
a conception of respect for autonomy that is not excessively individualistic, not excessively 
focused on reason, and not unduly legalistic” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 57). They have 
thus contested criticisms of the principlist approach by arguing that their critics, among them 
many feminist scholars, have misinterpreted their theory – a response that many believe to be 
dismissive in neither addressing the issues raised nor assuaging critics‟ concerns (Ells, 2001). 
Although they argue that autonomy does and should not take precedence over the other three 
principles in the ethical framework, there are nonetheless fundamental problems with the 
mechanism that they, and many others, invoke to denote autonomy in health care and research 
settings – the informed consent paradigm.  
 
Feminists challenge this conceptualization of autonomy as it is invoked in most bioethics 
discussions. Autonomy, they argue, is too often equated with agency (the making of a choice) 
(Sherwin, 1998b), and,    
when autonomy is the answer, the question is largely limited to asking whether the 
person has decided freely. Autonomy counsels us not to ask if the decision was wise, or 
even good in the short run for the person making it (Murray, 1994, p. 32).  
 
Furthermore, both the theoretical conception of autonomy and the application of this principle in 
the informed consent process are founded on Western ideals of liberty and individual rights, with 
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little cognizance of the ontological implications and omissions inherent in this approach.
1
 
“Traditional views of autonomy involve a vision of personhood which is both separate from 
others and hierarchical” (Adshead, 2001, p. 141). Bioethics has thus played a significant part in 
the social construction of the autonomous person. Notions of personhood cannot be separated 
from their significance in (bio)ethical conceptions and applications. This, in turn, points to the 
largely unacknowledged influence of relationships in the lives and experiences of all individuals 
– relationships that, if acknowledged at all, are usually treated as confounding variables in the 
research process (Blustein, 1993; Goldberg, 2003; Jennings, 1993; Kegley, 1999), and as a 
negative influence on the ethical conduct of such research (Callahan, 1984; Gorovitz, 1986).  
 
Notably, even proponents of the principlist approach have observed that  
there is an historical and cultural oddity about giving a standing to overriding importance 
to the autonomous individual (because) moral communities – indeed, morality itself – 
was founded at least as much on (the) other principles, and usually in a context of strong 
commitment to the public welfare (Faden et al., 1986, p. 18). 
 
This signals the need for a paradigm shift from individualistic notions of the person and personal 
autonomy to conceptions that recognize that the autonomy of individuals is fostered or hindered 
by the social contexts in which they are embedded (Kegley, 1999). While the importance of 
autonomy and informed consent should not be discounted, these concepts are in need of a 
reconceptualization that acknowledges both the individual and the social nature of persons. The 
implication is that no appropriate conceptualization of autonomy in any form can or should be 
fashioned independently of a comprehensive theory of the self.  
                                                 
1
 An in-depth critique of the Western liberal and individualistic values upon which the principle of autonomy is 
based is beyond the scope of this chapter. See, for example, Daly (1994), Fox (1990), Fox-Genovese (1991), Kekes 
(1997), Heller, Sosna and Wellbery (1986), Light and McGee (1998), Mullhall and Swift (1995), and Rasmussen 
(1990) for extensive discussions of this topic. More detailed discussions and critiques of the Western liberal and 
individualistic values upon which the principle of autonomy is based are also explored in sections two and three of 
this literature review. 
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Benatar (2002) asserts that those who undertake research in developing world countries have an 
ethical obligation to actively understand their participants, including the impact of poverty and of 
deep-rooted power and gender inequalities; cultural understandings and experiences of selfhood; 
and the social, cultural, and familial contexts in which participants are embedded. These 
considerations, Benatar maintains, can help researchers to understand the complexities involved 
in obtaining informed consent in these contexts. He emphasizes, moreover, that debates to 
understand and resolve these issues should not be undertaken solely within industrialized 
countries, but that “the inclusion of scholars and others from diverse societies will enable all to 
see themselves and what they value in a clearer light” (Benatar, 2002, p. 1138). By emphasizing 
dialogical morality and an ethic of care within a matrix of relatedness (Tangwa, 1996), both 
African and feminist ethicists make their primary focus the respect and preservation of 
interpersonal relationships - both in the daily, lived experiences of participants and in the 
research process itself. In contrast to conventional applications of ethics, what is needed to 
address the ethical complexities of research in developing countries is an approach to bioethics 
where the primacy of care, justice, and relatedness in women‟s experiences of their own 
autonomy is recognized and respected. Feminist bioethics is such an approach. 
 
2.1.4 The Principle of Autonomy: Challenges Posed by Contemporary Ethical Issues 
 
It has been argued that the conceptual analytic method that distinguishes bioethics does not 
provide workable solutions in real-world ethical decision-making: there is such a gap between 
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conventional bioethics and what is actually taking place in clinical settings
2
 that one cannot 
simply accept applied moral philosophy as medical ethics (Hedgecoe, 2004). Ethical decision 
making is a complex process. Advances in medical research are presenting bioethics with 
situations where applying the right principle from among those available is grossly insufficient.  
The individualistic paradigm of respect for autonomy is problematic in research and clinical 
reality – not only are patients and research participants encumbered with family and other social 
responsibilities; clinicians and researchers are also linked in complex institutional networks 
(O‟Neill, 2002).  
 
An extension of this is “the difficulty physicians have in moving beyond individual clinical 
decisions to an understanding of the collective consequences of those decisions, and…the 
complex and powerful set of social relations that shape decisions when they are made” 
(Zussman, 1997, p. 183). Moreover, relying on respect for autonomy that has essentially been 
reduced to respect for informed consent requirements, limits personal autonomy in clinical 
settings to freedom to refuse what others offer (O‟Neill, 2002). In bioethical theory, the principle 
of autonomy may be an ideal central value; in practice, adherence to this principle at the expense 
of others may fail to give sufficient guidance in ethically complex situations, where there are 
many potential resolutions and potentially no solutions. While respect for persons, doing good, 
protecting justice and avoiding harm may not be far from our minds when approaching ethical 
problems, these principles are not necessarily the best or most appropriate means of resolving all 
bioethical dilemmas (Harris, 2003).  
                                                 
2
 It is acknowledged that clinical settings and research settings are not equivalent, nor are ethical practices within 
each of these contexts necessarily interchangeable. However, for the purposes of this study, examples of applied 
ethics in both of these settings were included in the discussion to demonstrate the problems associated with applying 
traditional notions of principled autonomy in clinical as well as in research contexts.  
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In clinical practice, there are many examples of where informed consent and rigid attempts to 
uphold individual autonomy fail. Ethically complex problems posed by termination of treatment 
dilemmas (Bedell & Delbanco, 1984; Hanson, Danis, Mutan & Keenan, 1984; Jayes, 
Zimmerman, Wagner, Draper & Knaus, 1993; Wren & Brody, 1992), issues arising in adult 
intensive care units (Zussman, 1992), and in both general medicine and general surgery (Lidz et 
al., 1983) are just some of the situations in which adherence to principles of autonomy offer 
limited options for adequate ethical resolution. Many informed consent applications are 
extraordinarily complex – how, for example, one speaks for an unborn child, or a comatose 
patient – and yet, the principles of informed consent remain remarkably straightforward and 
simple (Zussman, 1997). Similar failures of applications of autonomy in informed consent have 
been reported in research settings, examples of which are explored in the following discussion. 
 
The current crisis of the autonomy model is intensified by new initiatives in research that are 
challenging the dominance of standard notions of autonomy in biomedical ethics. Ethical 
considerations around the technological advances in genetic medicine, for example, are 
according greater value to the principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice, and 
necessitating a re-evaluation of autonomy in relation to these competing ethical principles 
(Green, 1999). The main reason for this is that genes transcend individuals and genetic medicine 
and research are likely to have an impact on persons other than the patient or research 
participant. “By definition, human genetics pertains to relatedness rather than separateness” 
(Mullen, 1995 in Green, 1999, p. 64). For example, the right to autonomy and autonomous 
choices for all individuals is contested by arguments justifying legal authorization of compulsory 
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participation in genetic screening and counselling programmes. Such arguments are based on the 
premise that it is the duty of society to minimize the risk of unambiguous harm to individuals 
who may be unable to protect themselves (Jonsen, Veatch & Walters, 1998) – a premise that 
espouses and upholds the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence over the principle of 
respect for autonomy. The conflict between ethical principles is further highlighted in cases 
where individuals refuse to give (voluntary) consent for the disclosure of genetic screening 
results to relatives who may be at risk for developing the disease.  
 
Another area where the primacy of autonomy is currently attenuated is in the unique ethical 
issues generated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. An unprecedented, ethically-justified compromise 
of individual autonomy and confidentiality, for example, is demonstrated by the obligation of 
health professionals to inform identifiable partners of an HIV-positive person‟s test results if the 
latter is unwilling to disclose his or her status autonomously (Barrett, 2000; HPCSA, 2002; 
Shalowitz & Miller, 2005). HIV/AIDS research has also highlighted the inadequacies and 
insensitivity of conventional approaches to informed consent – and its procedural respect for 
autonomy – in developing countries (Lindegger & Richter, 2000).  
 
The limitations of principlism are further exposed by issues relating to organ trade and genetic 
manipulation. Callahan (2003) proposes that, in these situations, principlism cannot offer clear 
solutions that weigh up harms to individuals, to society, to the greater good, to future 
generations, against benefits to the individual in the immediate present, and argues that these are 
examples of where a communitarian perspective might offer more effective recourse. Similarly, 
deference to autonomy at the expense of alternative approaches has faced serious moral 
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objections which prove the insufficiency of the principle of autonomy in ethical challenges 
presented by resource allocation (Veatch, 1996) and by egg donation (O‟Neill, 2002). Gaylin 
(1996), too, presents a powerful argument against a rigid defense of autonomy, which  
is dangerous not just because it preempts other values such as justice and virtue, but also 
because it interferes with more sophisticated concepts of freedom. It is hard to imagine a 
paranoid schizophrenic living in the streets of New York, any more than a drug addict as 
being a „free agent‟ (Gaylin, 1996, p. 45). 
 
 
The ethical issues accompanying the development of new reproductive technologies are another 
critical arena highlighting the limitations of conventional applications of autonomy principles. 
Not only are genetic counselling, in-vitro fertilization and abortion redefining the meaning of 
motherhood and the moral value of mother-and-child, they are also necessitating the 
reexamination and reformation of biomedical ethics and its principles. Strict adherence to 
principles of individual autonomy frames ethical issues in the contested domain of abortion as 
conflict between maternal and foetal rights, a conceptualization which offers little guidance in 
reality. When maternal rights are pitted against the rights of the foetus, the problem becomes one 
of competition in which either the mother or the child wins. And, most often, the foetus takes 
precedence, rendering the pregnant woman virtually invisible (Sherwin, 1992b). If the frame of 
guidance is expanded from principles of autonomy to moral conceptions of personhood, to the 
relational space that mother and foetus share, the lens of ethical guidance shifts from  two 
independent beings whose moral claims are in opposition to one another, to the relationship 
between the foetus and the woman (Gibson, 2004).  
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Harris (2000) explores the limitations of conflict- and principle-based perinatal ethics and 
proposes an alternative model of pregnancy. Here, too, the focus is shifted from the mutually 
exclusive needs of the pregnant woman and her foetus, to their mutual needs. This model also  
avoids many of the pitfalls of traditional ethical formulations - their tendency to neglect 
gender-specific models of moral reasoning, their implicit assumptions that application of 
universal principles of autonomy and beneficence results in objective ethical solutions, 
and their failure to account for the ways that projecting foetal needs perpetuates social 
inequalities (Harris, 2000, p. 786).  
 
This view is shared by other theorists who argue that traditional enactments of autonomy neglect 
the vital importance of relationships, as well as the woman‟s own embodied experience and 
knowledge of her pregnancy (Goldberg, 2003).  
 
Examination of the principle of autonomy in psychiatric settings has also called into question the 
skewed focus of conventional conceptions on personal liberty. Research with psychiatric patients 
has attended to such ethical issues as the competence of these patients to consent to research, and 
focused on ways of guaranteeing that individuals give such consent as autonomously as possible. 
Narrowing the focus to questions of autonomy has the potential to ignore the broader 
circumstances of these potential participants and, at worst, denies their suffering or places 
responsibility for the suffering solely on the „autonomous‟ sufferers (Martin, 2001). Fisher 
(2003) also points out the inadequacy of the autonomy model in research involving adults with 
mental retardation and developmental disabilities. After reviewing the current theory and 
research on informed consent policies in such research settings, she argues that “adults with 
mental retardation, like all persons, are linked to others in relationships of reciprocity and 
dependency” (Fisher, 2003, p. 29). She goes on to explore how a relational ethics approach can 
counter the inadequacies of consent procedures with this vulnerable population by shifting the 
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focus away from individual autonomy to the goodness of fit between the decisional capacity of 
participants and the specific consent context (Fisher, 2003).  
 
Such challenges to the pride of place held by the principle of autonomy are paralleled in 
contemporary bioethical debates about suicide and euthanasia. One ethical view on this issue 
holds that autonomy entails individual judgements about what constitutes unbearable life, and 
should have priority over competing values; others argue that “suicide (in any form) can never be 
a rational response to the conditions of life, (and) that society‟s interest in life overrides even an 
autonomous desire to die” (Teays & Purdy, 2001, p. 373). Daniel (2001) contends that the ethical 
and legal authorization of euthanasia would sanction a view of autonomy that permits individuals 
to entreat others, including such institutions as medicine, to aid them in their pursuit of the good 
life, regardless of the potentially harmful risk that this poses to the common good. Here, again, 
the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence pose a significant challenge to the apparent 
dominance of the principle of autonomy. What each of the issues discussed above seem to 
highlight is that the ideology of autonomy as the freedom to make choices and to follow one‟s 
own preferences is potentially, with respect to the relations between individuals, inadequate (Ter 
Meulen, 2001). In the remainder of this literature review, this narrow conception of the 
autonomy ideal will be critically reviewed and a broader understanding of autonomy will be 
presented - one that recognizes how specific decisions are embedded within a complex set of 
relations, contexts and policies that constrain (or promote) an individual‟s ability to exercise 
autonomy with respect to any particular choice. As such, notions of the self and the ethical 




How does (bioethics) reconcile the clearly immense differences in the social and personal 
realities of moral life with the need to apply a universal standard to those fragments of 
experience that can foster not only comparison and evaluation but also action? 
(Kleinman, 1999, p. 70 in Hedgecoe, 2004, p. 126).  
 
 
2.1.5 An Alternative Approach: Challenges from Virtue Ethics 
 
The morality of interdependence and mutual responsibility has been clashing with respect 
for autonomy with increasing frequency and harshness for the past thirty years, and 
autonomy has won in these clashes too often. Reason does not require that autonomy be 
abandoned, only that its balance with other individual and communal values be restored 
(Gaylin & Jennings, 2003, p. 4).  
 
The findings discussed in section four above appear to give more weight to honouring the 
beneficent conduct - or paternalism - of physicians over the autonomy of patients, and are more 
consistent with the virtue-based ethics that owes its initial revival to Anscombe (1958) and has 
more recently been revived by the (ethical) theories of MacIntyre (1981) and Pellegrino (1993; 
1995). It is comprehensively reviewed by, for example, Meara, Schmidt and Day (1996) and 
Oakley (2001).  
 
Pellegrino (1995) has worked to promote and strengthen the sacred relationship between 
individuals who are ill and thus vulnerable, and their physicians, who have the power to do 
enormous good and enormous harm. In his call for the restoration of virtue-based ethics, 
Pellegrino extols the importance of physicians‟ virtues such as intellectual honesty and fidelity to 
the patient as the ethical basis of the clinical encounter. According to this approach, persons with 
virtue exhibit generous, caring, compassionate, sympathetic, and fair actions with integrity and, 
while virtuous persons may not always make good ethical decisions, decision-making is more 
complete – and arguably more ethical - if virtues and moral motives are included in bioethical 
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practice. Pellegrino acknowledges and addresses one of the main criticisms of virtue ethics – its 
circular logic. To break the cycle of defining virtue as “that which the virtuous person does and 
the virtuous person as one who acts virtuously…the concept of virtue must be defined in terms of 
some good, some telos, which the agent intends and acts to attain” (Pellegrino, 1995, p. 274).  
 
Although virtue ethics also has its roots in early philosophical traditions – primarily in the works 
of Aristotle (384-322BC/1953) – its virtual absence in contemporary bioethical theory is partly a 
consequence of the culmination of the theories of Kant and Mill in moral philosophy 
(Schneewind, 1997). One of the primary aims of virtue theorists, therefore, is to restore virtues to 
their rightful place in ethical theory and practice – a goal clearly articulated by virtue theorist 
Foot, who maintains that “a sound moral philosophy should start from a theory of virtues and 
vices” (Foot, 1978, p. xi). Others suggest that principlist ethics and virtue ethics are 
complementary approaches that, if integrated, could provide a coherent framework for enhancing 
the ethical competence of health professionals, and for augmenting public trust in the character 
and actions of these professionals and their profession (Meara et al., 1996). However, one of 
weaknesses of the new virtue ethics is that it is under-developed in the contemporary literature as 
a result of its focus on criticizing the traditions to which it is opposed, rather than stating 
positively and precisely what its own alternative is (Louden, 1997). This deficit notwithstanding, 
one of the most significant virtues of virtue ethics is that it shifts the focus from autonomy-based, 
contractual relationships to trust-based, covenantal ones (Pellegrino, 1995).  
 
While principled ethics could be described as “obligatory,” virtue ethics encompass the “ideal” – 
one approach complements the other (Meara et al., 1996). Advocates of the virtue approach thus 
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acknowledge that it cannot operate as a stand alone normative ethic, but should be conceptually 
integrated with other ethical theories to offer comprehensive ethical guidance in the health 
professions. The value that virtue ethics brings to conventional theories like principlism is its 
foundation in community narratives – a contribution which, coupled with its focus on covenantal 
relationships, is particularly helpful in offering ethical guidance in multicultural settings (Meara 
et al., 1996).  
The virtues of principlism are clarity, simplicity, and (to some extent), universality…But 
the vices of this approach are the converse of its virtues: neglect of emotional and 
personal factors, oversimplification of the issues, and excessive claims to universality. 
Virtue ethics offers a complementary approach, providing insights into moral character, 
offering a blend of reason and emotion, and paying attention to the context of decisions 
(Campbell, 2003, p. 292). 
  
There is recourse, perhaps, in taking what is of value in the emphasis of virtue ethics – which, 
notably, is also essentially individualistic - on the virtuous clinician or researcher, and extending 
this to an emphasis instead on virtuous relationships. Intrinsic to health care ethics is Kant‟s 
philosophy that individuals are rational beings whose autonomous decisions should be treated as 
sovereign. However, Ter Meulen (2001) contends that less emphasis should be placed on 
autonomy and more on moral virtues within relationships. As they are treated in ethical practice, 
says Ter Meulen, the relationships between patients and healthcare professionals, and between 
researchers and research participants, are predominantly contractual - defined in terms of rights 
and allowing no room for such virtues as solidarity and personal involvement. If, however, one 
shifts one‟s notions of personhood in bioethics from atomistic conceptions of persons to more 
relational constructs, then principles like autonomy become part of a wider morality of 
relationship and care, where ethics of relationship and ethics of responsibility are better balanced 
and bioethical practice is better served by an integration of the two (Tauber, 2003).  
 35 
 
In their discussions of the failure of autonomy as both a reality and an ideal, therefore, many 
theorists – virtue ethicists among them - appear to be moving in the direction of the feminist 
ethic of care, while not explicitly offering any of the clear alternatives to autonomy that many of 
the feminist approaches to ethics and bioethics seem equipped to offer. (See section three for a 
detailed discussion of ethic of care versus ethics of justice). From the above discussion, it is 
evident that the four principles approach is coming under increasingly critical scrutiny - from 
inside and out - and that this dominant theoretical framework could benefit from exploring 
alternative approaches such as feminist ethics, especially as it moves out beyond its Western 
borders and is applied in clinical research in developing countries, and to vulnerable populations 
within these contexts, where both the numbers and the marginalization of vulnerable persons 
increase proportionately. This requires more than simply presenting the alternatives, but also 
integrating them into the framework of bioethics (Crosthwaite, 1998) to produce viable 
theoretical positions for exporting into the field, applying them in the contexts where they matter 
most.  
The task for those who believe that autonomy is an important but not all-important 
response to the moral conundrums we face, is to show what we leave out when we frame 
our moral and social world in such constrained terms (Murray, 1994, p. 32).  
 
This task has been taken up by feminist theorists who, in their efforts to reconceptualize the 






2.1.6 Contextual Implications for Researchers 
 
In South Africa, many persons, particularly women, may be prevented from making autonomous 
choices (in the traditional sense of autonomy) because of political, economic, social, emotional, 
and cultural constraints on their freedom (Jobson, 2005; Mills et al., 2006; Sideris, 2005; 
Wassenaar et al., 2005). Women are more at risk for contracting HIV for several reasons – 
physiological factors, as well as other gendered, social norms and cultural practices. These 
include the accepted dominant role of the male in African cultures and the power of husbands 
over their wives in the marital relationship; attitudes that condone male promiscuity before and 
after marriage; and the belief that men should control the sexual encounter (Rakoczy, 2001; 
Wingwood & Diclemente, 2000). These circumstances leave women with very little personal 
autonomy over their sexual relationships, where they cannot negotiate safe sex or fidelity 
(Leclerc-Madlala, 2000; Martin & Curtis, 2004; Memela, 2005), and over decisions concerning 
their own bodies. The explicit and implicit expectation within many cultures (in South Africa) is 
that women must be socially and economically dependent on men, establishing the ownership of 
women by men and further decreasing their freedom. The burden of impact of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic also extends to those women who are not infected. Women are responsible for caring 
for the sick and dying, for orphans left behind – a burden often accompanied with the financial 
burden of these consequences. Indeed, it is the cycle of poverty that entrenches these norms and 
practices deeply within these communities. 
 
Women‟s lower status, the poverty that they live in and with, and their economic 
disenfranchisement, all have a major impact on their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS (Dunkle et al., 
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2004; Kahn, 2001; Mills et al., 2006). Women living in these circumstances are thus 
disempowered on a number of levels. One of the goals of feminism in general and feminist 
(bio)ethics in particular, is to make the voices of these women heard. It is for these reasons and 
within this context that the present study contextualizes the re-conceptualization of women‟s 
autonomy within these daily lived experiences of the women who are most affected by the virus, 
and who are likely to be the target of much of the clinical research that is carried out in 
developing countries such as South Africa. It is clear, then, that gender is a primary issue, and 
not one that should only be considered as an afterthought to the scientific concerns of such 
research.    
 
Thus, while autonomy should not be abandoned, it is only part of the story, and needs to be 
modified to include (women‟s) “stories about how we are to live together, and how we are to 
make families and communities that support the growth of love, enduring loyalties and 
compassion” (Murray, 1994, p. 33). The same argument applies to culture, and to the tendency to 
perceive one culture‟s worldview as superior to another. This is reflected in the domination of 
Western “independent” notions of self versus the interdependent views of personhood that are 
adopted in many non-Western cultures. In many developing countries, and in South Africa in 
particular, there are cultures with differing worldviews from those of the First World values of 
independence from which individualistic conceptions of autonomy arise. Thus, while feminist 
voices can help us to focus on women‟s unique experiences of agency, feminist (bio)ethics can 
also facilitate the adoption of a critical perspective when attempting to mould principles of 




The ethical issues associated with clinical research and especially with HIV/AIDS research, are 
as vast as they are complex. This, coupled with women‟s vulnerability, warrants special concern 
and challenges the adequacy of conventional informed consent procedures to the ethics of 
clinical vaccine trials (Mills et al., 2006; Wassenaar & Richter, 2000; Wassenaar et al., 2005). In 
these settings, ethical principles that are founded on (Western) concepts of abstract rationality, 
de-personalized obligation, procedural autonomy, and universality, may act to exploit, rather 
than exploit already disempowered women (Richter et al., 2000). “Trials, and in this instance, 
HIV vaccine trials, need to recognize that women‟s autonomy is historically compromised, 
requiring that a gender-sensitive ethics must be developed and actively applied” (Wassenaar & 
Richter, 2000, p. 7). In contrast to conventional applications the principles and procedures of 
informed consent in clinical research, what may be needed to address the ethical complexities of 
such research in developing countries - and in South Africa in particular - is a feminist approach 
to bioethics, where the primacy of care, justice, and relatedness in women‟s experiences of their 
own agency is recognized and respected. Towards this end, this study attempts to supplement 
and integrate conventional approaches to the principle of autonomy in informed consent with 
conceptual equivalents from feminist ethics.  Both feminist and African ethics emphasize 
dialogical morality and an ethic of care within a matrix of relatedness (Tangwa, 1996), making 
their primary focus the respect and preservation of interpersonal relationships (both in daily lived 
experiences of participants and of the research process itself), rather than abstracted notions of 
individual autonomy (Bowden, 1997). 
 
This first section in this literature review has attempted to demonstrate the dominance of the 
principle of autonomy in conventional ethical approaches and, more particularly, in principlist 
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approaches to bioethics.  It has highlighted some of the problems – conceptual and practical – 
with extensive, unconscious applications of autonomy as it is typically conceived. Virtue ethics 
has been presented as the beginnings of an alternative approach to autonomy that might rectify 
some of the shortcomings in conventional principles of autonomy, particularly as applied in 
informed consent contexts. In the next section, it will be shown how feminist ethics takes up 
some of the challenges posed by the virtue ethics approach. Building on the flaws of principled 
approaches to autonomy outlined in the section above, the feminist critique presented in the next 
section will highlight the gender bias in traditional bioethical principles. Following a brief 
outline of feminist theory, the feminist critique of conventional autonomy will be discussed, with 
particular attention to the dangers of applying a principle of autonomy that is de-contextualized, 
de-gendered and detached in health care and health research contexts. In the sections that follow 
this feminist critique, reformulations of concepts that are inextricable from the theoretical project 
of reconceptualizing autonomy will be presented. The reconceptualization of autonomy to 
include notions of relation and care will be explored further in the empirical chapters of this 
work, where the gendered association between the variables of autonomy and relation, 
independent and interdependent selves, and justice and care moral orientations will be examined.             
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2.2 Feminist Critiques of Traditional Bioethics and the Principlist Approach to Autonomy 
 
“And if I am for myself alone, what then am I?” 
(Hillel, n.d., I:14). 
 
 
Feminist bioethicists argue that the patriarchal character of the philosophical tradition on which 
bioethics is founded has produced a gender bias in ethical and bioethical theorizing that remains 
largely unacknowledged. Despite the fact that the philosophical, medical and (bio)ethical 
disciplines have been predominantly male-focused and sometimes misogynist (Crosthwaite, 
1998; Holmes, 1999; Kourany, 1998; Little, 1999; Mendus, 1996; Rawlinson, 2001; Sherwin, 
1996; Shildrick, 1997; Warren, 1992), bioethical principles and debate are usually assumed to be 
“uncontaminated by such contingencies as gender” (Crosthwaite, 1998, p. 32). This selective 
focus has narrowed the understanding of human nature and the scope of what constitutes a moral 
or ethical problem (Calhoun, 1988). The reliance of the principlist conception of autonomy on 
these ideologies may have resulted in the widely held and practiced belief that resolving ethical 
problems involves respecting autonomy, usually at the expense of other equally valuable 
considerations such as relatedness and interdependency (Ells, 2001). It is not hard to see how 
women have been ill served by the mainstream philosophical and ethical traditions. Of particular 
significance is that Western ethics has added, to the exclusion of women as moral agents, 
conditions for achieving agency – such as rationality and disembodied abstraction (Shildrick, 
1997) - that are characteristically masculine. This neglect has attracted much criticism from 
feminist schools of thought, which are united by their aim to reveal how women have been 
excluded, neglected and maltreated by the theories and practices of the dominant, and frequently 
androcentric, Western tradition.   
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2.2.1 Feminist Theory  
 
“…it is simply too unwieldy to try on every pair of feminist lenses available in an effort to try 
and get yet a better focus on a particular bioethical issue” (Tong, 1996, p. 74).  The feminist 
approach adopted in this thesis, therefore, is an eclectic one, drawing on values, assumptions and 
methodologies that are associated with a wide variety of feminist theories rather than adhering 
exclusively to one particular position. What all of these approaches share is a concern with 
reassessing, reinterpreting and transforming many of the traditional Western principles in order 
to critically reflect women‟s as well as men‟s perspectives and experiences. This concern stems 
from one of the most significant aspects of feminist theory: the assertion that the social structures 
according to which we live are essentially male-centered, male-dominated and male-oriented, to 
the exclusion of female viewpoints and participation.  
 
In contrast, feminism asserts that the perspective of women is valuable and in many ways distinct 
from the dominant male perspective. Feminist approaches to ethics thus seek to articulate moral 
critiques of actions and practices that perpetuate the subordination of women and other 
disempowered groups (Jagger, 1992; Tong, 1997). While traditional ethics takes abstract first 
principles as its starting point in ethical reflection, feminist ethics begin with women‟s 
experiences and move inductively from there to drawing conclusions and formulating guidance 
for ethical practice (Jakobsen, 1999). Feminist scholars thus present not only clarification of 
feminist goals and principles, but also work towards influencing predominantly androcentric 
research practices in the humanities and social sciences (Campbell & Wasco, 2000).    
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Feminist theory does not constitute one single perspective. Rather, the particularities and 
„difference‟ with which the theory is concerned characterizes the theory itself: it embraces a 
variety of different disciplines, different political agendas, and different racial, cultural and 
gendered interpretations of experience.
3
 Ontological and epistemological revision are central 
themes in all forms of feminist thought and action (Code, Mullett & Overall, 1988). Feminist 
bioethics also seeks to identify the implicit effects of gender inequalities and power imbalances 
in bioethical discourse and bioethical practices, bringing principles of autonomy and justice, and 
notions of obligation and responsibility, for example, under critical review (Little, 1999; Martin, 
2001; Wolf, 1996). This includes advocating the formulation of more relational reconceptions of 
major ethical and bioethical ideals, concepts and principles that are cognizant and respectful of 
the experiences of women and others who have traditionally been excluded.
4
 The value of this 
epistemological position is that it allows the conventional adherence to and practice of principled 
autonomy to be critically reviewed and contextualized from a distinctive perspective.  
 
2.2.2 Feminist Critiques of Conventional Autonomy 
 
Broadly speaking, feminist critiques of autonomy have been articulated in two different phases. 
Early feminist theorists, like their contemporary philosophers and ethicists, took up the concept 
of autonomy as a fundamental right to which all humans are entitled. Autonomy, these feminists 
argued, is an ideal that both men and women should have equal opportunity to realize. However, 
                                                 
3
 For a comprehensive overview of the varied feminist theories, ideologies, and epistemologies, see, for example, 
Brabeck and Ting (2000), Campbell and Wasco (2000), Code, Mullett and Overall (1988), Harrison (1985), Jagger 
(1988, 1992), Kourany (1998), and Tong (1989) for more thorough treatments of feminist theory, particularly as 
they pertain to philosophy. 
4
 Reviews and summaries of distinctive feminist approaches to ethics and bioethics can be found in, for example, 
Cole and Coultrap-McQuin (1992), Donchin and Purdy (1999), Fricker and Hornsby (2000), Rawlinson (2001), 
Sherwin (1992a, 1996), Shildrick (1997), Tong (1997), and Wolf (1996). 
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feminists recognized that women were not in a position in society where they could claim their 
right to autonomy. These early critiques of autonomy thus argued for the total emancipation of 
women from economic, social, political and psychological subordination (see, for example, Hill, 
1975). In a second phase of feminism during the 1980s and 1990s, however, feminists began to 
be concerned with the very ideal of autonomy as it was conceptualized in the philosophical 
mainstream (Friedman, 2000b), many arguing that it was fundamentally masculine. In 
challenging this gender bias, some feminists have explored how the ethical principles of 
mainstream ethics might attend to gender (Cook, 1994; Macklin, 1993). Others have gone 
further, investigating how these principles could be revised or reconceptualized to remove this 
gender bias and include the experiences of women (Held, 1998; Nedelsky, 1989; Okin, 1989; 
Young, 1990). Feminist bioethics thus poses a challenge to mainstream (Western) bioethics by 
exposing the masculine character of the generic subject it presupposes and of its supposedly 
gender-neutral subjects.  
 
In the following sections, the feminist argument against conventional bioethics and principled 
autonomy will be discussed, highlighting in particular the shortcomings of the principlist 
approach with respect to gender, relationships and context. Using examples from biomedical 
ethics, feminist bioethicists attempt to show how principlism fails women by paying insufficient 
critical attention to the influence of patriarchal structures and power dynamics on its ontological 
and epistemological underpinnings.  
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2.2.2.1 Principled autonomy and (the neglect of) gender 
There is considerable variation in how autonomy has been defined from study to study 
(Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986), which may account for the discrepancies in investigations into 
gender differences in autonomy. While some studies have suggested that men and women do not 
differ significantly in their experience of autonomy (Anderson, Worthington, Anderson & 
Jennings, 1994; McChrystal, 1994), others have found evidence in support of the theories that 
women value relatedness over autonomy (Jordan, 1984 in McChrystal, 1994; Surrey, 1991) and, 
as such, exhibit significant differences compared to men in terms of their experience of 
autonomy (Bekker, 1993; Miller, 1986, 1990). It has been argued that the duality in Western 
thought perpetuates the perceived differences between men and women, thereby downplaying 
differences within groups (beta bias) and overestimating differences between them (alpha bias) 
(Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1986, 1987, 1988; Stewart & McDermott, 2004), which has led in turn 
to a number of studies which have focused on the diversity within groups (Ewing, 1990; Killen, 
1997; Mines, 1988; Sinha & Tripathi, 1994; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994).  
 
However, in response to findings that have found a greater desire for autonomy in women than in 
men (Fleming, 2005; Lamborn & Steinberg, 1993), feminists are among those who point to the 
role of context in determining these results. While some have suggested that the women‟s 
movement and changing gender roles in society have contributed to the greater value that women 
appear to place on autonomy (Anderson et al., 1994; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Eagly, Mladinic & 
Otto, 1991; Gerson, 2002; Labott, Martin, Eason & Berkey, 1991), others have argued that 
societal pressure places women in a conflicted position, forcing them to deny their gendered 
tendency toward relatedness by exhibiting greater levels of autonomy (Catina, Boyadjieva & 
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Bergner, 1996; Layton, 2004). This has generally been defined as a negative experience for 
women (Lamborn & Steinberg, 1993) and may account for other instances of psychological 
effects on women, such as the development of eating disorders (Mensinger, 2005; Steiner-Adair, 
1990). It also draws attention to the importance of sociocultural context in shaping autonomy, 
which has been the focus of a number of studies (Catina et al., 1996; Collins, 1990; Henderson, 
1997; Joseph, 1991; Ma & Schoeneman, 1997).  
 
While bioethics has concentrated its focus on issues of patient and participant autonomy, and 
power imbalances between health professionals and their clients, researchers and their research 
participants, it has paid scant attention to the impact of gender on these issues (Crosthwaite, 
1998). In addition, there is still a widely held belief that bioethics is cognizant of the gendered 
particularities of its subject matter and of its own theoretical underpinnings. Feminist charges 
against the concept of autonomy include arguments that  
it is inherently masculinist, that it is inextricably bound up with masculine character 
ideals, with assumptions about selfhood and agency that are metaphysically, 
epistemologically, and ethically problematic from a feminist perspective, and with 
political traditions that historically have been hostile to women‟s interests and freedom 
(Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, p. 3).  
 
Donchin (2001) points out that the very valorization of autonomy as a norm in bioethics is 
problematic. Standard conceptions of autonomy in ethical approaches pit interpersonal 
connection against autonomy as mutually exclusive ways of relating which, combined with the 
contractarian model and focus on individual decision-making, presents images of “bleak 
dystopian scenarios” that block out alternative ways of reconciling theory and practice (Donchin, 
2001, p. 375).  
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Shildrick (1997) has challenged the dominance of autonomy in bioethical theory and practice on 
the grounds that autonomy has been constructed as the exclusive privilege of a male subject. 
Friedman (1997) points to the role that popular culture and gender stereotyping have played in 
reinforcing the association of autonomy with men, rather than women. This, combined with the 
establishment of autonomy as an ethical ideal, implies that, compared to men, women are 
somehow deficient human beings. Others have also drawn attention to this pathologizing of 
women and minorities who do not match or aspire to the separation and independence of the 
idealized autonomous self (Fishbane, 2001). This “attenuation of the human in „man‟ is a source 
of sickness, both cultural and individual” (Rawlinson, 2001, p. 405), such that the silence on 
gender in contemporary bioethics renders the „other‟ gender – that is, women – invisible.   
 
Wolf (1996) points out that many of the quandaries that bioethics confronts – from genetic 
screening and reproductive technologies to the HIV epidemic and allocation of health resources 
– have profound implications for women. And yet, bioethics has paid little attention to gender in 
its ethical considerations. Gender has also played a large but unexamined role in research 
settings, too, according to Wolf. In the selection of research subjects, for example, there has been 
little analysis of gender equity which, in turn, underplays the systematic exclusion of women – 
particularly women of childbearing age – from AIDS research protocols that may be the only 
means of access to a promising drug – not to mention the release of these drugs without adequate 
testing of safety and efficacy in women. Wolf also argued that bioethics tends to be a 
conversation among experts about patients‟ and research subjects‟ rights – conversations in 
which patients and research participants tend to be the objects of concern rather than full 
members of the ethical conversation.  
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Feminist ethics pay careful attention to context, to the social, to the unique particularities of 
individuals and of every moral problem, and to the power imbalances that are played out in 
bioethical theory and practice.  
It follows that one of its tasks is to challenge medicine‟s androcentrism – its standing 
assumption that men are the norm for human beings – and to call attention to the ways in 
which this assumption marks women as either unimportant or pathological (Lindemann 
Nelson, 2000, p. 493).  
 
Little (1999) emphasizes the androcentrism inherent in society, and in theories and practices that 
grow out of this society, not least of which is bioethical theory – the effect is that what is 
presented as normal for all humans is actually the norm for a small, privileged group of men, 
when these are in fact gendered concepts. Rawlinson (2001, p. 45), too, contests the “masculine 
marking of its supposedly generic human subject” and shows how this has been harmful to 
women, rendering them invisible and silent. As a result of feminism‟s attention to gender, key 
concepts such as respect for autonomy are afforded richer understanding as their meaning is 
extended beyond models of values that are exclusive to a privileged group of men (Lindemann 
Nelson, 2000).  
 
2.2.2.2 Principled autonomy and (the neglect of) context and relationships 
Furthermore, in its attempt to find principles that can be universally applied so as to speak of and 
for everyone, bioethics has traditionally underplayed the significance of relationships and the 
importance of context. Some have argued that, as a result of this, bioethics ultimately speaks of 
no one, for a person sans gender, sans culture, sans context, does not exist (Wolf, 1999). This 
narrow, individualistic, abstract view of people is so entrenched in bioethics that how people are 
in reality – interconnected, interdependent and often unequal – may become obscured or 
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invisible in bioethical theory and practice. The frequent neglect of the contextual aspects of 
people‟s lives in principlist ethics has been attributed to the preconception that Western society is 
typically constituted by autonomous, self-interested individuals of equal standing (Ells, 2001). In 
so doing, bioethics tends to deny the relationships upon which we, as children and as adults, are 
profoundly dependent. This narrows the problem-solving focus to that which is rational, 
impartial, abstract and individualistic so that other moral and ethical problems – those to do with 
interconnectedness, intimacy, dependence – are peripheral or invisible to the scope of issues that 
bioethics seeks to resolve (Ells, 2001). This includes being blind to women‟s experiences. 
Feminist ethics, in contrast, recognizes that even such seemingly impregnable ideals as 
objectivity and autonomy are merely products of certain ways of seeing the world; in feminist 
thought, then, re-vision is a central theme (Code et al., 1988).   
 
Donchin (1995) questions the assumption in principlist ethics that people are free to choose, and 
are thereby solely responsible for, their relationships and their actions. She argues that the central 
focus of principlist theory on voluntariness fails to recognize areas where responsibilities are 
shared, as well as the many factors that impede this voluntariness, to say nothing of situations 
where personal freedom to choose which relationships to belong to and which decisions to make 
is severely limited. Sherwin (1996) has also noted how the principled concept of autonomy has, 
in practice, often achieved effects contrary to its intended goal of guaranteeing freedom from 
oppression and exploitation, securing instead the powerful position of the privileged minority. 
Others have criticized the way in which conventional ethical principles are defined and 
interpreted, as well as the meaning and significance that is assigned to them, arguing that these 
are largely determined by a person‟s social and cultural context and may be influenced by effects 
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of power and oppression within these contexts (Hill, Glaser & Harden, 1995). Furthermore, the 
distance between researcher and research participant in current clinical research seems to reflect 
the androcentric philosophical tradition – a distance which may be more comfortable for men, 
who, it is claimed, value autonomy and independence, than for women, who value relationship 
and connection (Rosser, 1992).  
 
Not only do currently applied bioethical guidelines in research tend to assign the ontological and 
epistemological status of relationships to the corner, they also try to factor out any of the 
interpersonal processes that might “interfere” with the ethical conduct of the research and with 
the decisions of individual research participants. The reality is somewhat different: people are in 
relationships in reality – they make their decisions not as isolated individuals existing in a 
vacuum. Personhood is most often defined and experienced relationally (Bakhurst & Sypnowich, 
1995; Guisinger & Blatt, 1994; Mkhize, 2004; Tangwa, 2000) – gender, culture, context, are but 
a few of the factors that come into the decision making process. People involved in the research 
context are in relationship; research is enacted through relationships. Ethics exist because of 
relational contexts, and autonomy is developed and enacted within these contexts.  
 
There is irony in a health care or biomedical ethic that is concerned with, among other things, 
“bodily matters,” but that is curiously disembodied itself, “almost literally out of touch with lived 
experience” (Shildrick, 1997, p. 62). The disembodiment of Western bioethics is demonstrated, 
for example, in how pregnant women and their unborn children have typically been viewed as 
separate beings, with “ a conception of the fetus as an isolated, separate individual …who just 
happens to be occupying space within the body of the childbearing woman” (Donchin, 2001, p. 
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371), revealing in this one instance, the tenacious effect of bioethical norms and practices that 
largely disregard individual particularities and the contexts in which these are situated. 
Therefore, it is argued that applications of these principles in obtaining informed consent from 
research participants in developing countries, whose freedom is frequently limited, is potentially 
disempowering and harmful. If we are indeed to return to “first principles,” we should be asking 
not only what it means to respect a person, but what it means to be a person. This extends the 
principle of respect for persons to one that, in practice, truly respects research participants‟ real, 
lived experiences. In order to fully meet the ethical requirement of respect for all persons, 
researchers should be cognizant of the relationships and contexts of participants‟ lives and of the 
research process itself. This would entail recognizing the interpersonal nature of this process, 
acknowledging the relationships involved, and structuring it into consent and research 
procedures, rather than trying to deny or expunge its existence, or factor out its influence.  
 
When confronted with dilemmas in dealing with pregnant women who use illicit drugs, reject 
medical recommendations or cause fetal harm, the approach that is frequently employed in 
principled ethics is a conflict-based model. In conflict-based models, maternal rights are pitted 
against fetal rights in such a way that moral or ethical obligations owed to the pregnant woman 
are considered to conflict with those owed to their fetus. Chervenak and McCullough (1985 in 
Harris, 2000) framed these moral obligations within Beauchamp and Childress‟s (2001) 
principle-based bioethical model, showing how principles of autonomy and beneficence are seen 
to conflict in the consideration of ethical dilemmas in pregnancy. Harris (2000) highlights the 
pitfalls of conflict-based models that view autonomy and beneficence as the primary factors. She 
argues that traditional ethical approaches to these dilemmas tend to neglect gender-specific 
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modes of moral reasoning, and are based on the implicit assumption that application of universal 
principles of autonomy and beneficence results in objective ethical solutions. The limitation of 
principle-based bioethics in this instance is that its impartialist, universal approach makes it a 
clumsy tool for illuminating the moral counters of intimate relationships (Harris, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, principle-based ethics tends to neglect the broader social and political context in 
which ethical dilemmas are negotiated. By focusing on the mutually exclusive needs of pregnant 
women and their fetuses, rather than on their mutual needs, traditional conflict-based models fail 
to account for the ways that protecting fetal needs perpetuates social inequalities (Harris, 2000). 
In contrast, Harris proposes an alternative, relational model of pregnancy ethics that is cognizant 
of gender and the rights of both mother and fetus, thereby broadening the set of issues considered 
morally relevant to prenatal fetal harm.  
All things being equal, appealing to universal principles like autonomy and beneficence 
to sort out ethical dilemmas might result in objective solutions. However, as things are 
not always equal, other substantive issues must be considered (Harris, 2000, p. 790).  
 
This is particularly relevant when applying Western bioethical principles in the developing 
world, where implementation of the principle of autonomy – in this case, treating the fetus as a 
separate entity to its mother - is likely to be in conflict with a communitarian perception of the 
individual (Van Bogaert, 2006).        
 
Similarly, in ethical dilemmas faced posed by the abortion debate, traditional ethical approaches 
tend to focus almost all of their attention on the moral status of the fetus, neglecting the fact that 
the most significant moral feature of pregnancy is that it takes place in a woman‟s body, having a 
profound effect on a woman‟s life (Gibson, 2004). The Kantian focus on the moral significance 
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of the individual that is typical of principlist ethics obscures the significance of personal and 
social relationships and, as such, frames the ethics of the abortion decision in abstract, 
generalized terms. In contrast, Gibson (2004) argues that a fetus exists only in relationship with a 
particular other on whom it is entirely dependent for support; thus, the fetus is morally 
significant precisely because of that relationship, since it is out of relationships that our moral 
obligations arise. Based on this, Gibson (2004) reframes the abortion decision within a feminist 
model which shifts the focus onto the woman on whom the decision rests, while still recognizing 
the ontological and moral significance of the fetus by virtue of the relational ties between mother 
and unborn child.    
 
Another instance where respect for autonomy overlooks women is provided by Goldberg‟s 
(2003) discussion of this principle as it is applied in the perinatal relationship with birthing 
women. While acknowledging that autonomy plays a crucial role in the protection of the agency 
of birthing women in hospital settings, Goldberg argues that conventional understandings of 
autonomy, divorced as they are from relationships, do little to support the birthing woman‟s 
intuitive knowledge of her own body. By removing considerations of autonomy and informed 
consent from considerations of context, traditional ethical approaches do not acknowledge how a 
woman‟s choices are often constrained within an oppressive patriarchal framework. Such a 
framework, according to Goldberg (2003), disregards essential differences, and positions women 
– and birthing women in particular – as epistemologically absent insofar as she is capable of 
enacting her own agency. Because standard concepts of autonomy seem to suggest that decision 
making occurs in isolation of the relationships in which women are embedded, Goldberg 
 53 
contends that they offer an impoverished view of the unique experience of women with respect 
to their physical and emotional realities.  
 
Current feminist accounts of autonomy are relational or contextually embedded. These show 
how subordination constrains autonomy (Babbitt, 1993; Benhabib, 1995; Meyers, 1989); 
highlight the role of emotions in autonomous lives (Meyers, 1989; Nedelsky, 1989; Weir, 1995); 
view autonomy as an ongoing and improvisational process (Meyers, 1989, 2000b) and note how 
autonomy may be exercised in certain contexts yet deactivated in others (Friedman 1993; Meyers 
1989). From a feminist perspective, women‟s selfhood and agency can only be legally and 
socially affirmed if social policies are put in place that change those patriarchal structures that 
relentlessly undermine women‟s autonomy (Meyers, 2000a).  
 
2.2.2.3 Principled autonomy, patriarchy and power 
There is much support for refocusing thinking about autonomy: it shifts the emphasis “from 
independent self-determination towards ideals of integrity within relatedness” (Crosthwaite, 
1998, p. 37); it changes the goal from removing coercive influences to enabling positive 
empowerment (Crosthwaite, 1998); it channels the individualistic emphasis in bioethics into an 
enlightened and compassionate consciousness of people‟s sense of interdependence and 
community (Heard, 1990). Parker (2001) goes further than simply re-focusing, by rejecting both 
the liberal individual moral subject, and the communitarian embedded moral subject, in favour 
of a deliberative moral subject and arguing that it is the combination of the individual and the 
social that makes a coherent approach to the ethical possible. The integration of relatedness into 
current theories of autonomy has potential value for both men and women, as shown by studies 
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that have found that men, as well as women, seek and value interpersonal connectedness, but 
men‟s interdependence is oriented towards larger social groups while women focus on one-one 
relationships (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997; Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Baumeister and Sommer 
(1997) suggest that men‟s desire for power is not simply a way of gaining independence, but that 
men seek out power because power ties them to the person over whom power is held, thereby 
enabling a certain form of interdependence in relationship. Conversely, while women generally 
possess limited power, they do have access to the forms of power that are embedded in and 
sustained by their engagement in relationships (Carli, 1999).       
 
Feminists have also drawn attention to the potentially oppressive nature of intimate relationships, 
by considering identifying how these relationships may both facilitate and threaten the 
development and experience of autonomy.  Based on the influence that power and relational 
inequalities can have on individual autonomy, Warren (2001) recommends an alternative 
conceptualization of autonomy that is based on politically charged notions of empowerment. She 
argues that autonomy is a metaphor of power and expands on this metaphor to show how the 
personal and the political intertwine in applications of autonomy in clinical and research 
contexts, and how this can empower or disempower individuals within these contexts. 
“Empowerment asks bigger questions of the whole health delivery system than does standard 
autonomy. The empowerment model makes it easier to consider the broader social, historical, 
and political context, and to search out underlying values and interests” (Warren, 2001, p. 52). 
Revisions of the principle of autonomy that emphasize empowerment in this way are particularly 
valuable in extending ethical applications of clinical research by Western institutions to 
developing countries, where the operation of power inequalities, both in the researcher-research 
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participant relationship and in the relationships in which many women in these contexts are 
subordinated, cannot and should not be ignored. Including a discourse of empowerment in 
applications of relational notions of autonomy in research ethics would also involve being 
mindful of the broader political, social, and cultural contexts where the research is to take place 
and identifying the values and interests of all concerned. 
 
For example, in the case of abortion, conventional ethics attempts to formulate a general abstract 
rule about the relative importance of preserving life or protecting autonomy (Sherwin, 1992a). 
Whereas conventional approaches to medical ethics tend to view abortion as a moral problem, 
feminist ethics addresses the contextual influence of a society afflicted with patriarchal 
dominance relations, and views abortion as a choice embedded within women‟s lives. The 
feminist analysis thus links women‟s freedom from coercion over pregnancy to other aspects of 
women‟s relative power in society, positioning abortion within a socio-historical context that is 
sensitive to the face that male-dominated institutions have historically sought to manipulate 
women‟s sexual and reproductive lives (Sherwin, 1992a). Others have shown how, in end-of-life 
dilemmas, too, employing a principlist ethic could serve to reinforce the status quo of patriarchal 
power. Focusing particularly on the principle of autonomy, McGrath (1998) highlights the limits 
and superficiality of the abstract, rationalistic mode of reflection in principlist bioethics, arguing 
that this abstraction avoids or suppresses the evidence of how power and control are an important 
characteristic of biomedical discourse.    
 
Nedelsky (1989) also acknowledges the inexorable influence of relationships of power on 
individual autonomy and shows how this tension between autonomy and collectivity can be 
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reconciled in a relational and more context-embedded conception of autonomy. Similarly, 
Sherwin (1998b) distinguishes between the making of informed choices – agency – and being 
truly free from coercion in both the choices that are made and in the circumstances that structure 
that choice – autonomy. She proposes a relational reconceptualization of conventional notions of 
autonomy that can sufficiently absorb the complexity of making apparently un-coerced choices 
within a broader context of oppression. Towards this end, Macklin (1999 in Noring, 1999) 
proposes a relationships paradigm in ethics which is context-based, taking into account culture 
and gender, time and place, and emphasizing power, responsibilities, and historical 
considerations.  These alternatives offer particularly significant issues for consideration with 
respect to this study‟s contextual focus on research settings in developing countries. 
 
2.2.2.4 Autonomy in context 
Given the role of context discussed above, it is likely that the experience of autonomy in 
developing country contexts may be fundamentally different from autonomy as it has been 
traditionally conceived in Westernized countries. Studies that support this have found that 
cultural discrepancies exist between systems of meaning in Western and non-Western contexts 
(Neff, 2001; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). Others have shown that men and women in a range of 
societal contexts exhibit variable degrees of both autonomy and relatedness and, frequently, 
experience these in combination (Pearson et al., 1998; Turiel, 1998a, 1998b; Turiel & Wainryb, 
1994). Such studies highlight the important role that autonomy plays when conducting research 
in developed and developing world contexts, while simultaneously highlighting the necessity for 
a similar focus on relatedness.   
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In recent debates on the ethical requirements for conducting research in developing countries, the 
relationship between researchers and research participants is attracting greater attention. Benatar 
(2002) calls on researchers to recognize that they are, in most instances, from relatively 
privileged backgrounds, while many research participants are among the poorest, most exploited, 
and oppressed populations. Following this, Benatar highlights the need to be sensitive to the fact 
that those who are disadvantaged or vulnerable are unlikely to view the world through the same 
lenses as researchers from first world, developed countries or to have had experiences that are 
even remotely synonymous with Westernized notions or ideals. Autonomy-based theories tend to 
ignore the fact that people are essentially products of their social history and current 
environments. Such ontological neglect has the effect of protecting the privileges of powerful 
groups, and disempowering those who are exploited and oppressed (Sherwin, 1996).  
 
Women may place higher value than men on the centrality of relationships in their lives. It is 
likely, too, that they also participate differently in those relationships. While men develop power-
over and distance-between qualities of relationships, women work on promoting the values of 
care and mutual responsiveness within relationships (Friedman, 1998). The contrast between 
conventional notions of autonomy and feminist alternatives is clearly portrayed in the debate that 
was sparked by the announcement by a transplant team at the University of Chicago of its plans 
to transplant a hepatic lobe from a mother to her severely ill infant daughter. One opponent of the 
“unethical” procedure expressed his reservations by arguing that, “simply put, how can a parent 
be expected to make an informed, rational, free choice when asked to consider donating an organ 
to his or her dying child?” (Colen, 1989 in Elliott 1999, p. 106). The reasoning behind this and 
other reservations was that the mother‟s emotional ties and moral commitment to her daughter 
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essentially made her decision “involuntary” and not truly autonomous. Feminist critics of 
principled autonomy would argue, along with Elliott, that  
it is an odd notion of autonomy which would count emotional ties and moral 
commitments as constraints on autonomy. The idea that a parent is coerced by her love 
for and moral obligations toward her child says something about the central place the 
ethic of autonomy (and the individualism that underscores that) holds in our culture 
(Elliott, 1999, p. 106).  
 
 
In health care contexts, Dodds (2000) also shows how autonomy is frequently equated with 
informed consent and a person‟s exercise of “autonomy” is limited to choosing between the 
options with which she or he is presented. Similarly, Donchin (2000a) illustrates how, when the 
dominant, individualistic conception of autonomy is applied to ambiguous ethical cases such as 
physician-assisted suicide, it fails to reveal workable perspectives; perspectives that may only 
become clear when viewed through the lens of more relational conceptions of autonomy. 
Adshead (2001) provides further grounds for revising traditional views of autonomy to account 
for the dependency that is part of the lives of men and women alike. Conceiving of autonomy as 
embedded in the gaps and connections between people in their relationships, Adshead argues, is 
consistent with “notions of best psychological health, where mutual interdependence is seen as 
being a goal of mature development, and detached isolation in terms of self, is seen as being 
potentially pathological” (Adshead, 2001, p. 143). The individualism inherent in conventional 
conceptions of autonomy has also been criticized for the increasing alienation in contemporary 
society, where individualism and egoism is replacing the sense of community and solidarity (Ter 
Meulen, 2001).  
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Many have argued that the social is essential for the realization of autonomy. Dworkin (1988) 
developed an account of autonomy with explicit attention to the values of human connection; 
Feinberg‟s (1989) emphasis was on autonomy as self-legislation, self-reliance, self-possession, 
and yet still recognized that to be human is to be part of a community, where self-awareness 
comes from participating in existing social processes. However, these and other mainstream 
accounts of autonomy, while not entirely individualistic, are not considered sufficiently 
relational because they tend to regard social relationships as pre-requisites for, rather than an 
inherent part of, autonomy (Friedman, 1997). Accounts of autonomy should be cognizant of 
people‟s dependency, of their embeddedness in relationships, and of the relevance of both to 
ethical decision-making (Adshead, 2001).  
 
Thus, feminism is not alone in its rejection of liberal individualism and of the prevailing 
conception of autonomy that stands at the core of this theory (Fox & Swazey, 1984; Wolf, 1996). 
The contribution that a feminist approach to (bio)ethics can make is a revision of theory and 
practice that will effectively reflect the social and the individual nature of human beings 
(Donchin & Purdy, 1999; Fishbane, 2001; Fricker & Hornsby 2000). One of the main charges 
that the feminist critique has directed at traditional interpretations of autonomy is that the notion 
of the self on which these interpretations are based is unacceptably individualistic. (See, for 
example, Code, 1991; Benhabib, 1992; Friedman, 2000b; Keller, 1985; Nedelsky, 1989; 
Sherwin, 1992b). In formulating relational accounts of autonomy, therefore, feminists need to 
begin by building new models of selfhood in order to avoid the shortcomings of traditional 
approaches (Code et al., 1988; Cooke, 1999). To be an autonomous self, indeed, to “determine 
itself, a being must, at the very least, be a self” (Friedman, 2000b, p. 219). Herein lies the 
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apparent contradiction in feminist theory: the demand for respect for women‟s individual 
selfhood, and the rejection of assumptions about individual rights that suppress women‟s 
experiences and negate this respect (Nedelsky, 1989).  
 
Based on the critique above, it is evident that some of the criticisms leveled against mainstream 
autonomy have to do with the masculine and individualistic bias in ethics in general and in the 
self conceptualizations that underlie autonomy in particular. Feminists have argued above that 
women value the connectedness to others that is neglected in the principle of autonomy as it is 
conceived and applied in bioethical practice. In the next section, the androcentric and 
individualistic bias in contemporary ethics will be highlighted. The ethic of justice will be 
presented as a model of this individualistic ethics, and then contrasted with an ethic that 
emphasizes relatedness. Care ethics is an alternative that has been developed in conjunction with 
feminist calls for a more relational autonomy that is closer, they argue, to women‟s experiences. 
Care ethics has been put forward to counter the dominance of principles of rights, rationality and 
duty in the justice ethic that governs much of the guidance on resolving ethical dilemmas in, for 
example, human subjects research. The ethics of care will be described in more detail in the next 
section, and contrasted with the ethics of justice that has tended to dominate mainstream, male-
oriented bioethics. More specifically, the development of the moral orientations – justice and 
care - that form the foundations of these ethical approaches will be explored.  
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2.3 Justice versus Care: An Ethic of Individualism versus an Ethic of Connectedness, Men 
versus Women? 
 
(If  bioethics) is an indicator of the general state of American ideas, values, and beliefs, 
of our collective self-knowledge, and of our understanding of other societies and cultures, 
then there is every reason to be worried about who we are, what we have become, what 
we know, and where we are going in a greatly changed society and world.. 
(Fox & Swazey, 1984, p. 360).  
 
  
2.3.1 The Problem with Conventional Ethics: Individualism and Androcentrism 
 
The critique in the preceding section drew attention to the masculine nature of philosophical 
theories and ethical principles – the androcentric nature of contemporary bioethics. The 
dominance of the male in bioethics led to a focus on all that is individual – the individual, 
detached, rational male subject. Bioethics has a distinctly masculine nature and, as a result, its 
theories and practices have come to be largely dominated by individualism. The unconscious 
individualism of Western, American bioethics is further critiqued in the first part of this section. 
The culmination of this individualistic, androcentric focus can be clearly seen in the ethic of 
justice – a typically masculine type of ethic in its focus on individual rights, duties and 
responsibilities. Gilligan and many following her have found fault with this one-sided view and 
proposed alternative theories of morality and ethical decision making – an ethic of care. In the 
second part of this section, the ethic of justice will be contrasted with the ethic of care as further 
demonstration of the potential pitfalls of an ethic that centres solely on conventional principles of 
(individualistic) autonomy.   
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Bioethics is more than the sum of its collective medical and scientific parts; it uses biology and 
medicine as its metaphorical language and symbolic medium to deal with the beliefs, values, and 
norms that are basic to our society, its cultural tradition, and its collective conscience (Fox & 
Swazey, 1984). Bioethics is a microcosm of ideological cross-currents within contemporary 
Western liberalist society (Jennings, 1998). As such, the values of individualism that Western 
society has consistently revered – individual rights, autonomy, self-determination and contractual 
relations - have also been accorded paramount status in the theories and practices of bioethics. 
The importance that bioethics has placed on individualism has drawn it away from involvement 
in social problems, as the more socially-oriented values and ethical questions have generally 
been relegated to the perimeter of the bioethical framework (Fox, 1990). Rather than recognizing 
how social and cultural forces shape individuals from the inside and outside, bioethics tends to 
view these factors as external constraints that limit individuals and interfere with ethical 
deliberation. It was from this culture of liberal individualism that the principle of autonomy 
emerged, built on the atomistic conception of the self that Western individualism underscores. 
Many have criticized the excessive focus in bioethics on individualism (Callahan, 1980, 1984; 
Sullivan, 1982), while others have shown how the dominance of individualism has led to a 
preoccupation with autonomy in contemporary bioethics (Hoffmaster, 1992) – the “triumph of 
autonomy” (Wolpe, 1998, p. 48). Because the principle of autonomy is tied to its foundations in 
liberal philosophy, challenges to the current conception of autonomy constitute a challenge to the 
assumptions of individualism that define Western society (Graham, 2002).  
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Many have challenged the universal application of bioethical principles that are based as they are 
in a liberal individualist framework (Gordon & Paci, 1997; Jennings, 1998; Kuczewski & 
McCruden, 2001). “The centrality of autonomy in bioethics is a reflection of the importance 
modern (Western) civilization has placed on the individual” (Dyer, 1997, p.172). As a result of 
its liberalist, individualistic underpinnings, Western philosophy has evolved into a culture 
preoccupied with the self – a self that is disembodied and disembedded and essentially reflects 
only aspects of the male experience (Benhabib, 1992; Cook, 1999; Schoeneman, 1994). Dyer 
(1997) argues that the bioethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and 
justice are grounded in assumptions about the relationship of members of society to one another. 
Not only is the concept of autonomy inherently masculine it is also, by its association with 
individualism, inherently Western and a minority paradigm in relation to other societies and 
cultures throughout the world (Elliott, 2001). Similar concerns have been raised about informed 
consent, where respect for autonomy dominates, leading many to question the applicability of 
informed consent in societies that tend to emphasize relatedness rather than individualism (Alora 
& Lumitao, 2001; Benatar, 2002; Christakis, 1992; Dooley, 2001; Gasa, 1999; Tauber, 2003). 
Even in the West, there is no consensus on ethical principles (Snell, 2000), with arguments that 
the liberalism on which bioethics is based attempts to extend itself beyond reasonable limits and 
yet cannot accommodate conflicting interests (Schneider, 1998). And yet, “while there is some 
evidence emerging in the literature that a preoccupation with individualism, premised on the 
notion of a unique selfhood, is problematic, it remains, regrettably, at a superficial level” (Cook, 
1999, p. 1295).  
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The almost exclusive focus on individualistic principles in contemporary Western bioethics has 
neglected what many believe to be central to ethical conduct – relationships between individuals. 
The space that relationships are given in bioethics is primarily contractual. In reconceiving the 
principle of autonomy, the emphasis in autonomy should be shifted away from individuality and 
towards the social and relational nature of individuals, where the role of context is given 
sufficient attention (Ter Meulen, 2001). Support for this view has arisen from concerns about the 
deficiency of applications of autonomy in the contexts of, for example, advance care planning 
(Ikonomidis & Singer, 1999) and clinical rehabilitation (Jennings, 1993). Operating in an era of 
scarce resources, rehabilitation‟s social and professional goals are ill-served by unrealistic and 
inappropriate notions of autonomy and independence, which produce conflict and frustration 
rather than the empowerment and respect that are necessary for transformative healing (Jennings, 
1993). In many of these cases, bioethics has been criticized for failing to address the gap between 
theory and practice. In reality, morality and ethics exist in the intersubjective relations between 
people, where community meets individual and where it is possible to capture “both the value of 
communal life and the moral significance of the individual ethical voice” (Parker, 2001, p. 308). 
Furthermore, despite the predominantly communal values held by traditional African and South 
African communities, Western, individualistic principles seem to be permeating these societies, 
as is especially evident in the way that research is being conducted in these communities. 
Applying universal ethical guidelines and failing to recognize the importance of community 
may represent serious problems for the type of research increasingly being conducted in these 
contexts (cf., Crawley & Himmich, 2004; Diallo et al., 2005; IJsselmuiden & Faden, 1992; 
Itzhaky & York, 2000; McCullough, 2002; Molyneux, Peshu & Marsh, 2005; Molyneux, 
Wassenaar, Peshu & Marsh, 2005; Mosavel, Simon, van Stade & Buchbinder, 2005; Quinn, 
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2004; Torres, 2000; Weijer & Emanuel, 2000; Weijer, 2002) – particularly regarding ethical 
concerns central to HIV vaccine trials in the African context, where ubuntu may represent the 
only appropriate response to the pandemic and the only hope of conducting ethical clinical trials.     
 
Among the arguments against traditionally individualistic bioethics have been those that question 
the abstract, detached notion of the autonomous self – an ideal that privileges and universalizes 
that which is male, and removes the relational feminine self and qualities from the public ethical 
domain. As a result, bioethics has been criticized for its lack of attention to the role of situated 
context, of culture, of human emotions, of relationship, and of suffering, vulnerability, weakness, 
and compassion (Benhabib, 1992; Fry & Johnstone, 1994; Gaylin & Jennings, 2003; Thomasma, 
1997). This tendency in bioethics to presume gender- and cultural-neutrality may be the basis of 
the rigid and arbitrary dichotomizing of the public and the private, reason and emotion, self and 
other, mind and body, culture and nature, the abstract and the concrete (Harding, 1987c). Most of 
what Western philosophy teaches and practices is “significantly flawed…and overwhelmingly 
male-dominated” and is especially harmful to women (Kourany, 1998, p. 3). The pervasiveness 
of this ethical androcentrism in practice is evident in, for example, societal notions that doctors - 
men - cure and nurses – women – care, which has historically perpetuated the perception that 
males practice medicine while females are assigned to the more feminine healing roles (Jecker & 
Self, 1991), although this is no longer necessarily universally the case.   
 
Masculinist approaches in ethics are widely applied, despite arguments indicating how this ethic 
is harmful in many situations where appropriate ethical recourse is already a contested area. 
Parks (1999) shows how ethical androcentrism is manifest in traditional bioethics by considering 
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the case of maternal substance addiction to show how this ethic negatively affects the treatment 
of pregnant addicts. Situations such as this, when framed in a principlist framework, are treated 
as maternal-fetal conflicts. The mother and the unborn child are viewed as separate entities with 
conflicting rights and, in the case of maternal substance abuse, the rights of the fetus are given 
precedence over moral obligations owed to the pregnant woman. Feminist ethicists argue that a 
perinatal ethic based in general principles like autonomy and beneficence does not take gender 
into account, nor does it address the unique position of pregnant women (Harris, 2000), let alone 
pregnant addicts. Mahowald (1994) argues that unconscious application of allegedly gender-
neutral ethics amounts, in many circumstances, to gender injustice. Because justice or equality is 
often construed as an ethical demand to treat all individuals in the same way, women are 
traditionally treated no differently from men in areas where it is clearly neither possible nor 
ethical to do so. In reproductive genetics, infertility treatment, prenatal testing, and pregnancy 
termination, both male and female partners are considered essential to the reproductive process 
and, thus, modalities of testing, consenting, and counselling are discussed in the context of 
couples, despite the fact that none of these procedures requires participation or risk by the male 
partner (Mahowald, 1994). Women‟s reasons for making these decisions  
tend to be based on the complex set of caring relationships that each women bears to 
others…Gender justice, implemented through support for the autonomy of those most 
affected by reproductive decisions, is a means, perhaps even an indispensable means, 




2.3.2 Justice versus Care Perspectives: Men (Kohlberg) versus Women (Gilligan)  
 
2.3.2.1 An ethic of justice: Critique 
The ethical androcentrism that dominates the bioethical field is mirrored by the universal 
application of predominantly masculine models of ethics. The ethic of justice that is 
conventionally and universally applied in bioethics is based on a primarily masculine model of 
human moral development, which has justice as its ultimate goal. Traditionally, theories of 
human development have focused on male development, with the result that theories of female 
development are constructed as deviations from the norm (Yacker & Weinberg, 1990). Kohlberg 
(1969, 1976, 1981, 1984) used data from the analysis of responses given by men to hypothetical 
moral dilemmas to develop a six-stage model of moral development, based on Piaget‟s (1932, 
1965) theories of cognitive and moral development. According to Kohlberg‟s theory, individuals 
proceed through three progressive levels of moral development – pre-conventional, conventional, 
and post-conventional - with each level consisting of two stages. The highest level of moral 
functioning requires individuals to have developed the capacity for principle-based, utilitarian 
reasoning, with decisions at the final stage based on universal principles of justice, individual 
liberty and equality (Gump, Baker & Roll, 2000). Thus, Kohlberg‟s morality emphasizes 
autonomy, rules, and the equal distribution of rights and justice (Dierckx de Casterle, Roelens & 
Gastmans, 1998), and it assumes that this model is applicable universally, across gender and 
culture. And yet, Kohlberg developed his theory from research conducted exclusively on men 
and, in one of his subsequent studies, reported that most males reach a higher level of moral 
reasoning, while females tend to function at the lower stages at the conventional level (Kohlberg 
& Kramer, 1969 in Bukatko & Daehler, 1995).  
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Following Kohlberg‟s studies, many have pointed to his theory‟s neglect of “an entire domain of 
human activity, namely nurture, reproduction, love” (Benhabib, 1987, p. 160) and other human 
emotions, thereby excluding the perspective of care and failing to “give moral credit to or even 
to address many of the concerns that have historically been associated with women‟s experience” 
(Sharpe, 1992, p. 296). The only type of person that Kohlberg‟s model makes space for is one 
that has been detached from its context, rationalized, impartialized, abstracted, publicized, and 
reduced to its moral essence of autonomous justice. Based on this model, the criteria for 
autonomy in traditional ethical theories is the use of reason in an impersonal and impartial 
process to discern which principles should be followed. This ethic of strangers appears to give 
little or no weight to the importance of relationships or to the unique particularities involved in 
the current deliberative situation – the goal for ethical decision makers is, essentially, self-
governance, and the goal of ethical decisions is justice (Fry & Johnstone, 1994). Consideration 
of the interpersonal consequences of ethical decisions, according to this approach, indicates a 
lower level of moral reasoning and thus penalizes those who focus on these interpersonal 
ramifications (Gump et al., 2000).  
 
There are other crucial aspects that an ethic based on Kohlberg‟s theory neglects: its focus on 
cognition and rationality largely ignores the influence of both social and emotional experiences; 
its focus on justice implies that those qualities associated with caring, responsibility and empathy 
are antithetical to this ethic (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Dierckx de Casterle et al., 1998). 
And yet, justice is itself a “gendered concept (and) to imagine that (ethics) requires us to devise 
principles of justice is already to accept a male perspective (because)…men, much more than 
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women, value abstraction and separation” (Wolff, 1996, p. 212), as well as justice. 
Contemporary ethical theory may identify the basic general principles of ethical conduct, but it is 
only through human relationship that the individual particulars can become known (Woodward, 
1998) and it is arguably only by responding to these particularities that conduct becomes truly 
ethical.  
 
Feminists are among those levelling attacks against not only the prevailing ethic of justice, but 
against the individualism that lies at the heart of Western liberal society. The Western view that 
individuals are essentially autonomous and separate, existing ontologically, epistemologically, 
and morally prior to the collectivity may be true for men but it is not necessarily true for women 
(Baynes, 1990; Doppelt, 1990; Fox-Genovese, 1991). Incidentally, there is evidence to suggest 
that Kohlberg‟s justice perspective may not be relevant across all cultures, and in South Africa in 
particular. Ferns and Thom (2001) found that significant cultural differences exist in the stages 
of moral development of Black and White South African adolescents: like the women in 
Kohlberg‟s (1976) study, the majority of Black South African adolescents in Fern and Thom‟s 
study only reached stage four of moral development, which may be the result of the emphasis in 
their cultures‟ on interdependence and communality rather than the individualistic of 
independence and self-actualization valued in the West. Notably, too, Kohlberg‟s model on 
which justice ethics is founded has been criticized as inappropriate for application in non-
Western societies.  
 
As opposed to the maintenance of justice and individual rights that is emphasized in Western 
morality, moral processes from the African viewpoint are primarily concerned with the 
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maintenance of social unity and harmonious relationships (Mkhize, 2004; Verhoef & Michel, 
1997). This implies that not only are the gender differences in moral orientation consistent across 
cultures (Stimpson, Jensen & Neff, 2001), but that these differences may be paralleled by similar 
differences between Western and non-Western cultures. However, studies in some South African 
cultures have found that these gender differences may not extend across all cultures due to 
different socialization practices (Maqsud, 1998) or to the social injustices experienced by 
minority groups – such as women and Black people - that have resulted in a greater concern with 
justice and rights (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Knox, Fagley & Miller, 2004).   
 
If persons are regarded as atomistic, certain defensive notions of individualistic, rights-
based autonomy prevail; if a relational construction of personal identity is employed 
instead, then respect for autonomy becomes part of a wider morality of relationship and 
care. By reconfiguring trust within this latter understanding of personhood, bioethics 
better balances its concerns over choices and actions with those of relationship and 
responsibility (Tauber, 2003, p. 484). 
  
Tauber goes on to offer a trust-focused philosophical approach to harmonize the conflict between 
patient autonomy and physician beneficence.  He argues that emphasizing the relational nature of 
autonomy offers a corrective to excessive individualism‟s neglect of the social conditions 
necessary for self-determination. The ethic of care, by focusing on moral knowledge as the 
product of the mutual interdependence between individuals, may present what is needed to 
correct this severely atomistic orientation.  
 
Furthermore, the emphasis on moral obligations and contracts in the justice approach has also 
been criticized for assuming that the participants in contractual relationships as they are depicted 
in health care ethics are relatively equal in power and capacity (Peter & Morgan, 2001) – based, 
once again, on a limited view of personhood, and of the relationships and contexts that 
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individuals occupy. The values of justice and autonomy that are presupposed in current theories 
of moral development, of the self, and of ethical deliberation continue to imply that individuals 
are separate and relationships hierarchical and contractual. In contrast, the values of care and 
connection, salient in women‟s experience, present a view of the self as interdependent with 
others, and of relationships as networks of affiliation (Gilligan, 1986).  It is this ethic of care that 
is described in the following section.  
 
2.3.2.2 An ethic of care 
In 1982, Gilligan – a student of Kohlberg‟s – contested his theory of moral development, arguing 
that it was a model based on and applicable to men, at the expense of women and their 
experiences. Using women as her subjects, Gilligan used qualitative interview schedules to 
conduct her own research on moral orientation and decision-making strategies, and found that 
women proceed through different stages of moral development than those proposed by Kohlberg. 
Beginning with the level of individual survival, Gilligan‟s stages advance through selfishness to 
responsibility to self-sacrifice and, finally, to a morality of non-violence, where the conflict 
between selfishness and responsibility to self is resolved (Brabeck, 1993). In contrast to 
Kohlberg‟s ethic of justice, then, Gilligan‟s model is based on an ethic of care, where the 
emphasis on rights and personal autonomy that is emphasized in contemporary ethical theory is 
superceded by the contextual nature of relationships and the maintenance of care and connection 
within those relationships (Yacker & Weinberg, 1990). Tronto‟s (2005) four ethical elements of 
care – attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness – highlight the universal and 
the particular nature of responsible caring.  
On the one hand, it requires a determination of what caring responsibilities are in general. 
On the other hand, it requires a focus upon the particular kinds of responsibilities and 
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burdens that we might assume because of who, and where, we are situated (Tronto, 2005, 
p. 256).  
 
See Table 2.1 on page 73 for a comparison of the justice and care theories.  
 
An ethic of care thus views individuals as part of a matrix of interdependent relationships that 
affects how decisions are made, thereby introducing important dimensions into ethical discourse 
and into conceptions of principled autonomy. The rehabilitation of the feminist ethic of care is an 
important step towards constructing a conception of autonomy that is compatible with a 
relational, care-based ethical theory, and realistically acknowledging the full extent of the mutual 
interdependence of human beings (Carse & Lindemann Nelson, 1996; Kasprisin, 1996). Because 
the ethic of care regards relationships as primary, this perspective allows for unequal and 
unchosen relationships to be accorded moral significance and given due consideration which, in 
turn, re-defines moral failure as disengagement, indifference, and detachment from self and 
others (Sharpe, 1992).  
 
However, the idea of self-governance has not been deserted in the ethic of care and its emphasis 
on relational accounts of autonomy. Rather, it is the excessively individualistic account of human 
nature that lies at the heart of care ethicists‟ critiques. The emphasis on the relational nature of 
the moral agent in care ethics acknowledges the importance of relationships in the development 
of autonomy. Verkerk (1999) defines care as an ongoing process involving four interconnected 
phases – caring about, taking care of, care-giving, and care-receiving – which require such 
ethical elements as responsiveness, attentiveness, responsibility, and competence. Verkerk‟s 
account of care highlights both the relational nature of moral autonomy, and the necessity of 
relationship in achieving autonomy. It also suggests that, in practice, an ethic of care requires  
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Table 2.1 
Comparison of Gilligan’s Morality of Care and Responsibility and Kohlberg’s Morality of 
Justice 
 Morality of Care & 
Responsibility – Gilligan 
Morality of Justice - 
Kohlberg 
Primary Moral Imperative 
 
Nonviolence/ Care Justice  
Components of Morality 
 
Relationships Sanctity of Individual 
 
 









Compassion Rules / Legalities 
Nature of Moral Dilemmas Threats to harmony & 
relationships 
Conflicting rights 
Determinants of Moral 
Orientations 
Relationships Principles 
Cognitive Processes for 
Resolving Dilemmas 
Inductive thinking Formal / Logical-deductive 
thinking 
View of Self as Moral Agent 
 
Connected, attached Separate, individual 
Role of Affect 
 
Motivates care, compassion Not a component 
Philosophical Orientation Phenomenological (contextual 
relativism) 




I. Individual Survival I. Punishment & Obedience 
 II. From Selfishness to 
Responsibility 
II. Instrumental Exchange 
 III. Self Sacrifice and Social 
Conformity 
III. Interpersonal Conformity 
 
 
IV. From Goodness to Truth IV. Social System & 
Conscience 
 V. Morality of Nonviolence 
(goal: care) 
V. Prior Rights & Social 
Contract 
  VI. Universal Ethical 
Principles (goal: justice) 
(Brabeck, 1993, p. 37). 
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more than simply not interfering – the fundamental particularity and interdependence of 
individuals is central to the care approach, while respecting autonomy involves compassionate 
interference, and trying to see the world from others‟ points of views. Respect for autonomy, in 
this sense, requires “not so much refraining from interference as recognizing our power to make 
and unmake each other as persons and exercising this power wisely and carefully” (Dillon, 1992, 
p. 116).         
 
Gilligan‟s psychological account, paralleled by Baier‟s (1985, 2005) philosophical account, saw 
the beginning of powerful critiques of the nearly exclusive focus on justice, abstract rationality, 
rights, and individual autonomy in traditional ethical theories. Recognizing the masculine bias of 
contemporary approaches, feminists have articulated an alternative focus on an ethic of care 
(Cole & Coultrap-McQuin, 1992; Held, 1995a). Mullett (1988), for example, presents the care 
approach and counters some of the criticisms against this approach, offering positive solutions, 
as well as examples of positive caring in oppressive contexts. Women‟s ethical decision making 
processes involve focusing their attention on what the current situation requires of them, what 
the nature of the relationship is with those about and with whom the decisions are to be made, 
and how to maintain the integrity themselves and of the network of relationships in which they 
are involved (Hepburn, 1994). This is clearly somewhat different from the abstract, impartial and 
rational subject presented by the ethic of justice, in which the traits historically valued by women 
were - inevitably - considered inferior.  
 
Whereas from the justice perspective the self stands as the figure of moral agency against a 
ground of social relationships, in the care perspective, relationships become the figure which 
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defines self and others – a shift in moral perspective that is reflected in the change in moral 
questioning from “What is just?” to “How to respond?” (Gilligan, 1987, p. 23). Gilligan‟s work 
thus gave empirical weight to the growing conviction that women are more relational than men 
and men more individualistic than women, and that women‟s identities are inextricably tied to 
the interdependencies between people (Friedman, 2000a). A central argument in this study is that 
relationships constitute the arena in which research, and specifically informed consent 
procedures, are carried out. Thus, the questions investigated here - of how men and women 
experience themselves and how they experience relationships as a result of these identities - 
cannot be separated from the question of how research should be conducted to ensure that the 
dignity of each research participant is truly respected.           
    
The justice perspective is characterized by equality versus inequality, where morality involves 
the fair and dutiful mediation of conflicting claims between people and adherence to standards 
and principles. The care perspective, on the other hand, is characterized by attachment versus 
detachment. In contrast to the justice orientation, vulnerability is associated not with oppression 
and inequality but with abandonment. From this perspective, morality consists of nurturing 
connections, promoting individual welfare, and refraining from all forms of violence and 
exploitation (Self & Olivarez, 1993). Based on these distinctions, Self and Olivarez (1993) 
hypothesized that there would be significant differences in the moral orientations of men and 
women. Their findings supported this hypothesis, with a higher percentage of women exhibiting 
the care orientation and a greater percentage of men exhibiting the justice orientation. Their 
study follows on from other studies which yielded similar results (Gibbs, Arnold & Burkhart, 
1984; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter & Sampson, 1988; 
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Rothbart, Hanley & Albert, 1986) and was followed by further research in which significant 
gender differences were found (Wolff, 1996).  
 
Subsequent to her earlier work, Gilligan stressed that neither orientation is superior – care and 
justice are complementary perspectives (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). This was in response to 
increasing evidence against her finding that men and women differed significantly in their use of 
the two distinct moral orientations (Aldrich & Kage, 2003; Baumrind, 1986; Beal, Garrod, 
Ruben & Stewart, 1997; Forsyth, Nye & Kelley, 2001; Friedman, Robinson & Friedman, 1987; 
Galotti, 1989; Krebs, Vermulen, Lenton & Carpendale, 1994; Lifton, 1985; Pratt et al., 1988; 
Thoma, 1986; Walker, 1984, 1986, 1989; Walker, de Vries & Trevethan, 1987). Against those 
who set out to show that there are no sex differences or biases in Kohlberg‟s theory, Baumrind 
(1993) argues that these findings do not warrant the conclusion that there are no sex differences 
in moral orientation but instead suggest that the source and specific nature of the differences 
have yet to be established.  
 
The controversy over Kohlberg‟s morality of justice versus Gilligan‟s morality of care generated 
numerous empirical and non-empirical studies to further investigate the issue (e.g., Brabeck, 
1993; Woods, 1996). Some studies that did find a gender difference put forward a number of 
variables other than moral orientation that could account for the difference, including personality 
(Glover, 2001), age (Aldrich & Kage, 2003; Gump et al., 2000; Pratt et al., 1988; Walker et al., 
1987, social status (Puka 1989; Tronto, 1987), and type of dilemma presented (Wark & Krebs, 
1996). After reviewing the literature on both types of moral orientation, Woods (1996) 
concluded that what is most evident in all the studies reviewed is not that there are or are not 
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significant gender differences, but that the moral orientations posited by these two theories are 
far from universal, and are probably relevant only in Western cultures and, even then, only 
applicable to specific socioeconomic and educational groups. Similarly, Schminke, Ambrose and 
Miles (2003) present findings both for and against gender differences in moral orientation and 
suggest that context is a particularly important factor in determining difference, which is 
supported by other research (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; Weinberg, Yacker, Orenstein & DeSarbo, 
1993). It has been suggested, for instance, that women from minority or low socioeconomic 
status groups may have higher scores on measures of justice because emphasizing rights, justice 
and fairness is more likely to rectify the inequalities that they experience (Beal et al., 1997; 
Ward, 1995).  
 
The importance of context in the development of moral orientation is further highlighted by 
studies that have found that individuals exposed to significant degrees of conflict appear to 
demonstrate bimodal patterns of moral reasoning as a means of reconciling conflicting messages 
from their internal and external worlds (Tudin, Straker & Mendolsohn, 1994). Orbach (1986) has 
contended that women‟s „internal‟ feminine values are in conflict with the new femininity that 
they are striving for outside of the home, which involves embracing masculine values such as 
independence and rejecting their femininity. Across cultures, the ideal self appears to be 
inherently masculine (Williams & Best, 1982 in Williams & Best, 1990). The process of coping 
in stressful environments – such as growing up in the context of apartheid South Africa – is 
complicated by the conflicting values and attitudes that an individual caught in the juxtaposition 
of two cultures has available as resources (Lazarus, 1984 in Anderson, 1991). Black adolescents 
in South Africa may have been particularly vulnerable to such conflict due to the breakdown of 
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traditional families and loss of appropriate role models (Myburgh & Anders, 1989), denial of 
opportunity (Stevens & Lockhat, 1997), racial identity confusion (Bloom, 1994) and 
acculturative stress (Le Grange, Telch & Tibbs, 1998) resulting from the racial discrimination 
and subordination enforced by apartheid. This conflict and psychological and acculturative 
distress has been linked to suicidal behaviours (Wassenaar, Pillay, Descoins, Goltman & Naidoo, 
2000; Wassenaar, van der Veen & Pillay, 1998) and eating disorders (Garner & Olmsted, 1984; 
Garner, Olmsted & Polivy, 1983; Hooper & Garner, 1986; Marais, Wassenaar & Kramers, 2003; 
Szabo & Le Grange, 2001; Wassenaar, Le Grange, Winship & Lachenicht, 2000) within these 
groups.  
 
Others have approached the issue from a different angle. The justice and care orientations 
described above not “only reflect different ways of thinking about dilemmas but also define the 
kinds of situations that are seen as dilemmas” (Yacker & Weinberg, 1990, p. 19). Yacker and 
Weinberg (1990) developed a short objective test to measure the two different perspectives as 
defined by Kohlberg and Gilligan, hypothesizing that men would exhibit greater preference for 
the justice orientation and women would show greater preference for the care mode of reasoning. 
Their results supported this hypothesis – although they caution against dichotomizing moral 
judgement and artificially assigning men and women to categories of care and justice, proposing 
instead that men and women exhibit propensities for each orientation, rather than one or the other 
type of thinking, as shown by other studies (Cook, Larson & Boivin, 2003; Smetana, Killen & 
Turiel, 1991). Similar findings were presented by Jaffee and Hyde (2000), who conducted a 
meta-analysis to determine whether there were significant gender differences in the two moral 
orientations – justice and care. Their findings showed that females consistently used more care 
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reasoning and men more justice reasoning. Their results also suggested that the differences in 
effect sizes may be attributable to other specific moderator variables – such as age, 
socioeconomic status, type of dilemma, and gender of the protagonist in the dilemma. 
Nonetheless, their findings demonstrated clear evidence in support of a distinct care orientation, 
and the influence of other moderator variables on the results do not diminish Gilligan‟s larger 
point. 
 
2.3.2.3 Value of care ethics 
Despite the lack of agreement on the existence or significance of gender differences in the care 
versus justice moral orientations, the value of Gilligan‟s work lies in its acknowledgement of a 
distinctive alternative orientation to Kohlberg‟s theory which emphasized the importance of 
interdependency to women‟s identities, in contrast to the individualistic outlook typical of men 
(Friedman, 2000b). Thus, the care based approach has made visible those values that have 
historically held value for women but have not been regarded as fully moral or relevant in the 
ethical domain (Peter & Morgan, 2001). In response to arguments that the care perspective has 
no place in the existing impartialist ethical paradigm, Carse (1998) argues that there are aspects 
of the care perspective that are consonant with the mainstream bioethics‟ commitment to 
impartiality. She then goes on to locate some of the more important contributions and challenges 
that the care orientation offers to moral and ethical theory. Indeed, there are many contexts in 
bioethics in which care offers a more relevant and meaningful approach: in children‟s rights 
contexts (Cockburn, 2005), for example, in the context of advance care planning (Ikonomidis & 
Singer, 1999), and in the roles of parent, friend, physician, nurse, where “contextual response, 
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attentiveness to subtle clues, and deepening relationships are likely to be more important morally 
than impartial treatment” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 372).  
    
In the interface between professional commitments and the ethics of health care, the care 
perspective can provide much-needed flexibility and liberation from health professionals‟ narrow 
conceptions of their roles and responsibilities (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). In contrast to the 
impartial and abstract principles of the justice approach, care theory allows for openness to 
discussion, disclosures, and mutual decision-making in health care that, in turn, shifts the focus 
of ethical decisions to relationships and to the family, with support from health care 
professionals. Others, too, have suggested that contemporary bioethics needs to be supplemented 
with theoretical accounts, like care-based relational theory, that pay particular attention to the 
value of relationships in ethical practice and, especially, ethical decision making (Ikonomidis & 
Singer, 1999). Olsen (2003) argues that the dominant rights-based approach guides decisions 
about whether autonomy is respected, but offers no further guidance across the full range and 
types of ethical influence involved in clinical research and practice. This is where the 
assumptions of a relational approach like care ethics can be of value – assumptions that 
acknowledge that influence is inherent in clinical relationships and that all decisions are 
subjective and continuous (Olsen, 2003). Furthermore, there are many similarities between 
Gilligan and other feminists‟ care theories and those of African ethicists. Characterized by 
similar ontologies, epistemologies, and moralities, these theories share a rejection of the 
individual autonomy emphasized in Western, male-dominated approaches, replacing this with 
individuals‟ relations to others and to nature (Cameron & Lalonde, 2001; Harding, 1987c; 
Mkhize, 2004).     
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2.3.2.4 Problems with care ethics 
Despite the value that the alternative approaches offered by care ethics have brought to 
contemporary bioethics, some feminists have questioned substituting an ethic of justice for an 
ethic of care, not least because autonomy and justice are rights which women strive for and have 
been – and continue to be – denied – in both the public and private spheres (Held, 1995b). While 
some feminist critics have acknowledged the importance of an ethic of care for women, they also 
point out the negative impact on women‟s welfare of accepting this orientation without critical 
examination of its origins. This may exacerbate women‟s unrecognized and exploited self-
sacrificial position and lead to further oppression and powerlessness (Bowden, 1997; Chang, 
1996; Mullett, 1988; Tong, 1996). Card (1988) goes further to argue that an ethic of care 
emerged out of necessity, developed by women as a way to survive in oppressive relationships 
with men. Those who caution against theories which may exaggerate differences between men 
and women by focusing on stable gender characteristics, draw attention to the importance of 
context in determining moral orientation (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988; Mednick, 1989). Men 
may tend towards an ethic of justice because this approach of rights and rational control support 
their superior position in society, while women and minority groups appeal to the sympathy and 
mercy of a care approach because of their subordinate position (Clopton & Sorell, 1993). Such 
theories are consistent with research finding that the development of moral orientation is largely 
determined by social, cultural, and historical factors (Ferns & Thom, 2001; Gielen & Markoulis, 
1994; Huebner & Garrod, 1991; Tappan, 1997), including education (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & 
Lieberman, 1983) and racial and political conflict (Burman, 1986; Dawes, 1994; Smith & 
Parekh, 1996; Tudin et al., 1994; Wilson & Ramphele, 1989). 
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Similarly, the ethic of care has been criticized for being an underdeveloped theory, too confined 
to the private sphere and thereby reinforcing “uncritical adherence to traditional social patters of 
assigning caretaker roles to women” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 375). Underdeveloped, 
however, does not imply incomplete. Peter and Morgan (2001) have suggested that it is perhaps 
in combination with an ethic of justice that an ethic of care could address injustice while still 
maintaining a more connected sense of social relationships. Doing so would require recognition 
of the distortions of caring that result from the oppressive structures of society: the economic 
dependence of the care-giving person on his/her partner; relegating the responsibility of caring to 
one partner; and the restriction of women to caring roles at the expense of their sense of self 
outside of these roles (Mullett, 1988).  
 
Cautions against an unconscious application of care ethics have continued. Cockburn (2005) 
drew attention to the contested nature of care, and to the potentially harmful effects of valorizing 
the perspectives of careers over those being cared for – thus replacing conceptions of justice and 
equality with a needs-based discourse. Cockburn recommended instead that the limitations of 
current justice-based approaches should be acknowledged and then used strategically and 
partially, complemented by elements of care theories. The absolute value of care in the relational 
ontology of many care approaches, at the expense of other values, has also been criticized. 
Problems with the central notion that we do not have connections, we are connections, include 
the valuing of the relationship over the individual, and the jump from the idea that human 
survival depends on maintaining caring relationships to the idea that all relationships are good 
(Davion, 1993). Care approaches offer an impoverished ethical account if the moral integrity of 
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the self is lost within the ontological importance of the relationship; ultimately, care ethics must 
embrace the relational while still incorporating a sense of autonomy so that the positive aspects 
of both self-and other-care are maintained (Davion, 1993; Hoagland, 1988; Meyers, 1989).       
 
Carse and Lindemann Nelson (1996) outline these major criticisms and then go on to address 
them, arguing that much can be done to assuage the complaints that have been leveled against 
care ethics in order for further progress to be made toward rehabilitating care. While justice 
ethics calls for blindness to particulars of gender, race, and religion, the ethic of care challenges 
ethicists to develop an awareness of these particularities – not simply applying care to those 
connections that are closest and most visible to us,  but extending care beyond dyadic 
relationships and proximate spheres of social interactions. The rehabilitation of care and the 
integration of justice and care, will require the de-gendering of ethics such that the norms and 
prescriptions of both orientations are extended to women as well as to men, and to their 
respective social domains. “It is only after we bring the moral work of caring to the table that we 
can begin to articulate unromanticized, realistic, and just conceptions of what this ethic should 
entail” (Carse & Lindemann Nelson, 1996, p. 32).  
 
2.3.2.5 Integration of justice and care 
In more recent years, discussions have centered on how to best combine justice and care 
approaches (Held, 1995b). Feminist approaches to moral agency which seek to synthesize 
principle-based justice ethics with relationship-based care ethics offer researchers a means of 
reconciling their professional obligation to produce valid scientific knowledge with their 
humanitarian commitment to the welfare of their research participants (Fisher, 2000). This stems 
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from a growing recognition in recent years that justice ethics can and does co-exist with care 
ethics (Baier, 2005; Brabeck, 1989; Carse, 2001; Crittenden, 2001; Dierckx le Casterle et al., 
1998; Dillon, 1992; Higgins, 1989; Smetana et al., 1991; Waithe, 1989; Walker, 1992). Gilligan 
(1982) compared the synthesis of justice and care to a gestalt figure of moral landscape, showing 
how moral maturity entails an ability to speak in at least two languages and to see in at least two 
ways – suggesting that “wisdom comes, not in seeking closure, but in alternating between the 
two gestalts” (Little, 1998, p. 202). This view also emphasizes the tension between the universal 
autonomy of justice and the context-specific interdependence of care, where assigning half to 
males and half to females lacks empirical support and reduces the complexity of morality – and, 
more importantly, overlooks an opportunity to revise both theories (Brabeck, 1993). Botes 
(2000) argues that if only one of these two perspectives was consistently used in ethical decision 
making, certain ethical dilemmas would almost certainly remain unresolved. When the two 
perspectives are combined, however, moral choices become reasoned and deliberate ethical 
judgements that ensure justice while maintaining impassioned concern for the welfare and care 
of each individual (Brabeck, 1993).       
 
Care ethics developed as a feminist alternative to the principlist ethics derived from Kant‟s 
philosophy. But some have argued that, upon re-examination, Kant‟s writings appear to offer 
everything that care ethics requires and, beyond that, elements that repair the deficits in theories 
of care (Paley, 2002). This lends greater support for the possibility of integration of justice and 
care. Similarly, the ethics of love and obligation that Baier (1985) presents have parallels with 
Gilligan‟s care and Kohlberg‟s justice. Baier (1985) integrates care and justice into a trust 
approach, arguing that relationships of trust involve both love (trusting others not to harm us) 
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and obligation (trusting others to recognize and fulfill obligations). The concept of trust has the 
potential to facilitate the integration of justice and care, helping to overcome the problems of 
both approaches (Baier, 1985; Tauber, 2003). “Neither atomistic autonomy nor the ethics of 
responsibility can claim hegemony, for they are mutually interdependent, and a complete account 
of medicine‟s moral axis requires that they be integrated” (Tauber, 2003, p. 484).  
 
Ultimately, knowledge of both justice and care is necessary to resolve complex ethical dilemmas 
because actual moral life presupposes moral integration, including the integration of care and 
justice – a contention that is supported by empirical evidence (Peter & Morgan, 2001). What 
remains to be established is how justice and care can be successfully integrated. Held (1995b) 
proposes that care is the wider moral perspective into which justice should be incorporated, 
arguing that care is the most basic moral value and causally primary to justice. While the value 
of autonomy, individual rights and justice should not be undermined, these should be developed 
and sustained within a relational framework of trust. By re-examining the current conception of 
care, Verkerk (1999) combines respect for autonomy with attentiveness and responsive 
commitment, and introduces the notion of compassionate interference which is not so much a 
threat to autonomy but a means of attaining autonomy.  
 
Until recently, the ethical values of individualism and caring have been presented as 
incommensurable values, occupying different realms of meaning (Gadow, 1995). The conflict 
between these values is ultimately based on opposing views of the self – respect for individuals 
in the justice perspective is based on the universal rationality that all autonomous beings possess;  
the relational ethic of the care perspective views individuals as embodied and unique. Many of 
 86 
the criticisms that advocates of care invoke against the justice ethic centre on the individualistic 
bias of this ethic and, ipso facto, disembodied and disengaged notions of the self that confer 
autonomy with the high status that it holds in traditional ethical models (Benhabib, 1992; 
Friedman, 2000b; Keller, 1997). It is the existential re-conceptualization of the self underlying 
these approaches that provides the means for resolving the conflict between individualistic 
justice and engaged caring. If women are to escape the moral limitations of the current 
philosophical tradition, “they require nothing less than new models of the self, in terms of which 
moral imagination, empathy, and feelings are taken at least as seriously as autonomy, rationality, 
and detachedness have long been taken” (Code et al., 1988, p. 9). By re-meaning the values and 
interpreting them so that they belong to the same realm of meaning, integration becomes 
possible; similarly, re-interpreting the self in existential terms allows for reconciliation of the two 
realms (Gadow, 1995).  
 
The above discussion suggests that if autonomy can be severed from its individualistic 
assumptions, the values of autonomy do merit a central place in bioethical theory and practice. A 
justice-care perspective is likely to be more appropriate in informed consent and research 
settings with vulnerable populations, for example, where moral arguments for the consideration 
of participant perspectives in ethical decision-making stem from a synthesis of principle-based 
justice ethics and relational-based care ethics (Fisher, 1999). What most arguments for the 
integration of these two approaches seem to share is the call for a shift away from an excessively 
individualistic ethic to accommodate more relational values. Critiques of traditional 
interpretations of ethics as principle-based and justice-oriented have directed at least some of 
their criticisms against the notion of the self underlying these interpretations (Cooke, 1999). The 
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starting point, therefore, for reconstructing current conceptions of autonomy is a reconsideration 
of the accounts of self-identity that form the basis of these conceptions.  
Crucial to the reformulation of autonomy is a positive conception of human agency that 
recognizes relational experiences as an integral dimension of individuality…(which, 
along with) recognition of the specificity and complexity of social relations, has 
significant implications for the reconceptualization of other principles comprising the 
canonical inventory of bioethical principles, particularly beneficence, justice, and 
equality (Donchin, 2001, p. 367).   
     
 
What is hopefully evident from the discussion above is that women are more inclined to feel 
connected to others and, therefore, to employ a care approach, whereas men seem to prefer 
detachment from others and thus adopt a justice approach to ethical dilemmas. Based on 
evidence that the gender differences in moral orientation described above are due to differences 
in women‟s and men‟s self concepts (Ryan, David & Reynolds, 2004), some theorists have 
suggested a causal relationship between conceptions of the self and conceptions of morality 
(Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983). Because a justice and a care moral orientation 
involve different ways of relating to others, it is evident that discussions around integrating 
justice and care require an examination of the way in which the self is defined in relation to 
others. Furthermore, as with the distinction between care and justice, the connected and separate 
self concepts are also closely related to gender (Ryan et al., 2004). In the following section, 
conceptualizations of the self that underscore the moral orientations described above – the 
independent, autonomous self typical in the justice approach versus the interdependent relational 




2.4 Feminist (Re)-Conceptions of the (Gendered) Self  
 
“I think, therefore I am” 
    (Descartes, 1641 in Anscombe & Geach, 1954, p. 299). 
 
“I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” 
        (Mbiti, 1969 in Kigongo, 2002, p. 3). 
 
“The question of the self has always been central to feminism since in society we are never 
simply selves, but gendered selves” (Coole, 1995, p. 121). The basic premise of individualistic 
notions of the self that are implicit in most Western mainstream ideologies and philosophies is 
that society is outside of individuals, individuals exist independently of society, and that society 
is merely a collection of individuals. But feminists argue that to speak of individuals existing 
prior to and separately from society is an anomaly – society is inside and outside of individuals, 
it both constitutes and is constituted by them. In attempting to move away from Western 
understandings of autonomy, predicated on an individualistic view of persons, some feminists 
have proposed a relational conception of personhood in order to capture the complexity of the 
relations that exist between persons and their communities. This, in turn, acknowledges the 
inextricability of existential and metaphysical issues about the self from moral and ethical theory, 
since  
philosophical accounts of the self have implications for conceptions of what it is to lead a 
good life (and) feminist reconstructions of the nature of the self are interwoven with 
arguments that draw out the emancipatory benefits of conceiving the self one way rather 





2.4.1 Gender and Self 
 
Separately, theories of the self (see, for example, Chen & Welland, 2002; Leary & Tangney, 
2003; Pederson, 1999; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Singelis, 1994; Snodgrass & Thompson, 
1997; Van der Meulen, 2001) and explorations of gender differences in psychological 
functioning (see, for example, Else-Quest, Hyde, Goldsmith & Van Hulle, 2006; Hyde, 1990, 
1994; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; Roothman, Kirsten & Wissing, 2003; Umberson, Chen, House, 
Hopkins & Slaten, 1996) have been widely researched for many years. The association between 
gender and notions of the self have, however, only recently started receiving attention. While 
some studies have found no significant differences between men and women‟s self-construals 
(Grace & Cramer, 2002; McChrystal, 1994), much of this research has suggested that men and 
women do differ in their self-representations, women having a more relational, interdependent 
self-construal and men a more independent one (Cross, Bacon & Morris, 2000; Cross & Madson, 
1997; Gilligan, 1982; Jordan & Surrey, 1986; Maccoby, 1990; Madson & Trafimow, 2001; 
Markus & Oyserman, 1989; Mather, 1997; Miller, 1990; Norris, 1998; Pearson et al., 1998; 
Sampson, 1988; Stewart & Lykes, 1985). Alternative conceptualizations of the relational self 
were propelled into the center of feminist thought largely by Gilligan‟s (1982) theoretical and 
empirical exploration of the differences between men‟s and women‟s moral identity 
development. Her research highlights how principlist ethics, by conceiving of individuals as 
separate and of relationships as contractual, neglects the values of care, connection, and 
interpersonal responsibility that are central to how women make ethical decisions in their lives. 
In contrast to the rights- or justice-focused reasoning typical of men, the kinds of ethical 
problems identified by women in Gilligan‟s study were concerned with maintaining self-integrity 
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in relational contexts while responding to perceived obligations to others within these 
relationships (Fry & Johnstone, 1994).  
 
Gilligan‟s (1982, 1986) work gave empirical weight to the growing recognition that women are 
more relationally inclined than men, while men are more individualistically-orientated and place 
less value on relationships. Some have attributed this to differing socialization experiences 
(Chodorow, 1978, 1989; Maccoby, 1990; Madson & Trafimow, 2001; Maltz & Borker, 1982; 
Triandis, Leung, Villareal & Clack, 1985; Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, Iwao & Sinha, 1995), while 
others go further to argue that the self is fluid and determined to a large extent by context, 
including the nature of the relationships that individuals hold with others (David, Grace & Ryan, 
2004; Friedman, 1998; Kashima et al., 1995; Onorato & Turner, 2001; Ryan et al., 2004; Turner, 
1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherall, 1987). And yet, relationships constitute the 
arena in which research, and, specifically, informed consent procedures, are played out. Thus, 
questions of how men and women experience themselves, and how they experience relationships 
as a result of these identities, cannot be separated from issues about how research and informed 
consent should be conducted to ensure that the dignity of each individual research participant is 
respected. Gilligan‟s work is also particularly important in advancing the application of feminist 
theory to, for example, clinical research and practice in that it highlights the need to 
reconceptualize all relationships – between, for example, parent and child, researcher and 
research participant – to include not only the negative significance of inequality and power 
dynamics, but also the positive significance of relatedness and interdependency.  
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Following Gilligan‟s watershed work, a number of feminist analyses (see, for example, Bekker, 
1993; Mather, 1997; Norris, 1998) began to suggest that women‟s sense of self is a self-in-
relation (Miller, 1990), characterized by an emphasis on caring (Noddings, 1984), empathy, and 
interpersonal responsiveness that blurs the boundaries between selves and others (Chodorow, 
1978). In her empirical investigation of selected experiences of men and women, Lykes (1985) 
found evidence of two notions of the self: autonomous individualism and social individuality. In 
contrast to values associated with the autonomous individualism typical of the Western tradition, 
social individuality involves a “dialectical understanding of individuality and sociality grounded 
in an experience of social relations characterized by inequalities of power” (Lykes, 1985, p. 356). 
Lykes‟s work highlights again the inseparability of notions of gender and power from notions of 
the self, and the neglect of women‟s experiences in traditional self-theories. However, this does 
not only apply to women‟s experiences, as demonstrated by Lyons (1983), who found that equal 
numbers of the men and women in her study tended to value some form of interpersonal 
relatedness by including a relational component in their self-definitions. These findings add 
weight to the need to develop more relational notions of the self that will be applicable to both 
men and women.    
 
 
2.4.2 Models of Self Development  
 
In “an eerie suspension of biological reality” individual selves are traditionally conceived in 
Western thought as entirely self-sufficient, denying any form of interdependency at the 
beginning, end, or during the course of life (Meyers, 2000a, p. 4). Essentially, each of the two 
opposing self orientations – the atomistic self and the relational self – give autonomy a different 
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meaning which, in turn, determines the contested understanding of patient autonomy, and the 
task is to find their reconciliation (Tauber, 2003). Recognizing that the capacities of a self that is 
socially constituted are also constitutively social and relational, many feminists began to 
incorporate models of the relational self into alternative notions of relational autonomy. Several 
relational models of autonomy built on social conceptions of the self have been developed 
(Donchin, 1995; Ells, 2001; Friedman, 1998; Hoagland, 1988; Meyers, 2000a; Nedelsky, 1989; 
Sherwin, 1998a, 1998b; Shildrick, 1997). Alternative conceptions of autonomy are grounded on 
the view that people are embedded in relationships and, feminists argue, are able to 
accommodate the reality of interdependency that is lacking in conventional notions of autonomy. 
“A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough dependent upon other persons to 
acquire the essential arts of personhood. Persons essentially are second persons” (Baier, 1985, p. 
84). The developmental significance of human interdependence is reiterated in the relational 
model of autonomy developed by Code (1987).  She notes that because human life begins in 
interdependence, “theorists who take communality and interdependence as their starting point 
seem better able to accommodate the requirements of autonomy than theorists who take 
autonomous existence as the „original position‟ are able to accommodate community” (Code, 
1987, p. 360).  
 
Previous theories of self development suggested that the sense of self is attained through stages 
of varying degrees of separation (Erikson, 1963 in Stevens & Lockhat, 1997; Kohlberg, 1976; 
Kroger, 2002; Streitmatter, 1993). The goal of human development, according to these theories, 
was one of separation or individuation – a prerequisite for mental health. And yet, theorists have 
increasingly come to recognize that these models of self development do not fit the experiences 
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of women, or people from minority groups and non-Western cultures (Kemmelmeier & 
Oyserman, 2001). New theories have since incorporated values of relation and interdependence 
along with independence and separation in integrated models of mature self development 
(Lawler, 1990). This view is supported by Guisinger and Blatt (1994), who traced the 
individualistic bias in Western traditional self theories and present challenges which show this 
view to be incomplete. More importantly, they argued that “although biological theory has long 
been cited to account for the development of individuality and aggressive self-interest, there are 
now evolutionary models that can account for the development of an altruistic, cooperative, 
interpersonally related self” (Guisinger & Blatt, 1994, p. 106) and they go on to present evidence 
of the evolutionary basis of intrinsic relatedness in humans.  
 
Feminists have proposed alternatives to the traditional models of healthy self development. 
Miller (1990), for example, proposed a theory of self-in-relation, outlining an alternative process 
of self development in which the primary goal is not separation-individuation but relationship-
differentiation. Alternative models like Miller‟s self-in-relation do not work through self 
development as a series of separation, where dependency or connection is perceived as 
unhealthy. Instead, they propose that unhealthy development is a matter of extremes, excess and 
degree: excessive separation or extreme dependency is not desired – “what is important is the 
harmony of the two notions produced by the rich counterpoint of separation, yet connection, of 




2.4.3 The Self in Ethical Context 
 
Several studies have highlighted the influence of cultural context on self development, focusing 
on the fluidity and diversity of the self identities of individuals who occupy different cultural, 
socioeconomic, historical, racial and power hierarchical positions in society (Collins, 1990; 
Dongxiao, 2004; Franchi & Swart, 2003; Immamoglu & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2004; Li, 2002; 
Stevens & Lockhat, 1997; Uskul, Hynie & Lalonde, 2004; Watkins et al., 1998; Watkins et al., 
2003; Yeh & Hwang, 2000). Along similar lines, Meyers (2000a) draws attention to other flaws 
in prevailing conceptions of the self, which include the tendency to view the self as a 
homogenous, stable entity, when the reality is of multiple, sometimes fractious sources of self 
identity. She also argues that traditional theories valorize masculine qualities such as dominance 
and rationality, while stigmatizing those qualities associated with femininity – emotionality and 
concern for others. Similarly, since independence is the goal of self development in these 
theories, no morally significant relations, whether consensual or non-consensual, are 
acknowledged – all affiliations are considered to be contractual and freely negotiated. In most 
clinical research contexts, as in real life, this is not the case. In contrast, human connectedness 
and intersubjectivity are prominent themes in feminist thought. The goal of feminist 
reconceptualization of notions such as self-identity is to “reclaim the venues traditionally 
associated with women as morally significant sites, and to reclaim the moral agency of the 
individuals whose lives are centered in these sites” (Meyers, 2000a, p. 8). 
 
Western ethics has typically viewed problems in ethics as conflicts between self-interest and the 
greater good, with little guidance for reconciling the two. In this limited view, conventional 
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ethical approaches have tended to neglect the “moral aspects of the concern and sympathy that 
people actually feel for particular others, and what moral experience this intermediate realm 
suggests for an adequate morality” (Held, 1998, pp.  104-105). Feminists have recognized and 
incorporated these previously neglected values into alternative theories of self which emphasize 
care and connectedness, suggesting that the constitution of individuals is more about the relations 
than about the distance between them. Kasprisin‟s (1996) integration of concepts of autonomy 
with the relational ethic of care makes an important contribution to advancing a model of 
autonomy that realistically acknowledges the mutual interdependence of human beings. The 
implications for individuals of these more relational autonomy narratives, including “the lived 
practical and ethical consequences for individuals when their own self-story becomes more 
relational” have been further explored by Fishbane (2001, p. 273). When autonomy is understood 
relationally, respecting others‟ autonomy requires a reconfiguration of the participant‟s 
relationships and their personal perspectives, and is “a far more complex issue than is apparent 
within the standard conception (of autonomy)” (Donchin, 2000a, p. 187). Social relations are not 
only causally necessary for the development of autonomy, but are seen as constitutive of 
autonomy (Friedman, 1997). Incidentally, the idea that the self and relationships are inextricably 
interwoven is consistent with African conceptions of personhood. From an African perspective, 
selfhood cannot be defined individualistically because human beings are always in dialogue with 
the surrounding environment and are thus never alone (Mkhize, 2004).  
 
The importance of paying attention to how selves are experienced is nowhere more evident than 
in the context of HIV/AIDS, at the heart of the cultural politics surrounding the pandemic. The 
politics of AIDS appear to be about identity and difference, about the boundaries of personhood, 
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about how individuals shape their identities and draw their boundaries, and about how conflicts 
experienced within the self are resolved (Crawford, 1994). “The AIDS epidemic is clearly both a 
social crisis and a crisis of identity” (Crawford, 1994, p. 1347), and this makes crucial the 
revision of conventional definitions of identity which underscore the ethical principles that are to 
form the boundaries of the research that is conducted in this context. In South Africa, this would 
also entail changing perceptions of self-identity that are entrenched within a culture of power and 
superiority over women, where notions of masculine identity are typified by aggressiveness and 
dominance (Abrahams, Jewkes, Hoffman & Laubsher, 2004; Jobson, 2005; Memela, 2005; 
Sayagues, 2004; Sideris, 2004, 2005). The power inequalities created by the legacy of apartheid 
in South Africa, and the conflicting messages about entitlement and denial, may also have 
resulted in a degree of ambiguity in young individuals‟ self-concepts, which could account for 
inconsistencies in findings of independent versus interdependent self-construals within different 
racial groups (Carli, 1999; Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001; Majoribanks & Mboya, 2001).       
 
There have been other criticisms leveled against the dominant conceptions of the individualistic 
self. From their postmodernist position, social constructionists propose that identity and meaning 
are socially constructed, and are not formed in the mind of the individual. There are those who 
locate the development of self identity within the discourses about the self that exist between 
people (Gergen, 1991, 1994); others emphasize the consequences of an individual‟s actions on 
those to whom s/he is related, and propose that a healthy sense of self is inextricably linked to 
the capacity for relational accountability (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986). Common to 
both these views is a shift from the formulation of self identity as an individual activity to a focus 
on the relational nature of self development.  Fishbane (2001) extended this theoretical shift from 
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individualistic to more relational notions of the self by integrating relational theory from 
disparate fields. She goes on to explore the implications for individuals and the relationships 
between individuals “when they move from traditional autonomy-based narrative of their own 
sense of self to a more relational narrative” (Fishbane, 2001, p. 273). 
 
2.4.4 Feminist (Re)Conceptions of the Self 
 
As is evident from the discussion above, feminists are among those who have challenged the 
dominant conceptions of autonomy which are based on atomistic views of the self, and begun to 
put forward alternatives of autonomy that are grounded on more relational notions of the self 
(Donchin, 1995; Friedman, 1997; Hoagland, 1988; Meyers, 2000a; Nedelsky, 1989; Sherwin, 
1998a; Shildrick, 1997). Wallace (2003), for example, formulated a relational theory of 
autonomy based on a conception of the self that is both socially relational and independently 
reflexive. Building on Mead‟s (1934 in Wallace, 2003) hypothesis that the self is constituted by a 
“me” and an “I,” Wallace shows how autonomy arises from a self that is reflective of the whole 
community while simultaneously aware of itself.  The me is the self as generalized other within 
the community; the I is the response of self to attitudes of others. This notion of autonomy allows 
for a self to be socially constituted but not reduced to the constitutively social. Such alternatives 
recognize that people develop and exist within relationship, thereby filling the gaps in 
conventional theories with a more realistic conception of autonomy as interdependent (Ells, 
2001). The growing support for theories of relational autonomy prompted Keller (1997, p. 152) 
to assert that  
whatever shape feminist ethics ends up taking, it will incorporate a relational model of 
moral agency. That is, the insight that the moral agent is an encumbered self, who is 
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always already embedded in relations with flesh-and-blood others and is partly 
constituted by these relations, is here to stay.  
 
Following these alternative notions of the relational self, many feminists began to recognize that 
the capacities for autonomy of a socially constituted agent are necessarily also constitutively 
social and relational (Barclay, 2000; Friedman, 2000a; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). Notably, 
these feminist critiques do not call for the abandonment of notions of autonomy. The alternatives 
presented in this thesis call for a transformed approach to autonomy that can account for the 
multiple and fractious identities of the autonomous agents who are both emotional and rational, 
and the complex social and historical contexts in which these agents are embedded. Relational 
approaches also extend the focus from the individual to the effects of socialization, and of 
oppressive social contexts on autonomous agents.  
(Indeed), the difficulties generated by providing an adequate explanation of impairment 
of autonomy in contexts of oppressive socialization, together with feminist critiques of 
traditional notions of autonomy, have provided the main impetus toward the development 
of a relational approach…Analyzing the way in which socialization and social 
relationships impede or enhance an agent‟s capacities for autonomy has drawn attention 
to the connections among an agent‟s self-conception, her social context, and her 
capacities for autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, pp. 21-22).  
 
Others have focused on the inter-relational spaces between cultures, using the notion of 
bicultural competence (LaFromboise, Coleman & Gerton, 1993) to explain how individuals from 
minority cultures negotiate their self-identities within cultural contexts where the dominant self 
identity differs from their own (Yeh & Hwang, 2000).   
 
In this section, an attempt has been made to demonstrate how the self-in-relation can be an 
important extension of the notions of autonomy and independence underlying most 
conceptualizations of the self. Drawing on feminist theories of the gendered self, this section has 
 99 
presented alternatives to the individualistic notions of the self that have tended to dominate in 
Western philosophical and bioethical thought. The following section will attempt to show how 
incorporating these relational accounts of personhood into conceptualizations of autonomy can 
make a contribution to conventional bioethical approaches to ethical paradigms such as informed 
consent, and to the welfare of individuals that bioethics professes to serve. It is this relational 
view of the self that underlies many of the feminist alternatives to traditional notions of 
(individualistic) autonomy that have been developed. As such, feminist ethics is in an ideal 
position to present alternatives that locate autonomy both within a person‟s sense of identity, of 
self, and within the context of their particular daily, lived realities. These relational autonomy 
models, developed primarily by feminist ethicists, will be discussed in detail in the next section, 
followed by an attempt to locate these models within ethics as applied in clinical research in 




2.5 Feminist Alternatives to Principled Autonomy: Relational Models 
 
“We know ourselves as separate only insofar as we live in connection with others; we experience 
relationship only insofar as we differentiate other from self” 
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 63). 
 
 
2.5.1 Relational Autonomy: Feminist Models 
 
As has been shown in the preceding sections, several feminist theorists have developed models 
of autonomy that require a social or relational context. Relational alternatives to conventional 
notions of autonomy have been presented, for example, by Baier (1985), Benhabib (1992), Code 
(1991), Fox-Keller (1985), Hoagland (1988), Kasprisin (1996), and Nedelsky (1989). In contrast 
to what has been discussed as the traditionally male-oriented principle of autonomy, feminists 
have advocated relational concepts of autonomy that support the agency of participants without 
abandoning them to their rights (Sherwin, 1992b), thereby shifting the ethical perspective from 
self to self-in-relation-to-other (Murdoch, 1970; Noddings, 1984). The feminist approaches that 
seek to integrate justice-centered principlist ethics with relationship-based care ethics provide a 
means by which researchers might resolve the dilemma they are confronted with in human 
subjects‟ research in trying to reconcile their professional commitment to the generation of 
technical knowledge with their humanitarian commitment to the protection of their research 
participants (Fisher, 2000).  
 
This also extends to re-conceptualizations of autonomy that seek to render it more relational, 
contextualized and relevant to women and other marginalized groups. It must be emphasized 
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here that developing and applying notions of relational autonomy in ethics does not amount to 
replacing traditional notions of autonomy with alternative conceptions drawn from this feminist 
ethic of care, among other feminist propositions. In the afterglow of Gilligan‟s (1982) work on 
the differences between men and women‟s moral identities, many feminists warned against the 
potential ramifications of reifying these differences, arguing that this might serve to reinforce the 
oppression of women, entrenching them in the very same emotional, irrational, marginalized 
roles to which they had been assigned by Western patriarchal society. Sherwin (1992b), for 
example, cautions that articulating a feminine ethic which assigns to women values of care and 
emotional responsiveness risks reinforcing those characterizations of women that patriarchal 
society has traditionally used to justify women‟s relegation to the private sphere and their 
subordination to men. “Renouncing autonomy (altogether) would defeat feminist efforts to 
achieve justice and foster social change” (Donchin, 2000a, p. 189). This reflects yet another 
recurring feminist theme: a resistance to the dichotomous, dualistic, divisive modes of thinking 
that are typical of the philosophical tradition – dichotomies such as abstract/concrete, 
reason/emotion, universal/particular, subjective/objective, knowledge/experience, public/private, 
theory/practice, and mind/body (Code et al., 1988). Thus in this study, as in many other feminist 
works, the care and justice approaches which offer differing perspectives on autonomy are 
viewed not as antagonistic but as symbiotic approaches that, together, can generate a  richer 
understanding of the principle of autonomy.  
 
Wary of unwittingly advocating any absolute alternatives to autonomy, the alternatives presented 
here follow the call for a poststructuralist feminist ethic that displaces, rather than replaces 
autonomy (Shildrick, 1997). It is hoped that the ideas explored here will initiate further 
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investigation into and debate around richly gender- and culture-conscious perceptions of 
autonomy that will complement, indeed supplement, conventional, male-oriented approaches. 
This can be achieved, as we have seen, by looking to feminist ethics to provide a critical voice 
from women‟s perspectives. Like the perceptual shift invoked by ambiguous gestalt figures, the 
ethical reasoning of men and women demonstrates a similarly ambiguous shift, so that their 
perspectives are cast as different but complementary frames or visions of the same situation, 
depending on the dimensions of relationship in which they are grounded (Gilligan, 1987). By 
focusing on relational autonomy in this way, this study takes up one of the fundamental 
principles of feminist thought by explicitly steering clear of splitting the principle of autonomy 
into a masculine autonomy and a feminine autonomy. Instead, the two poles of yet another 
dichotomy implicit in Western thought are presented, not as alternatives in opposition to one 
another, but as complementary perspectives in symbiosis.  
 
There is further danger in the dichotomous thinking inherent in the Western tradition. Once 
individuals have been assigned to one side of the autonomy/connection duality, for instance, 
other assumptions are automatically made. Implicit in the idea that women are relational by 
nature and men autonomous, is the assumption that women are not autonomous and men are not 
relational (Berlin & Johnson, 1989). As a result, those masculine values traditionally associated 
with autonomy – isolation, independence, competition, and self-sufficiency – are removed from 
what is perceived as women‟s reality. Such associations are transformed when autonomy and 
relatedness are no longer conceived as bipolar characteristics but as integral parts of healthy 
maturity. Berlin and Johnson (1989) outline a new form of autonomy that allows for a 
commitment to oneself and one‟s relationships, to being a whole self within relationships. This 
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two-stranded commitment highlights the ability of a new, tuned-in autonomy to be realized 
within relationship while simultaneously “underscoring the absence of both freedom and warmth 
when caregiving takes place from a submissive position” (Berlin & Johnson, 1989, p. 94). Their 
argument is strongly for not abandoning autonomy, but for using the valuable contributions from 
Gilligan and other care theorists to re-focus notions of autonomy on the importance of 
relationships and caring, connectedness and empathy. The primary goal is to reclaim and revise 
the concept of autonomy so that both autonomy and relatedness can co-exist in mature selves.  
 
Elaborating further on the concept of relational autonomy, feminists have drawn attention to the 
ways in which the development and preservation of autonomy is inherently social. Selves-in-
relation are both pre- and co-requisites of autonomy. Friedman (1998) highlights the social 
nature of autonomy as follows: To acquire the very capacity for autonomy requires the self-
reflection borne from socialization; maintaining autonomy involves interacting in the social 
world, relating to others in particular ways; and sustaining autonomy requires socially created 
meanings whereby an individual recognizes and evaluates herself and her goals and values in 
relation to those around her. Social identities, social selves, and social contexts intersect to shape 
relational autonomy, thereby focusing conceptions of individual autonomy, and of moral, 
political, and bioethical agency, through the lens of the intersubjective and social dimensions of 
selfhood and identity (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). Developing this situated notion of relational 
autonomy, Holler (2001) puts forward as an alternative a “whole-system ethic” that is 
“necessarily ontological,” maintaining that the illusions of separation and of self-interest apart 
from other-interest in conventional notions of autonomy “threaten the very existence of the 
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living community” (Holler, 2001, p. 220).  Holler points out that there is evidence for the 
ontological primacy of relationship prior to isolation in our existence.  
 
“Unlike the autonomous man, who thinks that his self is entirely separable from others, the 
autokoenomous woman realizes that she is a self inextricably related to other selves” (Tong, 
1997, p. 94). Another alternative to the traditionally individualistic conceptions of autonomy in 
the ethical mainstream has been proposed by Hoagland (1988). Her alternative, autokoenomy 
represents the self-in-community and captures the sense of being free from dominance without 
necessitating self-domination (Sherwin, 1992b). One advantage of these alternative conceptions 
of autonomy is that they support richer and more acceptable notions of persons and, as a result, 
they support more comprehensive understandings of what counts as ethical problems. By 
recognizing that individuals are “situated within a web of relationships and contexts from which 
their decisions cannot be separated,” responsibility for choices and actions extends to the 
contribution that society makes – allowing for conceptions of autonomy that do not reinforce 
unacceptable ideology (Ells, 2001, p. 423). This is particularly significant when considering that 
principles of autonomy are applied in contexts where consent is required from disadvantaged or 
vulnerable populations by privileged groups of researchers. The task becomes one of balancing 
autonomy with community solidarity, both in ontological thought and epistemological action 
(Code, 1987) to ensure that principles applied in research ethics are as ethical in practice as they 
are in theory.   
 
Keller (1997) outlines the alternative model of autonomy proposed by Meyers (1987, 1989), 
which takes the relational self, situated in an ethic of care, as its starting point. Meyers‟ account 
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also severs traditional notions of autonomy from individualistic assumptions by building into 
autonomy the idea that the self is socially constituted and, therefore, the way that individuals 
experience and think about the world is a function of the relationships in which they are 
involved. However, this alternative does not eliminate the importance of autonomy in the caring 
individual‟s self concept. Self-respect is a central component of Meyers‟ theory, whereby 
autonomy and self-respect are each necessary for the realization of the other – they are reciprocal 
and mutually reinforcing. Meyers‟ relational autonomy is built on models of friendship. She 
looks at how women relate to one another, how they maintain and reinforce their sense of self-
respect through seeking out other‟s care and support and engaging in discussions with others 
when making major decisions. Autonomy is also enhanced through this dialogical process, 
Meyers argues, as it not only helps to solidify the relationships in which individuals develop their 
self-respect, but also can help the individual to make decisions which are more autonomous.  
Conceiving of autonomy as a dialogical process helps to distinguish which aspects of 
autonomy can be shared and which must be exercised by the autonomous person 
alone;…it explains how a person can be very much connected to others and still be 
autonomous; it illustrates how friendship (and mutually respectful researcher-participant 
relationships) can enhance the autonomy competency, and thereby the self-respect, of 
someone who can be minimally autonomous to begin with; and it issues one last 
challenge to the individualistic conception of autonomy by conceiving autonomy as an 
intersubjective activity (Keller, 1997, p. 161).   
 
 
Towards this end, many feminists acknowledge the central place that autonomy has in bioethical 
theory, while emphasizing that it must be scourged of its individualistic presumptions and 
reformulated as a concept which recognizes the centrality of relational experiences in human 
agency. This, they argue, will offer a conception of patient autonomy that is better suited to the 
practical work of bioethics than the dominant principlist model (Donchin, 2001). Common to 
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these alternative models is the emphasis on relationship. Much of the work in this area has been 
advanced by Donchin (2001), who has explored the alternative metaphors of mothering and of 
friendship put forward by earlier feminist theorists as more appropriate for application in health 
care contexts, and presented the sisterhood model which, she argues, overcomes some of the 
potential flaws of the previous two approaches. Donchin (2000a) presents a more inclusive 
understanding of autonomy that offers solutions to controversial ethical dilemmas like physician-
assisted suicide that the limited perspective of the dominant individualistic conception misses.  
 
Donchin (2000b) has also shown how prevailing accounts of autonomy which do not take the 
complex interplay between individual autonomy and biological and social relationships into 
account are ill-equipped to offer guidance in, for example, genetic decision making. She 
proposes the development of a strong relational model of autonomy which recognizes that 
“autonomy is not solely an individual enterprise, and that respect for the autonomy of others 
requires collaboration, long-term reciprocity, and equitable balancing of power relationships” 
(Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, p. 26). Dodds (2000) has also developed a more relational approach 
to autonomy. Like Donchin, Dodds argues that autonomy is narrowly conceptualized as 
informed consent in the bioethical literature, which, in turn, limits the options available in health 
care contexts and restricts ethical decision-making. Dodds presents relational autonomy as a 






2.5.2 Relational Autonomy in Context: Power and Relationship  
 
There has been much support in health care contexts for the expansion of traditional conceptions 
of autonomy. One such context is in the caring for dependent elderly persons. Here the 
individualistic bias of the conventional notion of autonomy fails to capture how individuals 
experience their changing identities, abilities and realities as they age and become more 
dependent on others. Ter Meulen (2001) argues for inclusion of three aspects of autonomy which 
are typically not acknowledged in contemporary healthcare ethics: identification, identity, and 
sense of meaning. Autonomy as the development of identity is necessarily a relational process, 
one which requires continuous identification with changing circumstances. In the context of 
aging, being autonomous also requires a sense of meaning of what it is to be old and, 
particularly, dependent, which, in turn, requires the solidarity and commitment of the care giver 
(Ter Meulen, 2001). The importance of shifting notions of autonomy from abstract concepts to 
shared interpretations of lived experiences is of particular significance in these contexts.  
 
Contextualizing the debate around the principle of autonomy in end-of-life ethical dilemmas with 
cancer patients, McGrath (1998) also discusses reformulating the principled approach to 
autonomy to one that is a way of approaching patients which views them as people in contexts 
and empowers them in more ways than simply providing them with information and asking them 
to sign the consent form. The idea of autonomy as empowerment changes the principle from one 
that should be applied in difficult situations to a way of continuously responding to the patient 
and their family. This shifts the focus from a concern with the information and signature 
requirements of the consent form to a more holistic approach that emphasizes patient 
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empowerment and is more respectful and inclusive of the particularities of patients‟ lives and 
experiences (McGrath, 1998).  
 
Moving beyond the narrow focus of informed consent in research contexts on conditions of 
adequate comprehension and competency to make voluntary choices is a central goal of Fisher‟s 
(2003) relational ethics. Fisher broadens the scope of informed consent in research to the 
relationship between the researcher, the research participant and the consent context. This 
involves not only recognizing how the broader social context affects individuals‟ decisions in the 
research setting, but also how researchers‟ own competencies and obligations are grounded 
within a particular context. From a relational perspective, informed consent becomes a product 
of mutual understanding and requires a shift from fulfilling conditions of autonomous choices to 
being responsive to the research participant‟s concerns, values and abilities. Obtaining consent 
then becomes an expression of connection and goodness-of-fit between researchers and their 
research participants (Fisher, 2003).  
 
Accompanying the awareness that social relationships are necessary for the realization of 
autonomy, however, is acknowledgement that relationships can also impede or obstruct 
autonomy, or, as is the case for many women in non-Western cultures, eradicate autonomy 
altogether. The connection between autonomy and the social is a complex one, which can be 
positive and negative. Autonomy can be both enhanced and impeded by relationships. In 
developing relational conceptions of autonomy, therefore, it is necessary to be cognizant of how 
social relationships can both promote and hinder the realization of autonomy (Friedman, 1997). 
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Nedelsky (1989) acknowledges the inexorable influence of relationships of power, of the 
collective, on individual autonomy and shows how this too often dichotomous tension between 
autonomy and collectivity can be reconciled in an alternative, more relational and more context-
embedded conception of autonomy. Instead of viewing autonomy as a process of erecting walls 
between the individual and the threat of the collective, Nedelsky argues that relationships, not 
isolation, are necessary for the development and maintenance of autonomy – they constitute both 
the source of and danger to autonomy. “To be autonomous, a person must feel a sense of her own 
power (which does not mean power over others), and that feeling is only possible within a 
structure of relationships conducive to autonomy” (Nedelsky, 1989, p. 25). Autonomy is an 
individual value which comes into being in the context of the social.  
 
Others, too, have traced the theme of empowerment in relational conceptions of autonomy. 
Fishbane (2001) considers how power imbalances do exist in society but shows how 
reconceptualizing the nature of persons alters these narratives of power. Competitive values of 
power-over have traditionally been associated with notions of autonomy; changing the 
underlying perspective to one of a relational view of persons challenges Western notions about 
power and the self.  
While acknowledging and working to change these power differences and abuses of 
power, relational and feminist theorists are also challenging the power-over model with a 
power-to (Goodrich, 1991) or power-with or mutual empowerment (Surrey, 1991) model, 
especially in interpersonal relationships (Fishbane, 2001, p. 277).  
 
This applies to men as well as women, argues Fishbane, in that the power-over model is 
socialized into our thinking about men‟s development – a dominant perception which can be 
altered by rethinking development in relational terms and reconsidering gender assumptions 
implicit in our culture.   
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Building on the recognition of the influence of power and relational inequalities on individuals‟ 
autonomy, Warren (2001) recommends an alternative conceptualization of autonomy that is 
based on notions of empowerment. While traditional autonomy is essentially individualistic, 
concepts of empowerment capture both the social and political context and reveal how power 
affects relationships and individual autonomy. An ethic of empowerment is, in many respects, 
better suited to realizing individual autonomy in research settings than are conventional 
applications of informed consent. This is especially significant when research is conducted with 
vulnerable populations in developing countries like South Africa, where the operation and 
influence of power relationships is clearly evident and unavoidable: both in the informed consent 
process, between researchers and research participants, and in the relationships between men and 
women in this society, where male power and control over females extends into many areas of 
their lives (Jobson, 2005; Memela, 2005; Sideris, 2004, 2005). Translating the discourse of 
empowerment into the ethical practice identifies and challenges these sources of power and 
inequality and finds ways of enhancing autonomy within these contexts (Warren, 2001).  
 
Thus, while autonomy should not be abandoned, it is only part of the story, and needs to be 
modified to include (women‟s) “stories about how we are to live together, and how we are to 
make families and communities that support the growth of love, enduring loyalties and 
compassion” (Murray, 1994, p. 33). The same argument applies to culture, and to the tendency to 
perceive one culture‟s worldview as superior to another. This is reflected in the domination of 
Western “independent” notions of self versus the interdependent views of personhood that are 
adopted in many non-Western cultures. In many developing countries, and in South Africa in 
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particular, there are cultures with differing worldviews from those of the First World values of 
independence from which individualistic conceptions of autonomy arise. Thus, while feminist 
voices can help us to focus on women‟s unique experiences of agency, feminist (bio)ethics can 
also facilitate the adoption of a critical perspective when attempting to mould principles of 
autonomy in informed consent practices into more gender- and culture-sensitive conceptions. 
“The provisional goal here must be to acknowledge always the textuality of morality, and to 
encourage the self-determining individual to root herself in the moral community rather than 
abstract herself from it” (Shildrick, 1997, p. 123). 
 
This section has provided a review of feminist models of relational autonomy. It has attempted to 
show how these models are a synthesis of the concepts explored in the preceding sections – 
integrating relational concepts of the self into traditionally individualistic principles of 
autonomy, and building on the integration of the predominant ethic of justice with an ethic of 
care that is based on these more connected notions of the self in relationship. What has become 
evident in these relational autonomy models is how the conventional principle of autonomy that 
was critiqued in previous sections can benefit from attending to the individualism inherent in 
Western bioethics and incorporating concepts from self-in-relation theories and care ethics that 
have previously been neglected in mainstream ethical approaches. The discussion above has 
demonstrated how these relational autonomy models can work in context by balancing out the 
power dynamics in the relationships that are inextricable from the research process, and 
empowering those involved in the informed consent process by meeting them where they are in 
their lives. In the final section of this literature review, the models of relational autonomy that 
have been developed in this chapter will be further contextualized, showing how such relational 
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alternatives are more appropriate, more respectful, and, ipso facto, more ethical, for conducting 
research with women within their situated, real, lived circumstances and experiences.  
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2.6 Situating Relational Autonomy in Research Ethics in HIV Vaccine Trials in Developing 
World Contexts: The Contribution of Social Science Research to Ethics in Research 
 
An ethic of interrelationship and interdependence would be able to accommodate the co-
existence of selves in community, showing not only how individuals relate to and depend on 
each other, but how they depend on and are depended on by their communities, as well as the 
way various collectivities are interdependent (Loewy, 1993). It follows from this that a genuinely 
universal and genuinely ethical ethics will be concerned with “embodied persons: racially, 
culturally, and historically specific, gendered individuals” (Kourany, 1998, p. 12). Rather than 
trying to deny the existence of the concrete particularities of potential participants‟ lives, 
applications of feminist ethics in research settings recognize the impact that these relational 
contexts have on individual participants‟ autonomy. These alternative, relational perspectives 
could enrich existing principles of autonomy and its application in informed consent practices, 
especially, but not exclusively, in the case of women, and of women in developing countries in 
particular. Moreover, the research process itself, as well as the procedures for ensuring that 
research involving human subjects is ethical, occur within relationship. Therefore, building 
relationally conceived principles into the informed consent process would involve transforming 
this from a detached, contractual process into a mutually respectful interaction that fully 
acknowledges participants as individuals with their own particular and unique life histories. 
These relational conceptions of autonomy, therefore, would not reinforce unacceptable ideology 
and practice, and are more truly synonymous with the ideal of respect for persons that lies at the 
heart of the principle of autonomy.  
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In acknowledging the existence and impact of relationships and contexts on individuals, the 
alternative, richer models of autonomy presented by feminists also turn the spotlight onto the 
inequalities that exist within these relational contexts for many of the participants from 
developing countries. Extending this relational model of ethics to the research process, Fisher 
(2000) argues that ensuring that research will be both valid and socially valuable, and 
formulating fair and ethical procedures, cannot simply be achieved through the scientist‟s moral 
reflections and ethical deliberations. She argues that a truly relational ethic can only be derived 
through scientist-participant dialogue, based on respect and mutual cooperation. This focus on 
mutual respect is also emphasized in other recent works on research ethics (Emanuel, Wendler, 
Killen & Grady, 2004; Lysaught, 2004). In addition, feminist models of relational autonomy in 
ethics also allow scientists and researchers to “integrate their rational and relational caring selves 
in ways that enhance their ability to engage research participants as partners in creating 
experimental procedures reflecting both scientific and interpersonal integrity” (Grossman et al., 
1997 in Fisher, 2000, p. 137). Fisher thus builds on the conceptual foundations of feminist ethics 
to develop a more a relational ethic for science and research that incorporates and enhances the 
interpersonal nature of and obligations inherent in the scientist-participant relationship. Such a 
process could arguably have improved the understanding of the research process in some 
complex microbicide HIV prevention studies, which reported that less than 30% of the women 
enrolled in the South African arm of the trial understood essential components of trial 
participation (Ramjee et al., 2000). Ironically, the scientific aim of the study was to empower 
women‟s agency in the fight to reduce sex workers‟ vulnerability to HIV.  
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In acknowledging the existence and impact of relationships and contexts on individuals, the 
alternative, richer model of autonomy presented by feminists discussed above turns the spotlight 
onto the inequalities that exist within these relational contexts for many of the participants from 
developing countries. A relational interpretation of autonomy is conscious of both interpersonal 
and political relationships of power and powerlessness, acknowledging that autonomy is not 
simply about being offered a choice or consenting to some predetermined research project, but 
about having the opportunity to resist oppression and to adequately shape the world (Sherwin, 
1998a). While autonomy ultimately resides in the individual, under relational autonomy, society, 
and not just the individual, is the subject of examination, so that responsibility for autonomy 
extends, but it not limited to, the social. Sherwin (1998a) emphasizes that, when relational 
interpretations of autonomy are applied in research contexts, informed consent is understood as 
an ongoing, interactive process in which both parties can be transformed.  
A relational view helps us to understand how the specific social location of (patients) can 
affect their autonomy status. It explains why requiring health care providers to disclose 
relevant information and seek the permission of (patients) is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, criterion for protecting (patient) autonomy (Sherwin, 1998a, p. 42). 
 
 
Feminist theory moves traditional ethical approaches out of their neutral standpoint, turning the 
spotlight on relationships and contexts in which people – men and women - are embedded. Not 
only do the above arguments address the current lack of attention to the relationships in which 
research participants are embedded, and their impact on individual autonomy, but they also allow 
for the acknowledgment in ethical theory and practice of the relationship between researchers 
and research participants. Central to these relational theories is the idea that informed consent is 
a collaborative project in which researcher and research participant are moral agents who work 
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together to ensure that research is socially valuable and valid while being conscious that 
participant perspectives should inform but not replace ethical deliberation by researchers (Fisher, 
2000).  Key themes in this approach are those aspects of the researcher-participant relationship 
which enhance ethical research – trust, mutual understanding, and collaborative decision making 
which is cognizant of each individual‟s value orientations. While it may not be possible to 
completely eliminate power differences from the research relationship, Fisher (2000) argues that 
the relationship between researcher and participant can be rendered complementary and non-
exploitative. Feminist relational ethics challenge traditionally universalistic and principled 
ethical positions to acknowledge the importance of intersubjectivity, particularity and context; 
they aim to equip researchers with ethical tools that reflect the interpersonal nature and 
obligations inherent in the researcher-participant relationship (Fisher, 2000).  
 
Research in the social sciences traditionally reflects the values and concerns of dominant social 
groups and, as such, has neglected issues of concern to women and other minority groups 
(Cameron, 2001; Kass, 1998; Macklin, 1993; Sherwin, 1996; Sinha, 2003; Wolf, 1996). Feminist 
bioethicists, on the other hand, argue that research is both personal and political and challenge 
social scientists to reconceptualize research as a setting for consciousness raising and social 
change (Campbell & Wasco, 2000). The dominant ethical discourses and practices can be 
transformed through engaging in dialogue with women who occupy both the centre and the 
margins of power (Donchin & Purdy, 1999; Nicholas, 1999). Such collaboration between 
researchers and research participants, and between Western and non-Western bioethicists 
“reflects a process of mutual influencing to discover shared and unshared values through which 
truly fair and ethical procedures can be derived” (Fisher, 2000, p. 130). Developing and applying 
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guidelines that espouse more relational forms of autonomy in and outside of the informed 
consent process is one such step in the (right) ethical direction. 
 
This brings the discussion to a pivotal question underlying the current study: What contribution 
can social science studies such as the one here make to the ethical conduct of biomedical and 
health research? It has been argued that, until recently at least, the field of bioethics has not fully 
acknowledged the role and implications of social science research for the practical 
implementation of ethical principles and theories. As a result, there has been a significant gap 
between ethics as it is theoretically presented in bioethics and the way in which ethical 
deliberation actually takes place in real world situations. Hedgecoe (2004) contends that this gap 
can isolate bioethics from practice and undermine the validity of its claims. “While it is possible 
for social science research to support the principlist approach, for example, it is also quite likely 
that in some, if not many cases, the evidence will not fit into this particular way of structuring the 
social world” (Hedgecoe, 2004, p. 137). The relationship between bioethics and the empirical 
social sciences is now receiving greater attention. Many have begun to acknowledge that social 
science research can contribute in a meaningful way to philosophical and medical bioethics 
(Emanuel, 2002; Haimes, 2002; Hedgecoe, 2004; Hoffmaster, 1992; Yeager, 1996; Zussman, 
1997). Social science studies on bioethical topics can yield useful information that, while not 
morally determinative, is morally relevant (D.R. Wassenaar personal communication with H. 
Richardson, December 2004). For example, empirical evidence is the basis of decisions about 
whether children of a particular age are competent to give informed consent, but this has serious 
implications for ethical medical treatment and clinical research. Thus, such empirical research 
can be regarded as basic moral work (Hedgecoe, 2004). Furthermore, ethics is no longer a purely 
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abstract discipline, as can be seen from the growing interest in empirical investigations and 
applied work within the fields of both philosophy and bioethics (Haimes, 2002).  
 
Collaboration between ethicists and social scientists can thus enhance the way that ethical work 
is conducted and, through social science‟s concern with connecting the particular with the 
general, and empirical data with theoretical explanations, the scope of issues open to ethical 
scrutiny could be expanded (Haimes, 2002; Hedgecoe, 2004). For instance, social science 
research into the interactions between the prevailing values in society and those of its individual 
members can provide empirical evidence against which ethical intuitions can be checked 
(Yeager, 1996). In addition, the contribution that social science research could make to 
understanding not only ethics but ethicists themselves, and how their social identity can affect 
their influence on the conduct of ethics, could be a matter of practical as well as theoretical 
interest for bioethicists (Haimes, 2002). In other words, social science theories are useful for 
illuminating how ethics is historically and culturally located and can shape and be shaped by 
social forces (Haimes, 2002). It is clear, therefore, that traditional bioethics should engage with 
the social sciences, acknowledging that the way things are can tell us something about the way 
things ought to be. The current social science study has attempted to contribute in this way to 
how ethical principles such as autonomy are practically applied and experienced in real world 
contexts.  
  
This section has attempted to show links between the theoretical concepts that were discussed in 
the preceding sections, and the research context, showing how relational autonomy models are 
practically applicable in the ethical conduct of research. It is only through locating relational 
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principles of autonomy within real-world contexts that the value of these concepts can be 
demonstrated. In the summary section that follows, the theoretical concepts explored in the 
literature review above will be linked to the empirical aims of this study.  
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2.7 Summary  
 
The preceding sections have attempted to show that, when applying alternative models of 
autonomy to research contexts in developing countries, respecting autonomy in this relational 
sense involves a number of complex ethical issues that pose a significant challenge to 
bioethicists and all those involved in the research process. Nonetheless, Macklin (1999 in 
Noring, 1999) argues that it is both possible and desirable to posit universal ethical principles for 
health research with human beings. Recognizing that there are many circumstances in which 
conventional principlist ethics offer insufficient guidance for ethical decision making, she 
proposes that this approach should be complemented with a new context-based paradigm that 
brings relationships and individual particularities to the ethical arena. This ethical paradigm can 
account for the impact that gender, race, culture, and community factors have on ethical decision 
making, and recognizes that relationships change over time, emphasizing the importance in this 
process of interactions, power, responsibilities, and historical considerations (Macklin, 1999 in 
Noring, 1999).  
 
In these contexts, focusing on and engaging actively with the complex network of relationships 
involved in human subjects research is, arguably, more appropriate than the current focus on 
those individualistic, abstract, contractual applications of principlist ethics. In research settings in 
developing countries especially, Sherwin (1998a) points to the importance of conceiving of the 
informed consent process as interactive and continuous, where relational interpretations of 
autonomy can reveal both how social influences may enhance or constrain women participants‟ 
decision making, and how an interactive informed consent process may be transformative for 
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participant and researcher alike. The process of research, in other words, is as important as the 
outcome (Emanuel et al., 2004; Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2004; Wassenaar, 2006).  
 
Many advocate collaborative partnerships between researchers, policy makers, and communities 
in developing countries (see, for example, Benatar, 2002; Emanuel et al., 2004; Heath, 2005; 
Mosavel et al., 2005; Mugisha, 2003). This could be extended beyond the macro-contextual level 
to the fostering of collaborative partnerships and interactions between individual researchers and 
their research participants. The ethical conduct of clinical research is an ongoing process and 
should not be deemed ultimately ethical after informed consent has been obtained (English, 
2002; Holzer, 1991; Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2004). It is only when clinical research truly 
recognizes and respects the contexts in which individual participants are embedded, as well as 
those relationships and circumstances within which participants make fully informed choices, 
does it begin to fulfill its ethical and moral obligations.  
This does not mean that (ethical) principles are relativistic…moral arguments take place 
in context, and they therefore depend at least implicitly on…beliefs about human nature 
and social process…the arguments begin from where we are, and appeal to where we live 
now. This is why moral relativism is seldom as important an issue in practical as it is in 
theoretical ethics (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, pp. 14-15).   
 
 
Jones (1999) and Nicholas (1999), for example, have developed strategies to that will enable 
participants to bring about change from within their own countries where, in many cases, power 
imbalances and gender inequalities are the norm and where women continue to be the victims of 
harmful practices and abuse in all forms. They argue that women should be empowered to 
determine the most ethical and effective ways of resolving the problems they face in their daily 
lives, with non-directive support from Western feminists, bioethicists and researchers that is 
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conscious and respectful of the complex realities of these women‟s lives. Clinical research in 
developed and developing world contexts can be transformed by opening up avenues of dialogue 
across this gulf between the developed and developing worlds. Such collaboration between 
researchers and research participants, and between Western and non-Western bioethicists, to 
discover shared and unshared values and experiences allows for truly fair and ethical procedures 
to be derived and subsequently applied. Explorations of how ethical principles, such as 
autonomy, can be reconceptualized to ensure a more acceptable fit between the typically abstract 
principles and goals of science and research with the lived realities and experiences of research 
participants in developing countries, is but one of the dialogues that need to be entered into. It is 
hoped that this thesis will make a step in this direction in attempting to situate feminist models of 
relational autonomy in developing world contexts, where much biomedical research is being, and 
will continue to be, conducted.  
 
Having reviewed the theoretical literature, some key issues have emerged. The dominance and 
the shortcomings of principled autonomy as it is employed in conventional bioethics have been 
highlighted. A review of feminist approaches to bioethics has shown how feminist ethics has 
been fundamental in providing a critique of autonomy, particularly with respect to its gender bias 
and neglect of values important to women. From these discussions, it has emerged that a central 
target in these critiques is the individualism inherent in Western bioethics and bioethical 
principles. Subsequent sections have demonstrated how this individualist approach has given rise 
to the individualistic notions of the self that underlie dominant conceptions of autonomy, and to 
the justice ethic that has tended to dominate bioethical thinking.  
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In the course of the above discussion it has become evident that the alternative approaches 
developed by feminists in response to these shortcomings have incorporated relational theories of 
the self into an ethic which pays specific attention to the particularities of gender and the 
importance of context – the ethics of care. More significantly, the emphasis on relation and 
connection in these models allows for the application of more relational principles of autonomy 
in research settings. The questions that remain are whether the combination, in theory, of 
concepts of a relational self and a moral orientation of care in relational autonomy models, would 
be evident in practice, and whether the way in which these combinations are experienced are 
associated with an individual‟s gender, as has been suggested in the literature. This study aims to 
address these questions. By combining the concepts of autonomy, self, and moral orientation as 
variables, it will investigate to what extent they are interlinked, and the role that gender plays in 
determining how these variables may be combined with respect to autonomy versus relatedness, 
independent versus interdependent self construals, and justice versus care. A description of an 





 3.1 Aims and Hypotheses 
The main aims of the present study are: 
1. To determine whether there is an association between an individual‟s gender and their  
identification with a particular “type” of autonomy – relational versus independent  
2. To determine whether there is an association between gender and independent versus 
relational self-construal 
3. To determine whether there is an association between gender and an ethic of justice 
versus an ethic of care 
4. To determine whether there is an association between an individual‟s gender, autonomy, 





Predicted Associations between Variables 
GENDER 
 
AUTONOMY SELF ETHIC 
Women         
 
Relational Autonomy       Relational Self             Care    
 
Men              
 
Independent Autonomy    Independent Self         Justice  








To meet these objectives, the following hypotheses will be investigated:  
1. Autonomy: Women will exhibit higher levels of relational autonomy than men; men will 
exhibit higher levels of conventional autonomy (as defined in the literature review) than 
women.  
2. Self: Men will exhibit a more independent self-construal than women and women will 
demonstrate a more relational self-construal than men. 
3. Moral Orientation: Men will show a greater tendency towards a justice orientation than 
women, while women will show a greater tendency towards a care orientation than men. 
4. There will be a consistent directional association (positive correlation) between relational 
autonomy, relational self, and care orientation for women, and a consistent directional 
association (positive correlation) between independent autonomy, independent self, and 
justice orientation for men. 
 
Secondary hypotheses: Although culture was not an explicit focus of this study, further 
investigation was done to see what the results would be when culture was taken into 
consideration, as hypothesized below. 
 
1. Autonomy: Black women are expected to have a higher level of relational autonomy than 
White women who, in turn, are expected to have higher levels of relational autonomy 
than Black men, who, in turn, will have higher levels of relational autonomy than White 
men. Conversely, it is hypothesized that White men will show greater levels of 
conventional autonomy than Black men, who, in turn, will exhibit a greater degree of 
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conventional autonomy than White women, who, in turn, will have a higher level of 
conventional autonomy than Black women.  
 
2. Self: White men will exhibit a more independent self-construal than Black men, who will 
show a more independent self-construal than White women, who are expected to have a 
more independent self-construal than Black women. Conversely, Black women will 
demonstrate a more relational self-construal than White women, who will have higher 
levels of relational self-construal than Black men, who will have a more relational self-
construal than White men. 
 
3. Moral Orientation: White men will show a greater tendency towards a justice orientation 
than Black men. Black men are expected to exhibit a greater tendency towards a justice 
orientation than White women, while White women will show a greater tendency towards 
a justice orientation than Black women. Conversely, Black women will exhibit a greater 
tendency towards a care orientation than White women. White women will have a greater 
tendency towards a care orientation than Black men, who will have a greater tendency 
towards a care orientation than White men.  
 
4. There will be a consistent directional association (positive correlation) between relational 
autonomy, relational self, and care orientation for Black women and for White women, 
and a consistent directional association (positive correlation) between independent 
autonomy, independent self, and justice orientation for White men and for Black men. 
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3.2 Research Design & Methodology 
 
It is not within the scope of this current research to review, evaluate, or reconcile all the feminist 
epistemologies that challenge traditional ideologies, nor to attempt to employ the diverse range 
of feminist methodologies available. The common link between these epistemologies lies in 
feminists‟ answer to the question, who can be the knower? Women can indeed be knowers and 
their experiences legitimate sources of knowledge that are worthy of the critical reflection that 
informs our understanding of the social world (Campbell & Schram, 1995; Campbell & Wasco, 
2000). Adopting a woman‟s perspective involves shifting the focus of research design and 
methodology, re-viewing and reinterpreting existing data from this new perspective. As a result, 
things that were previously unseen may be revealed by feminist inquiry, and anomalies – 
observations or data that do not fit the current theory – may be generated (Nielson, 1990).  
 
3.2.1 Feminist Critiques of Quantitative Methodology 
 
In reaction to the dominance of the male perspective in social science, many feminists have taken 
a stand against the over-reliance on empiricist, reductionist, quantitative research methods in 
social science research. As a result, “…a symbiosis has occurred between „feminist‟ and 
„qualitative‟ in the minds of many people, (where) qualitative methods are thought to be the 
methods that protest against the status quo, just as feminism does more generally” (Reinharz, 
1993, p. 69). Similarly, the feminist critique of positivism assumes that the subject/object 
separation (and, indeed, many of the dualisms that are problematized in feminist theory) is a 
problem exclusive to quantitative methodologies (Sprague & Zimmerman, 1989).  
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Qualitative methods, presumed untarnished by quantitative shortcomings, have been presented as 
the appropriately ameliorative alternative in feminist research. In doing so, feminists have – 
ironically – adopted the dualistic stance, or false dichotomizing, they set out to do away with 
(Sprague & Zimmerman, 1989; Thorne & Varcoe, 1998). “If one actually examines a large 
amount of feminist research, however, one quickly learns that the fusion of „qualitative‟ and 
„feminist‟ is more myth than reality” (Reinharz, 1993, p. 69) and,  
while significant attention has been paid…to the ways in which quantitative methods are 
identified with masculinist versions of scientific rigor, there has been little discussion of 
the idea that this coupling is historically produced and is not necessary or inevitable 
(Lawson, 1995, p. 451).  
 
When one studies quantitative methods more closely, it becomes clear that there is nothing 
inherent in these methods that promotes patriarchal analyses simply because the two have been 
linked historically (Risman, 1993). 
 
3.2.2 Value of Quantitative Methodology in Feminist Research 
 
“It is important to note…that qualitative methods are no more essentially feminist than 
quantitative techniques are essentially masculinist” (Lawson, 1995, p. 450). Both methods have 
their own strengths and weaknesses. A number of writers have recently begun to defend and 
advocate the use of quantitative techniques in feminist research, arguing that, if critically 
employed, these methods can actually be more appropriate – indeed, essential – in certain 
instances (Dunn & Waller, 2000; Griffin & Phoenix, 1994; Reinharz, 1993; Risman, 1993; 
Sprague & Zimmerman, 1989). Others have gone on to identify specific methodological features 
that typify feminist methods, rather than particular data collection techniques – a focus on 
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women‟s experiences; the stipulation of explanations for women; and the researcher‟s position 
on the same critical plane as the explicit subject matter (Harding, 1987b). Quantitative research 
has been shown to be equally valuable in highlighting the unequal treatment of women and men 
by utilizing the techniques of quantification while avoiding the methodological pitfalls evident in 
traditionally „masculine‟ research (Sprague & Zimmerman, 1989). “Thus health professionals 
working from a standpoint consistent with feminist theorizing will not disregard the potential for 
quantitative research or empirical science within the larger project of developing knowledge for 
the reduction of gendered social inequalities” (Thorne & Varcoe, 1998, p. 490).  
 
Feminist methods, like feminist theories, do not employ a monolithic approach; feminist 
scholarship embodies a multiplicity of research methods (Dunn & Waller, 2000; Harding, 1987a) 
that are conscious of personhood and of the involvement of the researcher (Reinharz, 1992). 
Because all of our perspectives are partial and situated, the use of one or the other method alone 
does not resolve this subjective tension. Given this, Lawson (1995) contends that feminist 
scholars can and should take advantage of quantitative techniques within the context of relational 
ontologies to answer particular kinds of questions and to demonstrate how processes of 
oppression operate. As part of their methodological work towards transforming gender relations 
and exposing the diversity of individual experience, the goal of feminist researchers is to erode 
polarized distinctions by producing work that is both theoretical and practical, basic and applied, 
abstract and compellingly concrete (Crawford & Kimmel, 1999).  
 
This study employs quantitative methodology to investigate the relationship between gender and 
autonomy. It is a between-subjects, correlational design which compares the scores of two 
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groups – men and women - from the student population to test the difference between population 
means on measures of autonomy, self-construal, and moral orientation. The main research 
hypothesis is that men will exhibit higher levels of independence in their experience of both 
autonomy and self-construal, and, correspondingly, will show a greater tendency towards an 
ethic of justice; women will exhibit higher degrees of interdependence in their experience of 
their autonomy and their self-construals, and greater tendencies towards an ethic of care in their 
moral orientations. 
 
3.3 Sample  
 
The primary comparison in this study focused on gender differences. Thus the main sample was 
comprised of 188 women and 158 men for gender comparison. However, a mixed race (Black 
and White) sample of men and women was chosen so that a secondary analysis could determine 
whether there would be similar differences along racial lines. For this purpose, the sample was 
drawn specifically from student populations of Black men, Black women, White men, and White 
women. A group of Black student men and women was included as a comparison group to assess 
the relative degree of independent autonomy versus relational autonomy in Black students 
compared to White students, and to evaluate whether Black men and Black women experience a 
more relational form of autonomy than White men and White women respectively. Indian 
students were not included in this sample because this would have generated too many variable 
cells for comparison and analysis would have been diluted. It was initially intended that the 
sample for this study would be comprised of 400 participants: 200 women (100 Black women 
and 100 White women) and 200 men (100 Black men and 100 White men). However, due to 
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poor response rate (n=675; 45%) and a large number of spoiled questionnaires (n=329; 48.74%), 
the final sample was made up as follows: 188 women (100 Black and 88 White) and 158 men 
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Of the total sample group, 45.66% (n=158) were men and 54.34% (n=188) were women, as 










Figure 3.1 Gender 
 
3.3.2 Race 
The student sample was made up of 195 Black students (56.36%) and 151 White students 
(43.64%). (See Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2 Race 
 
 133 
3.3.3 Other Demographics  
 
Age of the sample participants was between 17 and 50 years of age. The majority (n =261; 
75.4%) of the sample fell into the 17–21-year age category.  
 
Home language: First-language English speakers comprised the largest language group (n=147; 
42.5%), followed by first-language Zulu-speakers (n=143; 41.3%). Other languages reported 
included Xhosa, Afrikaans, and other African and European languages.  
 
Occupation: Students made up the majority of the sample (n=335; 96.8%). Other occupations 
were reported mostly as temporary or part-time jobs over and above being students, including 
waiter, teacher, coach, sales clerk, librarian, and research assistant.  
 
Course: The largest proportion (n=80; 23.1%) of the sample were BSocSci degree students, 
followed by students in the SFP (Science Foundation Programme) courses (n=79; 22.8%), and 
thereafter variously distributed between BA, BCom, Psychology, Law, BSc and BAgric students. 
The majority of the participants were in first year (n=165; 47.7%) and unmarried (n=335; 
96.8%).  
 
3.4 Instruments  
 
While many of the standard questions about conditions of informed consent – competence, 
language, understanding, voluntariness – have been widely explored in the current literature 
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(Benatar, 2002; Kent, 1996; Lindegger & Richter, 2000; Meisel & Roth, 1983), to date, very 
little work has been done on the principle of autonomy as it is applied in informed consent 
procedures in South Africa. As outlined in the literature review above, autonomy does not equate 
with voluntariness, that is, with competence, understanding, and freedom from coercion. 
Perceptions and experiences of autonomy extend beyond these checklist criteria, and develop 
from a web of inter-related factors, among them, selfhood, culture, gender, social and historical 
influences. The measurement of autonomy, therefore, is not straightforward, and requires 
instrumentation that will assess as many of the aspects that constitute personal autonomy as 
possible.  
 
An extensive search of the empirical literature on autonomy was conducted and a number of 
autonomy scales were found, using gender, self, agency, culture, morality, and ethics/informed 
consent as the major parameters. It was interesting to note that many of the more relational 
discussions and assessments of autonomy came from the nursing literature, while review of the 
literature revealed more frequent treatment of autonomy as voluntariness according to standard 
criteria of principled autonomy in informed consent. This could be because nurses work more in 
the divide between the principles of medical ethics and the practice of patient care, creating a 
need for a more relational form of ethical principles and practices. 
 
The assessment of autonomy in the South African context is problematic, because no appropriate 
measures of autonomy were found for application to the South African population with adequate 
validity. In choosing instruments, the primary aim was to measure autonomy as it is understood 
and practiced in mainstream bioethics vs. relational autonomy as proposed by, among others, 
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feminist scholars.  The main factors being measured were the selfhood dimension of autonomy – 
independent vs. relational self identity – and the care and justice orientations of autonomy, using 
gender as the independent variable. Autonomy- and self-related constructs from a number of 
empirically validated scales were reviewed in order to identify the most appropriate measures for 
the purposes of this study. An extensive review of the literature yielded several possible scales 
that could potentially be used in combination to measure the relevant aspects of autonomy, self, 
and moral orientation. From the 65 measures that were examined, the following 8 instruments 
were subsequently considered more closely for inclusion in this study: the Autonomy Scale 
(Bekker, 1993); Autonomy, the Caring Perspective (Boughn, 1995); the Relational-
Interdependent Self-Construal Scale (Cross et al., 2000); the Moral Justification Scale (Gump et 
al., 2000); the Relational Being Scale (McChrystal, 1994); the Relationship Self Inventory 
(Pearson et al., 1998); the Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994); and the Moral Orientation Scale 
(Yacker & Weinberg, 1990).  
 
3.4.1 Pilot Instruments 
 
Ultimately, the final instrument had to include a measure of independent versus relational 
autonomy; a measure of independent versus relational self; and a measure of justice versus care 
orientations. Of these, the following were chosen to measure autonomy – Bekker (1993), Boughn 
(1995) – the following to measure relational / independent aspects of the self – Cross et al. 
(2000), McChrystal (1994), Pearson et al. (1998), and Singelis (1994) – and the following to 
measure the justice and care moral orientations – Gump et al. (2000) and Yacker and Weinberg 
(1990). (See Appendix A for a comparison of these scales). The authors of each scale were 
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contacted to explain the purpose and goals of the research and to request permission to use their 
scales in this study. Every author responded positively and granted permission for their scales to 
be used in this research. Further correspondence was entered into with some of the authors 
concerning subsequent studies that they had conducted using their scales, and providing valuable 
insights or comments on the proposed research. After further examination the measures that were 
included in a preliminary pilot study were Bekker‟s (1993) Autonomy Scale; Cross et al.‟s 
(2000) Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale; and Pearson et al.‟s (1998) Relationship 
Self Inventory.  
 
During the pilot study (N=52), it became clear that the Autonomy Scale (Bekker, 1993) and the 
Relationship Self Inventory (Pearson et al., 1998) were not the most suitable measures for 
inclusion in a final questionnaire. Participants in the pilot reported that the statements of the 
Autonomy Scale were vague and confusing, possibly as a result of the translation of this scale 
from Dutch to English. The results generated by this scale were also unsatisfactory as they were 
inconsistent and their reliability and validity questionable. It was also found that the Relationship 
Self Inventory was too long (60 items) and reportedly tedious to answer; it was thus not included 
in the final questionnaire given the time constraints in asking participant students to complete the 
instrument in an allocated amount of time.   
 
Based on the feedback and results from the pilot study, available instruments were reconsidered. 
Length of the scale was an important consideration, as was simplicity of language. In the final 
elimination, three self-report questionnaires were included to assess autonomy, self-other 
orientation, and moral orientation: McChrystal‟s (1994) Relational Being Scale; Cross et al.‟s 
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(2000) Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale; and Yacker and Weinburg‟s (1990) 
Moral Orientation Scale. These instruments are discussed in further detail below. 
 
3.4.2 Relational Being Scale 
 
3.4.2.1 Description  
The Relational Being Scale (McChrystal, 1994) is based on the Stone Center‟s self-in-relation 
theories – that relational beings develop in and through a matrix of relationships with, rather than 
through separation from, other people (McChrystal, 1994). The Relational Being Scale (RBS) 
(see Appendix C) is a self-report, visual analogue scale that was developed to quantitatively 
measure the qualities of relatedness and autonomy as defined by Gilligan (1982), Miller (1986, 
1990), Surrey (1991) and their colleagues at the Stone Center. Comprising 28 items in total, the 
RBS has two subscales: the Autonomy subscale (A) with 13 items, and the Relational subscale 
(R) with 15 items. R subscale items were devised using key concepts from Relational Being 
theory – “the maintenance of relationships over adherence to abstract concepts of justice; 
definition of self; the theory of human development; the concept of the ideal person; the capacity 
for empathy; psychopathology and psychotherapy practice” (McChrystal, 1994, p. 5). These 
concepts were formulated into statements which required participants to consider their opinions 
of themselves in their responses. Items for the A subscale were inferred from the concepts 
generated from the work on relatedness.  
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3.4.2.2 Reliability and validity coefficients 
In the original study, total scale alphas and item total correlations were 0.68 for the A subscale 
and 0.77 for the R subscale. The interscale correlation (-0.18) indicated no correlation between 
the two scales (McChrystal, 1994). No reliability data were given by the authors.  
 
3.4.2.3 Administration and scoring 
The RBS is a visual analogue scale: each statement is followed by a 9cm line, with „very 
accurate‟ at the left end of the line and „very inaccurate‟ at the right end of the line. Respondents 
are asked to make a cross at the point which most accurately reflects the accuracy of the 
statement as it applies to them. A ruler is used to score each item – it is placed along the line and 
the centimeter measurement (of 1-10) where the participant has marked his /her cross is given as 
the score. The lines are measured from right to left.      
 
3.4.3 Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale 
 
3.4.3.1 Description 
The Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal (RISC) Scale (Cross et al., 2000) developed out of 
the growing concern that Western, individualistic assumptions of personhood dominate much of 
the research on the self, while the connection of the self to others has largely been ignored (Cross 
& Madson, 1997). More recently researchers have begun to recognize the importance of others in 
the self-identities of many people, particularly women, while individual differences in the self-
construal have been shown to explain some of the differences women and men‟s behaviours 
(Markus & Oyserman, 1989; Surrey, 1991). The RISC Scale (see Appendix C) was developed by 
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Cross et al. (2000) to measure the tendency to define self in relation to others, identified as the 
relational-interdependent self-construal. Items were generated from concepts related to relational 
forms of the interdependent self-construal as defined in the literature, as well as from 
modifications of conceptually related measures. It was found that individuals with high RISC 
Scale scores were more committed to and placed greater importance on their close relationships, 
and were more likely to take the needs and opinions of others into account when making 
decisions (Cross et al., 2000). The RISC Scale was subsequently examined in three separate 
studies: a validation study; a study of the role of relationship considerations in decision-making; 
and an investigation into the association between the relational-interdependent self-construal and 
relationship development strategies (Cross et al., 2000). In the original studies, women 
consistently scored higher on the RISC scale than men did.    
 
3.4.3.2 Reliability and validity coefficients 
The original validation study found the RISC to be a relatively stable self-report measure of 
individual differences in the relational-interdependent self-construal construct (Cross et al., 
2000). Factor analysis revealed that the scale is underscored by a single factor, while reliability 
tests showed the scale to have high internal consistency, convergent, discriminant, and criterion 
validity, and good test-retest reliability. Coefficient alpha for the original study (averaged across 
the sub-samples) was 0.88.  
 
3.4.3.3 Administration and scoring 
The RISC Scale consists of 11 questions which require subjects to rate self-other attitudes 
according to a „strongly agree‟ (score = 7) to a „strongly disagree‟ (score = 1) forced choice 
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format (Likert-type scale). Total scores range from 11 to 77. Two of the eleven items are 
negatively phrased and their scoring is reversed in the data analysis.  
 
3.4.4 Moral Orientation Scale 
 
3.4.4.1 Description 
The Moral Orientation Scale Using Childhood Dilemmas (hereafter referred to as the MOS) is an 
objective test developed by Yacker and Weinberg (1990) to measure two distinct moral 
orientations as outlined in the work of Kohlberg and Gilligan. Concepts underlying the MOS 
were based on the hypothesis that individuals showing a stronger care orientation or ethic place 
greater emphasis on responsibility towards others and the preservation of relationships; those 
showing a greater tendency towards a justice orientation emphasize individual rights over 
relationships (Yacker & Weinberg, 1990). The MOS consists of 12 moral dilemmas that children 
(aged 8-10) typically face in their daily lives (see Appendix C). Although the scale was designed 
to measure adult moral orientation, childhood dilemmas were used in the assessment as they are 
relatively simple and universal, as opposed to the moral dilemmas that adults might face (Yacker 
& Weinberg, 1990). The childhood moral dilemmas were formulated in consultation with child 
development specialists, and were based on published and unpublished materials including 
curricula, moral judgement interviews, popular child-rearing texts, and interviews with parents 
(Yacker & Weinberg, 1990).  
 
The MOS consists of two subscales: a Justice subscale (J) and a Care subscale (C). As 
hypothesized in the original validation study, there was a significant gender difference on the 
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scores of the MOS, with men showing a stronger tendency towards a justice orientation and 
women showing a stronger tendency towards a care orientation.  
 
 
3.4.4.2 Reliability and validity coefficients 
The MOS was found to provide a valid assessment of preferred mode of moral thinking (Yacker 
& Weinberg, 1990). Initial validation showed the scale to have stable discriminant validity and 
good test-retest reliability (0.71). No other reliability data was provided in the validation study.  
 
3.4.4.3 Administration and scoring  
As mentioned above, the MOS consists of 12 childhood dilemmas that require respondents to 
imagine that they are helping an 8-to 10-year-old child decide what to do in each situation. Each 
dilemma is followed by four choice alternatives that respondents must rank from 1 to 4, 
according to their preferences for choosing each consideration in helping a child decide what to 
do. Without being identified as such, two of the four choices presented with each dilemma are 
defined within the justice mode of moral reasoning, and two are framed within the care mode 
(Yacker & Weinberg, 1990). Only the first choice given for each dilemma is scored in the final 
analysis: a respondent‟s total score on the Care subscale is calculated by adding the number of 
care responses selected as first choices; the number of justice responses selected as first choices 
are added to obtain the total score on the Justice subscale. Scores may therefore vary from 0 to 
12, with higher scores on the Justice and Care subscales indicating a stronger orientation towards 
justice and care respectively. In order to avoid falsely dichotomizing moral thinking, the authors 
of the MOS did not designate cut-off scores for the scale, in line with Gilligan‟s own findings 
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that individuals do not exhibit one or the other type of moral orientation, but rather stronger 
tendencies towards a care or justice orientation (Yacker & Weinberg, 1990).  
 
3.4.5 Demographic Questionnaire 
 
A demographic questionnaire (see Appendix C) was included in order to obtain information 
about participants‟ age, gender, race, familial, and demographic details. This data provides 




3.5.1 Pilot Study 
 
As discussed in section 3.4 above, the first measures chosen for this study were Bekker‟s (1993) 
Autonomy Scale; Cross et al.‟s (2000) Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale; and 
Pearson et al.‟s (1998) Relationship Self Inventory. From August 2004 to September 2004, the 
author obtained demographic data from, and administered the Autonomy Scale (AS), the 
Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal (RISC) Scale, and the Relationship Self Inventory 
(RSI) to a convenience sample of Black and White South African students after obtaining 
permission from lecturing staff. A research assistant was employed to go to lecture theatres at the 
end of Psychology lectures to explain the research to students and ask them to complete the pilot 
questionnaires. Confidentiality and anonymity were ensured.  
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There was a very poor response rate (10%) using this method. Students either did not take 
questionnaires to complete or they would take them and not return them, or fill them out 
incorrectly. One of the main problems identified was the length of the questionnaires. As a result, 
the original questionnaires selected were reviewed and the instrument was modified to exclude 
the longer questionnaire and include different, shorter measures: McChrystal‟s (1994) Relational 
Being Scale (RBS), the Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal (RISC) Scale (Cross et al., 
2000), and Yacker and Weinberg‟s (1990) Moral Orientation Scale (MOS). A small, second pilot 
study was conducted to test whether these questionnaires yielded suitable results for the purposes 
of this research. Feedback from both this and the initial pilot was valuable in that it indicated 
ambiguous questions and problematic areas including comprehension of concepts for second 
language speakers and overlap of measures. Based on these findings, it was decided that the final 
study would comprise the RBS, the RISC Scale, and the MOS.   
 
3.5.2 Main Study  
 
From January to March 2005, the author approached lecturers to request permission to come into 
their lectures and use the last 10 minutes to explain the research to students and ask them to 
complete the questionnaire in class. Permission was obtained from lecturers of psychology, 
philosophy, law, and English undergraduate classes to hand out questionnaires at their lectures. 
The author and four research assistants went to different lectures with prior approval from 
lecturers to explain the research and hand out questionnaires at the end of lectures to those 
students willing to complete them. The researcher requested that time be allowed for a brief 
explanation of the nature and aims of the study (Appendix B), as well as confirmation of 
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confidentiality and the right to refuse to participate or to withdraw. Students were not required to 
put their names on the questionnaires and this anonymity ensured confidentiality. It was also 
emphasized that completion of the questionnaires was not related to course requirements or 
assessment, and some students chose not to take questionnaires to complete. Those who took 
questionnaires to fill out were asked to hand them in on completion or, if they did not finish 
before their next lecture, were told to hand in to their lecturer or at the School of Psychology. Of 
the 1500 sets of questionnaires that were distributed, 675 were returned, a response rate of 45%. 
Of the returned questionnaires, 346 (51.26%) were usable.    
 
The questionnaires were scored, and the results were entered onto a spreadsheet. The data was 
subsequently analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, 2004). 
Demographic information was analyzed quantitatively using descriptive statistics on SPSS 
(2004). The results obtained from analysis of questionnaire scores was correlated with the 
demographic data, and specifically with the categories of gender and culture to determine if 
results were systematically associated with gender and demographic variables.   
 
3.6 Analysis of Data 
 
The data comprised self-report questionnaire responses and the results were generated by the 
scoring of these responses. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the information obtained 
from the demographic questionnaire. The scores for each subject on the Relational Being Scale 
(RBS) subscales, the Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal (RISC) Scale, and the Moral 
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Orientation Scale (MOS) subscales were calculated and analyzed using inferential statistical 
procedures on SPSS (2004). The significance level was set at p<0.05 throughout the analysis.  
 
3.6.1 Assumption Testing  
 
Levene‟s test for homogeneity of data was used to establish that the data were normally  
distributed. Parametric tests (Multivariate Analysis of Variance) could thus be used to test for 
significant differences because the data were normally distributed and had equal variances.  
 
3.6.2 Reliability Testing 
 
Reliability analyses were performed on the RBS, RISC Scale and the MOS to establish the 
internal consistency of each of these measures. The alpha (Cronbach) value of 0.82 for the RISC 
was sufficiently high to justify inclusion of this measure. The low alpha values for the Relational 
Being Scale subscales (0.64 for the A subscale and 0.52 for the R subscale) suggest that this 
scale was not a sufficiently reliable measure for inclusion, and that the results should be 
interpreted with caution.   
 
3.6.3 Descriptive Statistics  
 
The mean scores and standard deviations for each subscale of the RBS, the RISC and the MOS 
were calculated separately for men and women, and then for Black men, Black women, White 
men, and White women.  
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3.6.4 The Relational Being Subscales 
 
A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was used to test for significant differences in 
average values between men and women on the RBS subscales. It was possible to use this 
parametric test because the groups had equal variances.  
 
3.6.5 The Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale 
 
The differences between men and women on the RISC Scale scores were assessed with 
MANOVA.   
 
3.6.6 The Moral Orientation Subscales  
 
Significant differences between men and women on the MOS subscales were tested for using the 
MANOVA.  
 
3.6.7 The Relationship between Gender, Race, and the RBS, RISC and MOS Subscales 
 
MANOVA was used to test for significant differences on the RBS subscales between Black men, 
White men, Black women and White women. MANOVA was also used to test for significant 
differences between Black women, White women, Black men and White men on the RISC Scale 
and on the MOS subscales. Where there were significant interactions between groups, 





Using Bivariate Correlation Analysis, the correlations between the RBS subscales, the RISC 
Scale, and the MOS subscales were computed separately for men and women, and for Black 
women, Black men, White women and White men.  
 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
 
At the time that this study was planned and conducted, no mandatory ethics review procedures 
were in place for social sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The researcher and 
supervisor accepted the responsibility for ensuring ethical practice for the duration of this study. 
The recruitment of participants for the interviews was on a voluntary basis. The volunteers were 
informed of their freedom to choose not to participate and their right to withdraw. Although this 
study is located in the context of HIV/AIDS vaccine trials, the specific content of the discussions 
and envisaged questionnaire contained no reference to HIV/AIDS, and pertained instead to 
informed consent and autonomy-related topics, which were not considered to be of a particularly 
sensitive nature. No risks or potentially harmful consequences of the interview were thus 
anticipated or experienced, nor was debriefing considered necessary. Questions surrounding the 
validity of employing Western theories and measures in the South African cultural context 
demonstrate the importance of developing a culture- and gender-sensitive measure of autonomy, 
and interpreting results with caution. Every effort was made to avoid any gender or cultural bias 




This chapter will present the results generated by analysis of the data collected in the 
investigation. The variables that were analyzed are as follows: the Autonomy and Relational 
subscales of the Relational Being Scale (RBS); the global scores of the Relational-
Interdependent Self-Construal (RISC) Scale; and the Justice and Care subscales of the Moral 
Orientation Scale (MOS). The results are presented in six sections. Firstly, the demographic data 
of the sample, followed by the mean subscale scores for the RBS, RISC and MOS for both 
groups - women and men - are summarized. Thereafter, each of the four hypotheses of the study 
is addressed. Although the association between subscale scores, gender and race was not a 
primary hypothesis of this study, the effects of race and gender are also presented for review and 
discussion in each of the above sections as a secondary investigation in this research. Finally, 
qualitative observations are discussed. 
 
4. 1 Demographic Data 
 
Of the 1500 sets of questionnaires that were distributed, 675 (45%) questionnaires were returned, 
of which 251 (37.18%) were spoiled, 78 (11.56%) had missing data, and 346 (51.26%) were 
usable. Of the useable sample, 45.66% (n=158) were men and 54.34% (n=188) were women. 




4.2 Mean Subscale Scores 
 
4.2.1 The Relational Being Scale  
 
The mean RBS subscale scores for men and women are presented in Table 4.1, and the subscale 
scores for Black men, Black women, White men, and White women are presented in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.1 
Means for Relational Being Scale Subscales by Gender 
               GENDER 
 
 
  Men Women 
 
AUTONOMY Mean 91.12 88.64 




RELATION Mean 91.50 94.53 






Mean 58.52 61.16 






Mean 71.00 74.82 











 GENDER & RACE 
  Black Men Black Women 
 
 
White Men  White Women  
AUTONOMY Mean 91.2 90.46 91.04 86.81 
n 95 100 63 88 
Std 
Deviation 
14 14.58 12.56 10.11 
RELATION Mean 95.79 93.14 87.21 95.93 
n 95 100 63 88 
Std 
Deviation 
13.36 13.75 15 11.4 
 
The mean scores on both of the RBS subscales (A and R) for all South African sample groups 
were higher than the male and female sample from McChrystal‟s (1994) original study. Men 
scored higher on average than women on the Autonomy (A) subscale, while women‟s mean 
score on the Relation (R) subscale was higher than men‟s.  
 
The Black group scored higher than the White group on both the Autonomy and the Relation 
subscales (see Appendix E for table of RBS means by race). Black men had the highest mean 
scores and White women the lowest on Autonomy. Black men only scored marginally higher on 
average than Black women on Autonomy, a result that is particularly interesting when compared 
with the mean scores of these two groups on the R subscale, where Black men‟s mean scores 
were notably higher than Black women‟s mean scores. Of the four race by gender groups, White 
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women scored highest on Relation, followed by Black men. White men scored the lowest on this 
subscale.        
 
4.2.2 The Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale 
 
The mean scores of the RISC Scale for men and women, and for Black men, Black women, 
White men, and White women, are summarized in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3  
Means for Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale Scores 
  GENDER GENDER & RACE 
 
 









RISC Mean 55.58 
 
58.04 55.04 54.6 56.11 61.49 
n 158 
 





9.92 10.28 10.08 12.22 8.39 
CROSS  































There were marginal differences between the mean scores on the RISC of women in the present 
study and those in the original validation study (Cross et al., 2000), with the former group 
scoring higher than both Sample 1 and Sample 2 from the original study. Interestingly, the male 
sample in this study had higher mean scores than the men in Samples 1 and 2 of the original 
study. In the current study, women‟s mean scores were consistently higher than those of the men.  
The mean scores of the White group on the RISC were higher than the RISC mean scores of the 
Black group (see Appendix E for table of RISC means by race). Examination of the race by 
gender sample groups reveals similar findings to the gender analysis for the White but not the 
Black group. On average, White women scored higher than White men and all other groups on 
the RISC; however, Black men scored higher than Black women. Interestingly, the mean scores 
of White men were higher than the scores of both Black women and Black men.      
 
4.2.3 The Moral Orientation Scale 
 
The mean subscale scores of the MOS for men and women are presented in Table 4.4, and the 
mean scores for Black men, Black women, White men, and White women are presented in Table 
4.5. Consistent with expectations, men in this study had higher mean scores than women on the 
Justice subscale, while women scored higher on average than men on the Care subscale. In both 
cases, the differences were marginal.  
 
Comparing these subscale scores in the race and the race by gender sample groups, however, the 
results are somewhat different. The Justice mean scores of the White group were higher than 
those of the Black group, while the Black group‟s Care mean scores were higher than those of 
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the White group (see Appendix E for table of MOS means by race). White men had the highest 
mean scores on Justice, closely followed by White women. Interestingly, Black men scored 
lower on Justice but higher on Care than all other groups. Black women had the second highest 
mean scores on Care, followed by White women. Consistent with their highest scores on Justice, 
White men had the lowest mean scores on Care. 
 
Table 4.4 
Means for Moral Orientation Scale Subscales by Gender 
                            GENDER 
 
 
  Men Women 
 
JUSTICE Mean 7.02 6.94 
n 158 188 
Std Deviation 1.85 1.70 
CARE Mean 4.98 5.06 
n 158 188 






Mean 5.62 5.95 
n 29 22 






Mean 5.90 6.86 
n 20 28 
Std Deviation 2.8 1.8 
* Total MOS score is equal to the number of care responses selected as first choice and may   








 GENDER & RACE 
  Black Men Black Women 
 
 
White Men White Women 
JUSTICE Mean 6.62 
 
6.79 7.43 7.09 
n 95 100 63 88 
Std 
Deviation 
1.84 1.75 1.76 1.64 
CARE Mean 5.37 
 
5.2 4.6 4.9 
n 95 100 63 88 
Std 
Deviation 
1.83 1.80 1.73 1.62 
   * Total MOS score is equal to the number of care responses selected as first choice and may     
      vary from 0, indicating a strong justice orientation, to 12, indicating a strong care orientation. 
 
4.3 The Association between Autonomy and Gender (and Race) 
 
4.3.1 Autonomy and Gender 
 
The differences between average values for men and women on the Autonomy and Relation 
subscales of the RBS were tested for significance using a Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA). As shown in Table 4.6 below, only one of the two expected gender differences on 
the Relational Being Scale subscales was significant. As predicted, women had significantly 
higher scores than men on Relation. While men scored higher than women on Autonomy, this 

























       *The mean difference was significant at the .05 level. 
 
4.3.2 Autonomy and Race 
 
There was one significant difference between race groups on the Relational Being Scale 
subscales. The Black group had significantly higher scores than the White group on the Relation 
subscale. The Black group also scored unexpectedly higher than the White group on the 
Autonomy subscale but this difference was not significant. These results are shown in Table 4.7 
below.  
Table 4.7 













90.83 1 301.432 1.773 .184 
RELATION 91.57 
 
94.46 1 701.299 3.946 .048
*
 
       *The mean difference was significant at the .05 level. 
 
Differences between the RBS subscale scores of Black women, Black men, White women, and 
White men were assessed for significance using Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA). 
These results are summarized in Table 4.8. Significant differences between each group on the 
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Autonomy and Relation subscales were assessed using Bonferroni‟s pairwise comparisons, as 
shown in Table 4.9.  
 
Table 4.8 
Comparison of Gender by Race Interactions on Relational Being Scale Subscales 
 df Mean Square F Significance 
AUTONOMY 3 368.775 2.175 .091 
RELATION 3 1174.964 6.612 .001
* 




Comparison of Significant Differences on RBS Scores between Black Men, White Men, 
White Women and Black Women 














91.04 86.81 90.46 
Black 
Men 












.301 - .342 
Black 
Women 









87.21 95.93 93.14 
Black 
Men 
Sig. - .001* 1 .993 
White 
Men 
Sig. .001* - .001* .036* 
White 
Women 
Sig. 1 .001* - .915 
Black 
Women 
Sig. .993 .036* .915 - 
* The mean difference was significant at the .05 level.  
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Overall, women‟s mean scores on the Relation subscale were higher than men‟s scores; men‟s 
Autonomy mean scores were higher than women‟s Autonomy scores. The mean scores of Black 
men on Autonomy were ranked the highest, followed by White men, Black women and, finally, 
White women. Conversely, White women scored highest on the Relation subscale, followed by 
Black men, Black women and, finally, White men.   
 
Analyzed for significant differences by race and gender using MANOVA, the above results show 
that White women‟s Relation scores were significantly higher than White men‟s scores on this 
subscale. However, while White men scored higher than White women on Autonomy, this 
difference was not significant. The higher scores of Black men compared with Black women on 
the Autonomy subscale were consistent with the results of the White subgroup; however, this 
difference was not significant. Contrary to expectation, the scores of Black men on Relation were 
also higher than those of Black women, although not significantly so. Results across all four 
groups showed that there were no significant differences between Black men, White men, Black 
women and White women on the Autonomy subscale. On the Relation subscale, Black men, 






4.4 The Association between Self-Construal and Gender (and Race) 
 
4.4.1 Self and Gender 
 
Women scored significantly higher than men on the Relational Interdependent Self-Construal 
(RISC) Scale, as shown in Table 4.10.   
 
Table 4.10 
Comparison of Gender Means on the Relational Interdependent Self-Construal Scale 











58.04 1 509.984 4.931 .027
*
 
*The mean difference was significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
4.4.2 Self and Race 
 
The RISC mean scores of the White group were significantly higher than the RISC mean scores 
of the Black group. These results are presented in Table 4.11 below. 
 
Table 4.11 
Comparison of Race Means on the Relational Interdependent Self-Construal Scale 












54.82 1 1325.798 12.820 .001
*
 
  *The mean difference was significant at the .05 level. 
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The results of the analysis by gender and race, using MANOVA and Bonferroni‟s pairwise 
comparisons on the RISC scores are summarized, respectively, in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 
below. White women scored significantly higher than White men on the RISC. In contrast, Black 
men‟s RISC scores were higher than Black women‟s scores but this difference was not 
significant. The RISC mean scores of White women were significantly higher than those of 
Black women, Black men and White men. There were no other significant differences. 
Interestingly, the RISC mean scores of White men were higher than those of Black women and 
Black men, although not significantly different.   
 
Table 4.12 
Gender by Race Interactions on the RISC Scale 
 df Mean Square F Significance 
RISC 3 913.694 8.835 .001
* 




Comparison of Significant Differences on RISC Scores between Black Men, White Men, 
White Women and Black Women 












56.11 61.49 54.6 
Black 
Men 















Sig. 1 1 .001
*
 - 
      * The mean difference was significant at the .05 level.  
 
 160 
4.5 The Association between Moral Orientation and Gender (and Race) 
 
4.5.1 Moral Orientation and Gender 
 
No significant gender differences were found on either the Justice or the Care subscale of the 
Moral Orientation Scale. The Justice subscale scores of men on the MOS were greater than 
women‟s Justice scores. Women‟s Care scores were higher than the scores of men on the Care 
subscale, as shown in Table 4.14 below.  
 
Table 4.14  
Comparison of Gender Means on the Moral Orientation Scale Subscales 









6.94 1 .596 .195 .659 
CARE 4.98 
 
5.06 1 .464 .151 .698 
     
 
 
4.5.2 Moral Orientation and Race 
 
Whites scored significantly higher than Blacks on the Justice subscale, while the Black group 






















5.28 1 22.854 7.447 .007
*
 
       *The mean difference was significant at the .05 level. 
 
The interaction effects between the mean subscale scores on the MOS for Black women, Black 
men, White women, and White men were analyzed using MANOVA and are presented in Table 
4.16 below. Significant differences between each group were assessed using Bonferroni‟s 
pairwise comparisons, as shown in Table 4.17. There were no significant gender differences 
within the White group or the Black group on the MOS subscales. White men scored higher on 
Justice than White women, while White women scored higher on Care than White men. These 
differences were not significant. Conversely, Black women‟s Justice scores were higher than 
those of Black men; Black men‟s Care scores were greater than Black women‟s Care scores. 
Neither of these differences was significant. The scores of White men on the Justice subscale 
were significantly higher than the scores of Black men but there were no other significant gender 
by race differences on this subscale. Black men scored significantly higher on the Care subscale 
than White men. The mean ranks for the Justice and Care subscales were as follows: Justice: 
White men > White women > Black women > Black men; Care: Black men > Black women > 






Comparison of Gender by Race Interactions on the MOS Subscales 
 df Mean Square F Significance 
JUSTICE 3 9.651 3.150 .025
* 
CARE 3 8.614 2.807 .040
* 




Comparison of Significant Differences on MOS Subscale Scores between Black Men, White 
Men, White Women and Black Women 




JUSTICE Means 6.62 7.43 7.09 6.8 
Black 
Men 





Sig. .029* - 1 .144 
White 
Women 
Sig. .423 1 - 1 
Black 
Women 
Sig. 1 .144 1 - 
CARE Means 5.38 4.6 4.91 5.2 
Black 
Men 
Sig. - .045* .509 1 
White 
Men 
Sig. .045* - .219 .209 
White 
Women 
Sig. .509 .219 - 1 
Black 
Women 
Sig. 1 .209 1 - 




4.6 Correlations between Scores by Gender (and Race) 
 
4.6.1 Correlations between RBS, RISC and MOS Scores by Gender 
 
Correlations between each of the subscales of the RBS, MOS, and the RISC Scale were done 
separately for men and women and are shown in Table 4.18 below. Correlations between men‟s 
scores on all three scales showed significant positive correlations between Autonomy and RISC 
scores, and between Relation and RISC scores. As expected, there were significant negative 
correlations between the Justice and Care subscale scores of both men and women. There were 
no significant positive correlations between the subscale scores of the RBS, MOS and the RISC 
Scale scores of women. 
 
4.6.2 Correlations between RBS, RISC and MOS Scores by Race  
 
Correlations by race on each of the scales are shown in Table 4.19 in Appendix F. Correlations 
by race were as follows: Consistent with what was expected, there was a significant negative 
correlation between the Justice and Care scores of the Black group. However, the scores of the 
Black group on the Autonomy subscale were significantly positively correlated with their scores 
on the Relation subscale. This is contrary to the hypothesis, as these two subscale scores were 
designed to measure variables on opposite ends of the autonomy/relation continuum. This, 
together with the low reliability score of the RBS, suggests that there may be problems with the 
validity as well as the reliability of the Relational Being Scale. Similarly, in the White group 
scores on the Autonomy subscale were significantly positively correlated with RISC scores. 
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Table 4.18 
Correlations between RBS, RISC and MOS Scores by Gender 
GENDER 











1 .128 .232(**) .011 -.014 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .109 .003 .893 .858 
n 158 158 158 158 158 
Relation Pearson 
Correlation 
.128 1 .234(**) -.135 .135 
Sig. (2-tailed) .109 . .003 .090 .091 
n 158 158 158 158 158 
RISC Pearson 
Correlation 
.232(**) .234(**) 1 -.058 .065 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .003 . .467 .414 
n 158 158 158 158 158 
Justice Pearson 
Correlation 
.011 -.135 -.058 1 -.995(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .893 .090 .467 . .000 
n 158 158 158 158 158 
Care Pearson 
Correlation 
-.014 .135 .065 -.995(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .858 .091 .414 .000 . 











1 .012 .055 .093 -.068 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .872 .451 .203 .352 
n 188 188 188 188 188 
Relation Pearson 
Correlation 
.012 1 .074 .085 -.056 
Sig. (2-tailed) .872 . .314 .244 .447 
n 188 188 188 188 188 
RISC Pearson 
Correlation 
.055 .074 1 -.054 .021 
Sig. (2-tailed) .451 .314 . .460 .771 
n 188 188 188 188 188 
Justice Pearson 
Correlation 
.093 .085 -.054 1 -.934(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .203 .244 .460 . .000 
n 188 188 188 188 188 
Care Pearson 
Correlation 
-.068 -.056 .021 -.934(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .352 .447 .771 .000 . 
n 188 188 188 188 188 




Since constructs measuring components of autonomy and of the relational interdependent self 
would be expected to be negatively correlated, this overlap is unexpected and points to the 
potential validity problems with the subscales of the Relational Being Scale. Other significant 
correlations in the White group were found, as predicted, between Relation subscale scores and 
RISC scores (positively correlated) and between Justice and Care subscale scores (negatively 
correlated).     
 
Correlations between the Autonomy and Relation subscales of the RBS, the Justice and Care 
subscales of the MOS, and the global scores of the RISC Scale were calculated separately for 
Black women, White women, Black men and White men. Significant correlations are shown in 
Table 4.20 in Appendix F.  
 
White men had the only significant positive correlation between Relation subscale scores and 
RISC scores. However, significant positive correlations between Autonomy subscale scores and 
RISC scores were obtained for Black men, White women, and White men. This is contrary to the 
hypothesis that Autonomy scores would correlate negatively with Relational Interdependent Self 
Scores. Furthermore, the Autonomy and Relation subscale scores of Black men and White 
women were significantly positively correlated. Considering that these are polar subscales on the 
same scale, these results suggest that findings associated with this scale require further 
investigation and should be interpreted with caution, especially in view of the low reliability of 
the RBS. There were no significant positive correlations between the scores of Black women on 
all three scales. The Justice and Care subscale scores for all four groups (Black men, White men, 
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Black women and White women) were all significantly negatively correlated, consistent with the 
polarity of these two subscales on the Moral Orientation Scale. Contrary to expectation, there 
were no significant positive correlations between scores on the Justice and Care subscales and 
the scores on any of the other subscales for any of the groups.   
 
4.7 Summary of Results 
 
Three hundred and forty six usable questionnaires were returned of the 1500 that were 
administered. Of this sample, 158 were men and 188 were women. On the Relation subscale of 
the Relational Being Scale, women scored significantly higher than men. Although men scored 
higher on average than women on Autonomy, there were no significant differences between men 
and women on the Autonomy subscale of the Relational Being Scale. Reliability scores on the 
RBS subscales were relatively low and therefore results on this scale should be interpreted with 
caution. Women scored significantly higher than men on the Relational Interdependent Self-
Construal Scale. No significant gender differences were found on either of the Moral Orientation 
Scale subscales. Men‟s Justice subscale scores on the MOS were higher than women‟s Justice 
scores; women‟s Care scores were higher than the scores of men on the Care subscale. 
Reliability scores for both the RISC and the MOS were considered sufficiently high to justify 
inclusion of these measures.   
 
In the race-only analysis, the sample comprised 195 Black and 151 White participants. As 
expected, the Black group scored significantly higher than the White group on the Relation 
subscale. There were no significant differences between race groups on the Autonomy subscale.  
The RISC mean scores of the White group were unexpectedly significantly higher than the RISC 
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mean scores of the Black group. As hypothesized, Whites scored significantly higher than Blacks 
on the Justice subscale, while the Black group scored significantly higher than the White group 
on the Care subscale.  
 
The sample by race and gender was divided as follows: 100 Black women, 95 Black men, 88 
White women, and 63 White men. While White men scored higher on average than White 
women on the Autonomy subscale, and Black men scored higher than average than Black 
women on the Autonomy subscale, these differences were not significant. Analyzed for race and 
gender, results across all four groups showed that the mean scores on the Autonomy subscale of 
Black men, White men, and Black women were significantly higher than the mean scores of 
White women. Given that this was the only significant result found on the Autonomy subscale 
across all analyses, and given the unexpected significant positive correlations between 
Autonomy and Relation subscale scores, it seems likely that the reliability of the results on the 
Autonomy subscale, and on the Relational Being Scale in general, is low. On the Relation 
subscale, Black men, Black women, and White women all scored significantly higher than White 
men, as expected. The RISC mean scores of White women were significantly higher than those 
of Black women, Black men and White men. There were no other significant differences on this 
scale in the gender by race analysis. Black men scored unexpectedly higher than Black women 
on the RISC scale but this was not a significant difference.  
 
The scores of White men on the Justice subscale were significantly higher than the scores Black 
men. Black men scored significantly higher on the Care subscale than White men. These were 
the only significant differences in the gender by race analyses on the Justice and Care subscales. 
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Although White men had higher Justice scores than White women and White women had higher 
Care scores than White men, these differences were not significant. Contrary to the hypothesis, 
Black women‟s Justice scores were higher than the Justice scores of Black men, while Black 
men scored higher on the Care subscale than did Black women. Neither of these differences was 
significant.  
 
There were significant positive correlations between the subscale scores of men on Autonomy 
and RISC and between Relation and RISC. There were no significant positive correlations 
between any of the subscale scores for women. Analyzed by race alone, Autonomy and Relation 
were significantly positively correlated for the Black group, while Autonomy and RISC scores 
and Relation and RISC scores were significantly positively correlated for the White group. 
Significant positive correlations were also found between the Autonomy subscale scores and 
RISC scores were found for Black men, White women, and White men. Moreover, the 
Autonomy and Relation subscale scores of Black men and White women were significantly 
positively correlated. Given that these results were unexpected and unlikely, it is probable that 
the low reliability of the Autonomy subscale in particular significantly influenced the results. 
The Relation subscale scores and RISC scores of White men were significantly positively 
correlated. No significant positive correlations were found for Black women on any of the scales. 
Justice and Care subscale scores were significantly negatively correlated across all groups, 
consistent with their polarity on the Moral Orientation Scale.  
 
In summary, the hypotheses of this study were only partially confirmed. In the primary analysis, 
hypotheses were tested by gender alone. In terms of gender differences on the Relational Being 
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Scale subscales, the hypothesis that women would show significantly higher results on Relation 
than men was supported, suggesting higher levels of relational autonomy in women. Although 
the direction of difference on the Autonomy subscale was as predicted (men higher than 
women), this difference was not statistically significant and therefore cannot confirm the 
hypothesis. The hypothesis that women would be significantly higher than men on the Relational 
Interdependent Self Construal scale was supported. However, the gender differences found on 
the Justice and Care subscales of the Moral Orientation Scale, although in the expected direction, 
were not significant.  
 
When analyzed by race, the hypothesis that Black participants would score significantly higher 
on Relation than White participants was confirmed. However, this result was somewhat 
complicated by the finding that the Black group also scored higher than the White group on the 
Autonomy subscale, although this difference was not found to be significant. The significant 
differences between Black and White scores on the RISC were in direct contrast to what was 
hypothesized, as the White group actually scored significantly higher on the RISC than the Black 
group. The hypotheses on the Moral Orientation Scale were confirmed for race: Whites scored 
significantly higher than Blacks on Justice, while Blacks scored significantly higher than Whites 
on Care. In the third and final analysis, examining race by gender, similar contradictory results 
were found. Within the White group, the significant gender difference that was found on the 
Relation subscale of the RBS was consistent with the hypothesis, as were the significant gender 
differences on the RISC scale. However, no other significant gender differences were found 
within the White group to support any of the other hypotheses. Similarly, none of the hypotheses 
were supported by the results according to gender differences within the Black group. 
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The finding that White women scored significantly lower than the other three groups (Black 
women, Black men and White men ) on Autonomy, and that White men scored significantly 
lower than all other groups on Relation, cannot confirm or disconfirm the predicted hypotheses 
with respect to gender by race differences. Similarly, given that the only significant difference 
between all four groups on RISC was that White women were higher than Black women, Black 
men and White men, there is little support for the predicted differences on this variable. Finally, 
the significantly higher scores of White men on Justice and of Black men on Care than all other 
groups lends only partial support to the hypothesized differences on the Moral Orientation Scale. 
These results will be discussed in chapter five in terms of the main hypotheses outlined in 







Most of the expected results were not significant, although all results with respect to gender were 
in the direction expected and consistent with the hypotheses about autonomy, self-construal, and 
ethical orientation. However, the fact that most of the expected results were not significant needs 
to be explored. Examining the results according to race, and race and gender (hereafter gender by 
race), it seems likely that race was a variable that significantly influenced the findings for 
gender.  In the sections that follow, significant results on each of the hypotheses will be 
discussed. However, most results on all hypotheses were not significant. Therefore, a number of 
explanations will be explored to account for why the expected differences turned out to be 
mostly non-significant.    
 
5.1 The Association between Autonomy and Gender (and Race) 
 
The scores on the Relational Being Scale (RBS) are a measure of qualities of autonomy and 
relatedness. The Relational subscale measures concepts of relatedness as defined by self-in-
relation theories, the priority of relationships over abstract concepts of justice, theories of human 
development, and notions of the capacity for empathy and the concept of the ideal person 
(McChrystal, 1994). Items on the Autonomy subscale were inferred from the concepts generated 
from the work on relatedness. The RBS positions relatedness and autonomy as polar opposites, 
with high scores on the Relational subscale corresponding with low scores on the Autonomy 
subscale, and vice versa. It was hypothesized that men would have higher scores on the 
Autonomy subscale than women, while women would score higher than men on Relation. A 
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subsequent hypothesis was that the White group would be higher than the Black group on 
Autonomy, and the Black group would be higher than the White group on Relation.                     
 
5.1.1 Autonomy and Gender 
Significant findings 
Women scored significantly higher than men on the Relation subscale of the Relational Being 
Scale (RBS). This result lends support to the hypothesis that women have a more relational sense 
of autonomy than do men. This study drew on theories from the Stone Center and others (Baker-
Miller, 1984 in McChrystal, 1994; Jordan, 1984 in McChrystal, 1994; Surrey, 1985 in 
McChrystal, 1994) that women differ from men in fundamental ways and, specifically, that they 
value relatedness more than autonomy. The significant gender difference on Relation is 
consistent with other studies that have found significant gender differences in autonomy (Bekker, 
1993; Chodorow, 1978; Miller, 1986, 1990; Surrey, 1991), with women exhibiting a more 
relational sense of autonomy than men.  
 
However, the lack of significant differences between men and women on the Autonomy subscale 
of the RBS, as discussed below, suggests that women have a greater tendency towards 
conventional autonomy than current feminist theory implies. It seems likely that gender 
differences in the experience of autonomy are less pronounced than previously thought, and that 
women‟s stronger tendency towards the relational continuum of this autonomy scale (RBS) lends 
more support to women‟s relational sense of self than to a significant difference between men 
and women‟s experience of autonomy, particularly given the similarity between women and 
men‟s scores on the measure of conventional autonomy. This significant difference in 
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relatedness between men and women is paralleled by the significant difference between men and 
women in the experience of a relational interdependent self, and is discussed in further detail in 
section 5.2.1 below.  
 
Non-significant findings 
No significant differences were found between men and women on the Autonomy subscale. The 
difference between men and women was in the direction anticipated (men higher than women) 
but was not statistically significant. No conclusions can thus be drawn in support of the 
hypothesis that men would exhibit greater levels of conventional autonomy than women. This 
finding adds to a body of research that has also found no evidence in support of differences 
between men and women in the experience of autonomy (Anderson et al., 1994; McChrystal, 
1994). This may be, in part, due to the considerable variation in the way that autonomy has been 
defined from study to study (Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986).  
 
However, it should be noted that the non-significant results of this study do not necessarily imply 
that a difference in men‟s and women‟s experiences of autonomy does not exist. It could be that 
men and women do differ in their experience of autonomy, but not as much as posited by some 
feminist theorists. These differences may have changed in the years since these theories were 
posited, or it could be that a tertiary education sample of men and women may be more 
androgynous. Differences between men and women may not be as extreme or distinct as some 
theories propose, with both men and women experiencing both independent and relational 
aspects of autonomy. Furthermore, differences between groups may have been previously 
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overestimated, and there may in fact be greater variation within groups (for example, women) 
than between groups (Ewing, 1990; Killen, 1997; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994).  
 
While acknowledging the important contribution that relational theories have made to expanding 
the understanding of the self for women in particular, Berlin and Johnson (1989) argue that, by 
acknowledging that women have relational capabilities, it seems to be simultaneously concluded 
that they lack the capacity for or interest in autonomous ability. They attribute the emphasis on 
difference between the sexes with respect to autonomy to the masculinist connotations that the 
concept is encumbered with – isolation, hierarchy, self-sufficiency and isolation – making it the 
opposite what women reportedly value. This could lead to an assumption of homogeneity within 
groups that plays down the differences within genders. The exaggeration of difference has also 
been highlighted by Stewart and McDermott (2004). Hare-Mustin and Marecek (1986, p. 210) 
note that the “construction of gender emphasizes difference, polarity, and hierarchy, rather than 
similarity and equality of the sexes. Because autonomy and relatedness are viewed as gendered, 
they come to be seen as opposites, and their similarities are overlooked.” This may explain why 
women scored high on both the Relation and Autonomy subscales of the RBS, indicating high 
levels of both autonomy and relatedness.   
 
The fact that the results of the current study do not seem to be consistent with previous research 
that has both found and not found gender differences in autonomy and relatedness may be 
partially explained by the presence of alpha bias and beta bias (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1987) 
in the theories that focus on gender. Alpha bias is the tendency to exaggerate gender differences, 
as is apparent in psychodynamic theories, sex role theory, and feminist psychodynamic theories; 
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beta bias is the tendency to over-generalize psychological research done on men, to women, and 
is evident some systems approaches to family therapy, and in theories that view male and female 
roles as complementary (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1987). The lack of significant differences 
between men and women on Autonomy in this study may be in part due to greater similarities 
between the sexes, and greater differences within the sexes. Furthermore, while interpersonal 
connection has been shown to be particularly important to women, as demonstrated by women‟s 
significantly higher scores on Relation in this study than men, autonomy and its connotations of 
freedom and agency may actually contribute to the probability of satisfying connections (Berlin 
& Johnson, 1989). This could account for women‟s higher than expected scores on the 
Autonomy subscale of the RBS, whilst still scoring significantly high on Relation.     
 
That the men and women in the current study did not differ significantly on the Autonomy 
subscale could also be a reflection of the changing times, and of changing gender-role 
perceptions and expectations. Fleming (2005) also found only marginal gender differences with 
regard to desire for autonomy. Conversely, significant differences were found between men and 
women regarding their achievement of autonomy, suggesting that girls do not exhibit the same 
tendency to struggle for independence as boys, relying more on parental norms. An important 
implication of Fleming‟s (2005) study is that girls appear to value autonomy and personal agency 
as much as boys. Fleming (2005) suggests that studies that have found marked gender 
differences in autonomy may have been focusing on the achievement of, rather than the desire 
for, autonomy. These implications lend support to the Autonomy results of this study, and are 
supported by previous research (Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986).  
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Similarly, Lamborn and Steinberg (1993) found that girls were more likely than boys to 
demonstrate emotional autonomy in the context of a supportive parental relationship. Their 
results call into question the conventional view that the development of autonomy is more 
developed in males than in females. However, they also found that greater emotional autonomy 
tended to be associated with more negative outcomes for girls, particularly for girls from certain 
ethnic backgrounds, which they attribute partially to the cultural pressure on girls to remain less 
autonomous. This may also explain why the Autonomy scores of women in the current study 
were higher than expected – but not as high as the scores of men. Women who desire and/or are 
experiencing greater autonomy may simultaneously be experiencing negative consequences as a 
result of their increased autonomy, and hence may be placing a limit on the amount of autonomy 
they achieve or exhibit. Indeed, it has been pointed out that females in societies that value 
autonomy, assertiveness and individuation, learn to value autonomy and separation and thereby 
devalue their gender identity, which tends towards affiliation and involvement (Gilligan, 1990; 
Orbach, 1986). This theory could also account for why women‟s Relation scores in the current 
study were significantly higher than men‟s Relation scores, but, simultaneously, women and 
men‟s scores on Autonomy did not differ significantly.        
 
The differences that appear to have existed between men and women in terms of autonomy and 
relatedness may have narrowed in recent years, with women becoming more autonomous and 
men more relational. Studies that have found differences between men and women in the 
opposite direction to what has previously been put forward – i.e., women being more 
autonomous than men - support this argument (Lamborn & Steinberg, 1993; Steinberg & 
Silverberg, 1986). Anderson et al. (1994) also suggest that the lack of significant differences may 
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be, at least in part, because the women‟s movement has altered past gender discrepancies in 
levels of autonomy. This may also have resulted in a degree of conflict for women, as they 
negotiate the discrepancy between their previously relational roles and desires, with their new 
desire for and levels of autonomy (Gerson, 2002).  
 
Some suggest that women are experiencing a „splitting‟ in terms of their gender roles, 
expectations, and identities (Catina et al., 1996; Layton, 2004). Layton (2004) notes that the 
psychological position of women is moving away from the relational psyche, towards defensive 
autonomy – a transition stage, characterized by splitting, between the submissive relational 
female and the defensively autonomous male. She suggests that since women have moved into 
the workplace and are doing the same work as men do, they also have the same difficulty with 
finding time for relationships as men do. Incongruity between women‟s relational values and the 
individualistic values of society may lead to identification with an ideal (autonomy) that 
contradicts gender identity, and is associated with a range of negative outcomes and maladaptive 
responses for women, such as the development of eating disorders (Mensinger, 2005; Steiner-
Adair, 1990). This seems consistent with the conflicting findings on the RBS in this study, where 
women showed a significantly greater tendency towards relational autonomy than men, but, 
equally, a tendency towards conventional autonomy that did not differ significantly from men. 
      
In summary, there is evidence to suggest that the differences between men and women with 
respect to autonomy may not be as pronounced as previously suggested. There has been both 
alpha – exaggerating difference - and beta – underplaying difference - bias in gender difference 
research., conversely, that women value autonomy as much as men. It also seems that the gap 
 178 
between men and women in terms of autonomy has narrowed, although this may have resulted in 
some conflict for women as they negotiate contradictory gender roles and expectations within 
themselves and in society. This also suggests that autonomy and relation might not be binary 
concepts, which is particularly evident in the current study‟s finding that women scored high on 
measures of Relation as well as Autonomy.  
 
5.1.2 Autonomy and Race 
Significant findings 
As hypothesized, Black participants scored significantly higher on the Relation subscale than 
White participants. It seems likely, then, that individuals from Black cultures have a more 
relational sense of autonomy than those from White (and arguably more Westernized) cultures. 
However, in a similar finding to that of the gender differences on this scale, the scores of the 
Black and White groups on Autonomy were not significantly different and, in fact, Black 
participants scored higher on average than White participants on this subscale. Therefore, the 
significant difference on the Relation subscale may reflect a more relational sense of self in 
Black individuals than a consistently more relational sense of autonomy. As such, the significant 
difference between Black and White groups on the Relation subscale only partially confirms the 
hypothesis that White participants would exhibit a more independent, conventional sense of 
autonomy and Black participants a more relational sense of autonomy.  
 
Non-significant findings 
The hypothesis that White participants would score higher than Black participants on Autonomy 
was not supported as there was no significant difference between the groups as a whole. In fact, 
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contrary to the expected direction of difference, Black participants actually scored consistently 
higher on Autonomy than White participants. The absence of a significant difference between 
Black and White groups on Autonomy will be explored further in section 5.1.2.2 below.  
 
5.1.2.1 Gender differences within race groups 
Significant findings 
Analyzing the results according to gender differences within each race group yielded some 
interesting findings. Consistent with the hypothesis, White women‟s scores on the Relation 
subscale were significantly higher than White men‟s Relation scores. For this group, therefore, 
the hypothesis in terms of relational autonomy was supported statistically. The results on 
Relation are consistent with theories on the value that men and women place on independence 
and relatedness, respectively (for example, Friedman, 1998; Meyers, 2000a, 2000b; Nedelsky, 
1989; Rosser, 1992) and with empirical research that confirms such differences between men and 
women (for example, Chodorow, 1978; Bekker, 1993; Miller, 1986, 1990; Surrey, 1991). One 
possibility for this is that Whites in South Africa can be classified as a Westernized group, and, 
as such, their preferences for independence and relation are congruent with differences that have 
been found in other Western samples (Catina et al., 1996).  
 
The significant difference on Relation between White men and women could indicate that men 
have a stronger tendency towards autonomy and independence than women, whereas women 
tend towards relatedness and involvement in relationships, at least in this White group.  
However, as discussed below, there was no significant difference between White men and 
women on the Autonomy subscale, which suggests that women have a greater sense of 
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conventional (independent) autonomy than previously argued, and indicates that the hypothesis 
in terms of gender differences in conventional autonomy for this group can not be confirmed.  
 
Non-significant findings 
No significant difference was found between White men and women on Autonomy. Similarly, 
there was no significant difference between Black men and women on the Autonomy subscale, 
although, consistent with the findings on gender differences, the direction of difference for this 
group was as expected, with Black men higher than Black women. These findings are contrary to 
previous research that has shown consistent gender differences in the experience of conventional 
notions of autonomy (Chodorow, 1978; Bekker, 1993; Friedman, 1998; Meyers, 2000a, 2000b; 
Miller, 1986, 1990; Nedelsky, 1989; Rosser, 1992; Surrey, 1991). It is worth noting that, in every 
analysis conducted on the Autonomy subscale (that is, by gender, by race, and gender by race), 
no significant differences were found between any two groups, nor were there any significant 
interactions. This could imply that there were fundamental problems with the construction of this 
subscale in particular that may have reduced its reliability and complicated the validity of the 
results. As a result, no conclusive deductions can be made about the relative experience of 
Autonomy across both gender and racial groups.  
  
Black men and women‟s scores on Relation were also not significantly different. Furthermore, 
the hypothesized direction of difference was not supported: the scores of Black men were 
unexpectedly greater than Black women. Perhaps Black women are tending towards greater 
autonomy – hence the marginal differences between their scores and those of Black men on 
Autonomy – and this is reflected in the lower-than expected scores of this group on the Relation 
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subscale. Since the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the empowerment of 
women has received a great deal of attention and has been accompanied by the advancement of 
women, and Black women in particular, in the workplace. These factors may have contributed 
towards the higher Autonomy and lower Relation scores of Black women, especially if one 
considers that the sample tested was predominantly university students, who are likely to be 
more educated and more urbanized than women from rural, traditional Black cultures.   
 
5.1.2.2 Gender differences between race groups 
Significant findings 
The hypothesis that White men would score significantly lower than White women, Black 
women and Black men on Relation was statistically supported by the results. However, given 
that this was the only significant difference between Black men, Black women, White men and 
White women on both the Autonomy and the Relation subscales, the hypotheses with respect to 
the experience of independent autonomy and relational autonomy by men and women from 
Black and White race groups cannot be confirmed. 
 
Non-significant findings 
White women had the highest scores on the Relation subscale, although they were not 
significantly higher than Black women or Black men. In summary, the direction and order of 
difference in the mean ranks of all four groups, Black men. White men, Black women, and White 
women, were almost all as expected, although few were significant. Exceptions to the 
hypothesized direction of differences were the unexpectedly lower scores of Black women than 
Black men on the Relation subscale, and the higher than expected scores of Black men than 
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White men on the Autonomy subscale. However, neither of these differences was significant.  
 
Interestingly, although Black men and Black women‟s scores on Autonomy, while not 
significantly higher than White women‟s scores, were higher on average than the scores of White 
women, while Black men‟s Autonomy scores were higher on average than White men‟s 
Autonomy scores. This is contrary to another study that found Whites to score the highest on a 
measure of Autonomy compared with both Black and Hispanic cultural groups (Anderson et al., 
1994). This, combined with the similarity of Black men and women‟s scores on Autonomy, and 
Black women‟s lower Relation scores than Black men, has interesting implications for the 
apparent experiences of Black women in terms of autonomy and relation. These will be 
discussed in further detail below.  
 
Previous studies investigating the claims about culture, gender and the self-concept have found 
that women exhibit a more interdependent self-construal only in individualistic societies 
(Watkins et al., 1998; Watkins et al., 2003). This somewhat explains the low scores of Black 
women in the Relation subscale. Furthermore, the results appear to be partially supported by 
Watkins et al. (2003) who found that Indian (non-Western) women tended to define themselves 
in terms of more personal (individual) preferences, while Indian men made more reference to 
social or group identity. In addition, as mentioned above, the sample in the current study were 
almost all university students living in an urban environment and experiencing a degree of 
acculturation (not assessed), which could explain why the expected differences between Black 
and White participants on Autonomy were not significant. Indeed, Ma and Schoeneman (1997) 
found that the independent vs. relational divide existed between men and women in rural Kenyan 
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communities, but that Kenyan university students were similar to American university students 
in their responses.  
 
Similarly, studies that examined gender differences in collectivist cultures (African, Indian and 
Nepalese) have found that women who achieve relative educational success (such as reaching a 
tertiary educational level) tend to be atypical in comparison to other women in their culture, 
exhibiting more male-like and individualistic self-conceptions (Watkins et al., 2003). This seems 
to hold true for the Black but not the White women in the current sample. Catina et al. (1996) 
investigated the differences in the experience of autonomy between women from economically-
developed Western European countries, and less well-developed Eastern European countries. 
They found that women in the latter countries were socialized so as to prepare them for the dual 
role of mother and professional – roles which are portrayed as compatible rather than 
oppositional, as they are in West European countries.  
Apparently, German females define social ideals of autonomy, individuation and 
separation in terms of interpersonal detachment, whereas Bulgarians are more inclined to 
see them as individual enhancements in the context of interpersonal relationships (Catina 
et al., 1996, p. 105).  
 
It could be argued that the socialization experiences of White women versus Black women in 
South Africa can account for the contrary findings on both the Autonomy and Relation 
subscales.  
 
It has been previously suggested that Black women may not be as high as expected on measures 
of relation because they have different child-rearing and socialization experiences to White 
women. While acknowledging the value of relational theories for Black women, Black feminists 
have pointed out important differences between groups of women, which include differences in 
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mothering, and in the mother-daughter relationship, as well as the societal and historical contexts 
within which women‟s identities are formed (Henderson, 1997). Like the women in the 
Bulgarian sample, some argue that Black women are raised to become strong, independent 
women who may have to eventually become heads of households as a result of precarious 
circumstances growing out of poverty and racism (Joseph, 1991). This, they argue, is in contrast 
to White girls, who are raised to be relational and dependent. Collins (1990) argues that 
independence, self-reliance and resistance are central themes in Black women‟s psychology, 
while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of relationships in their lives. Because Black 
women‟s development of self tends to be within a societal context of negative images of Black 
women, Black mothers may be teaching their daughters resistance and self-acceptance 
concurrently.  
 
The arguments above are in line with those theories that focus on the diversity and heterogeneity 
within groups, both male and female, and Black and White (Ewing, 1990; Killen, 1997; Mines, 
1988; Sinha & Tripathi, 1994; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994). Social scientists are also becoming 
interested in the discrepancies that may exist between shared cultural systems of meaning and 
individual beliefs (Neff, 2001). One study of this nature found that non-Western, traditional 
females believed that they should obey male authorities, as required by cultural tradition, but 
they also perceived this obligation to be unfair (Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). In a similar study, 
Neff (2001) found that Hindu Indians, a cultural group that is perceived as prototypical of 
collectivism, did not display the general tendency to subordinate personal to interpersonal 
concerns, but instead made diverse judgments about autonomy and responsibility. Given the 
culturally embedded nature of gender hierarchy, these exceptions to what has widely been 
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accepted as the norm point to the need for future research to focus on the way that “gender, 
culture and power intersect to influence social and moral development, in Western as well as 
non-Western cultures” (Neff, 2001, p. 253).  
 
This, in turn, highlights the role of context in the development of personal autonomy and 
interpersonal connectedness. It also suggests that personal autonomy and interpersonal 
connectedness are present in both men and women, and brought out in varying combinations of 
contextual influences, including social and power relationships. Like the results of gender, the 
race by gender results in the present study may be ambiguous or non-significant because men 
and women from a range of cultures develop a multifaceted social orientation that includes 
concerns with both individual autonomy and interpersonal relatedness (Turiel, 1998b). Previous 
research supports this (Pearson et al., 1998; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994). Instead of prioritizing one 
mode of reasoning (autonomy or relation), women and men give emphasis to each concern 
depending on particular aspects of the situation being considered at the time, including the 
relative positions of power held by men and women in society (Turiel, 1998a).  
 
As has been argued throughout this study, the development of any form of autonomy is 
inextricably linked to the development of self (Code et al., 1988; Cooke, 1999; Friedman, 
2000b). Because self is hypothesized to be a product of culture, the lack of significant 
differences between men and women, and the contrary findings in terms of Autonomy and 
Relation within the Black group, could also be attributed to changing gender roles as a result of 
the relation between self-construal and gender (Cross & Madson, 1997). The transitional and 
transformative nature of South African society over the past decade has brought in changes in the 
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circumstances of many individuals, not least of which the previously disadvantaged groups – 
women and Black people. This suggests that an acculturation measure should have been included 
which might account for some of the findings with respect to race. Conventional gender roles are 
gradually being eroded within the current culture of Black and female empowerment, as Black 
Economic Empowerment and affirmative action policies – favouring Black women in particular 
– are moving more women into higher positions in the workplace and, (presumably) affording 
them greater personal and financial freedom and autonomy. This is discussed in more detail in 
section 5.2.2 below.  
  
5.2 The Association between Self-Construal and Gender (and Race) 
 
Items on the Relational Interdependent Self-Construal (RISC, Cross et al., 2000) scale were 
based on concepts related to relational forms of the interdependent self-construal as defined in 
the literature, as well as from modifications of conceptually related measures. The relational-
interdependent self-construal is defined as the tendency to think of oneself in terms of 
relationships with close others (Cross et al., 2000). According to Cross et al. (2000), individuals 
who score high on the RISC scale characterize their relationships as more committed and closer 
than those who scored low on this measure, and are more likely to take the needs and wishes of 
others into account when making decisions. The hypothesis of this study was that women would 
have higher scores than men on the RISC. A secondary hypothesis was that Black individuals 
would score higher on the RISC than White individuals.   
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5.2.1 Self-Construal and Gender 
Significant findings 
Women‟s scores on the Relational Interdependent Self-Construal Scale were significantly higher 
than men‟s scores on this scale, which is consistent with the hypothesis. This is a result that is 
consistent with the theories, largely emanating from the United States, that the independent, 
autonomous self-construal is more typical of men, while the qualities of interdependence and 
relatedness describe the self-construals of women (Gilligan, 1982; Jordan & Surrey, 1986; 
Maccoby, 1990; Markus & Oyserman, 1989; Mather, 1997; Miller, 1990; Norris, 1998; 
Sampson, 1988; Stewart & Lykes, 1985). This result is also supported by the original study in 
which the Relational Interdependent Self-Construal scale was developed (Cross et al., 2000) as 
well as other studies in which women scored consistently higher than men on measures of 
interdependent self-construal (Cross & Madson, 1997; Madson & Trafimow, 2001; Pearson et 
al., 1998).  
 
It should be noted, however, that the original study was based on a sample of university women 
only, and the significant differences that have been found in the other studies listed above were 
marginal. Pearson et al. (1998) found that, while women did have higher scores than men on 
their Connected Self subscale, these differences were small, and no gender differences were 
found on the Primacy of Other Care and Self and Other Care subscales. They suggest that both 
the Connected and Separate Self constructs appear to be meaningful for both men and women. 
Other studies have found no difference, or found contradictory differences between men and 
women (Grace & Cramer, 2002; McChrystal, 1994).  
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One of the explanations offered for why men and women‟s self-construals may differ in this way 
concerns their differential socialization experiences. Triandis and his colleagues have argued that 
allocentric values are similar to collectivist values – that is, interpersonal closeness and attending 
to the needs of others – and that allocentrism is to individuals what collectivism is to groups 
(Triandis et al., 1985; Triandis et al., 1995). Extending this argument, others have proposed that 
men and women grow up in distinct subcultures that differ in the same way that individualist 
cultures differ from collectivist ones (Maccoby, 1990; Maltz & Borker, 1982). As a result, 
women are socialized to be interdependent and attuned to relationships (Gilligan, 1982; Jordan, 
Kaplan, Miller, Stivey & Surrey, 1991 in Madson & Trafimow, 2001; Markus & Oyserman, 
1989; Surrey, 1991), while men are brought up to be autonomous and self-reliant (Maccoby, 
1990). This is consistent with feminist psychoanalytic work that has suggested that the 
development of women‟s relational and men‟s independent sense of selves may largely be a 
result of child-rearing practices (Chodorow, 1978, 1989). This is supported by other empirical 
research (Madson & Trafimow, 2001). Kemmelmeier and Oyserman (2001) suggest that this 
similarity between men‟s self-construal and the values of the broader culture is partly the result 
of the dominant influence that men have had, and continue to have, in Western society. Women, 
on the other hand, may understand and participate in the values of the larger cultural framework, 
but must find a way of reconciling the gap between their self-construals and the social context.   
 
This does not only apply to women, however, as demonstrated by Lyons (1983) who found that 
equal numbers of women and men seem to value some form of interdependence in their self-
concepts. Lykes (1985) has shown how the inseparability of gender and power in notions of the 
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self suggest that independent versus interdependent self-construals are less a function of 
biologically assigned gender roles and more a product of social context and the relative 
distribution of power. This implies that independent and interdependent self-concepts are not 
necessarily the sole domain of men and women respectively. Indeed, many have suggested that 
men and women‟s notions of self are grounded in their different experiences of and access to 
power and resources (Chen & Welland, 2002; Lykes, 1985). Lykes (1985) sought to clarify the 
link between the social context and notions of self, and found that women and lower 
socioeconomic groups – i.e., people from less powerful groups - tend to be more likely to 
recognize the connectedness of the self and others, and the self-defining nature of social 
experiences. The findings of the current study on the RISC, with women scoring higher than 
men, add to these findings. However, Lykes also emphasized that differences in self-conceptions 
do not differ from one individual to the next but rather, that alternative notions of the self are 
systematically revealed by individuals from particular social groups with particular social 
experiences. Crucial for understanding variations in men‟s and women‟s sense of selves is 
recognition of the variations of men‟s and women‟s positions in society relative to the 
distribution of power and not to biology (Lykes, 1985).   
    
Chen and Welland (2002) examined the effects of power as a function of self-construal and 
gender and showed how interdependent versus independent self-construals in women and men 
are influenced by power. Because men and women are likely to experience different 
combinations of power and self-construal, they have different goals and motivational foci. 
Individuals with independent self-construals will pursue self-interest goals when in power, while 
those with interdependent self-construals will pursue other-oriented responsibility goals (Chen & 
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Welland, 2002). It seems likely that such dynamics are present in South African society and 
differences in men‟s and women‟s self-construals are perpetuated by the existing power 
differentials.  
 
This also points to the importance of context in the formation of self – a cycle that “is 
perpetuated in part because women‟s gender socialization emphasized relatedness, so that 
women are more likely to think in…situated terms, a way of thinking not well suited to the 
Western cultural paradigm of individualism” (Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001, p. 130). Indeed, 
many have argued that the separate and connected self-concepts are not stable and invariant 
across time and context, but fluid and dependent on contextual factors, including the nature of 
the self-other relationship (David et al., 2004; Onorato & Turner, 2001; Turner, 1985; Turner et 
al., 1987).  Perhaps the perceived nature of the particular relationship and the way in which 
individuals participate in these relationships led to the results for men and women in this study as 
they have in others (Friedman, 1998) – but it would be interesting to see what differences may 
have emerged both between and within groups (i.e., men and women) had there been a follow-up 
investigation.  
 
The above arguments for the fluidity of self-concepts do not necessarily discount theories that 
women and men experience predominantly different types of selves (Chodorow, 1989).  
Rather, it is proposed that concrete differences in social context can mediate these gender 
differences. In situations where the nature of the self-other relationship is ambiguous, 
such as when the familiarity of the hypothetical other is unspecified, individuals may 
need to look to other sources of information to determine the appropriate behavior. It is 
suggested that in a situation such as this, individuals may look to their own identity (i.e., 
male or female), making salient the norms and stereotypes that exist for gender, with 
women more connected and care-oriented and men more separate and justice-oriented 
(Ryan & David, 2004) (Ryan et al., 2004, p. 248).  
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Nonetheless, Ryan et al. (2004) found that gender was not a significant predictor of the social 
distance between self and other, in contrast to the results of the present investigation. However, 
closer examination of men and women‟s perceptions of the nature of self-other relationships 
could dilute the apparent gender differences in their self-concepts that were found in this study. 
Indeed, the fact that these significant results do not hold across cultures (Black and White) in this 
study, are evidence of the influence of factors other than gender in self-development.     
 
5.2.2 Self-Construal and Race 
Significant findings 
Contrary to the hypothesis that Black participants would score higher on the RISC than White 
participants, the scores of the White group were actually significantly higher than the Black 
group on this scale. This could be, in part, due to the fact that this scale was validated on a 
Western sample of college women, which suggests that the generalizability of the scale in non-
Western contexts is questionable. Another possibility is that the majority of Black participants 
were second language English speakers and may have had difficulty understanding some of the 
terms in the questionnaires, as suggested by the low reliability scores. This could point to 
potential problems with the validity of the results for this group in particular. 
 
A study by Stevens and Lockhat (1997) offers some insight into Black adolescent identity 
formation in South Africa. They contend that the successful negotiation of congruence between 
self image and the role expectations of the environment as postulated in Erikson‟s (1963 in 
Stevens & Lockhat, 1997) model of identity development has been hindered in Black South 
African adolescents. Exposure to images of personal success and achievement in the external 
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environment while simultaneously being refused access to these symbols, as well as the 
breakdown of traditional family structures and values are partly responsible for impeding the 
development of healthy self-concepts. What is emerging from the debris of apartheid, according 
to Stevens and Lockhat (1997, p. 253) is a “Coca-Cola culture,” a culture of rampant 
individualism which is encouraging Black adolescents to reject collectivist identities and 
embrace Western ideologies, including individualism, in order to cope with the current socio-
historical context – resulting in a number of difficulties in social adjustment and identity 
integration among Black adolescents in post-apartheid South Africa. This could explain why the 
scores of the White group on the RISC were significantly higher than those of the Black group in 
this sample.  
 
5.2.2.1 Gender differences within race groups 
Significant findings 
As expected, the RISC scores of White women were significantly higher than those of White 
men. As such, this finding lends greater support to the hypothesis that men would be greater than 
women. A discussion of these significant gender differences can be found in section 5.2.1 above. 
 
Non-significant findings 
The difference between Black men and women on the RISC was not significant. In fact, contrary 
to the hypothesized direction of difference (Black women would be greater than Black men on 
RISC), Black men scored higher on average than Black women on the RISC. This result is 
consistent with the findings on the Relational Being Scale (RBS), where Black women scored 
lower than expected, and lower than Black men, on the Relation subscale. Results within the 
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Black group on both the Relation subscale and the RISC are in direct contrast to the hypothesis 
that women, and Black women in particular, would have more relational self-concepts than men. 
This finding is consistent with others that have found no significant gender differences in ratings 
of independent-interdependent self-construal in their non-Western samples (Misra & Giri, 1995 
in Li, 2002). Given that the difference between Black men and women on this scale was not 
significant, it appears that the significance of the gender difference within the White group was 
powerful enough to render the gender difference for the whole sample significant.   
 
5.2.2.2 Gender differences between race groups 
Significant findings 
White women‟s scores were significantly higher than the scores of the other three groups (White 
men, Black men and Black women) on the RISC. These findings only partially confirm the 
hypotheses, with the exception that Black women were expected to score significantly higher 
than White women on this Relational Interdependent Self-Construal scale. This can also be 
linked to the previous results for Black women on the Autonomy and Relation subscales, and 
implies that Black women may not be as relational in their self-concepts as previously proposed.  
 
Non-significant findings 
The mean rank differences between the four groups also showed some interesting and 
unexpected trends. The finding that both White and Black men scored higher on average, 
although not significantly higher, than Black women on the RISC is completely contrary to what 
was expected. Again, this can be linked to the previous results of Black women on the Autonomy 
and Relation subscales, and is consistent with similar findings that non-Western women appear 
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to have more independent self-construals than non-Western men and Western men and women 
(Imamoglu, 2003 in Imamoglu & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2004; Uskul et al., 2004). It is also 
surprising that White men‟s scores were higher (but not significantly) than Black men on this 
scale, given that Black individuals were expected to be more relational than White individuals. 
This is particularly surprising when one considers that the results of the previous section (5.1.2) 
showed that Black men scored higher on Relation than expected. However, it does appear to be 
consistent with the finding that Black men scored higher than White men on Autonomy. 
 
The lower than expected scores of both Black women and Black men on the RISC contradict 
theory and empirical evidence that indicates that women, Black people, and individuals from the 
lower end of the economic spectrum are not faithfully represented by self-theories that 
emphasize individualism and autonomy (Lykes, 1985). Others, however, caution against the 
pigeonholing of groups into individualistic versus collectivistic frameworks, arguing that this 
may obscure subtle differences within groups, where there is more heterogeneity and diversity 
than made apparent by current widely held views (Dongxiao, 2004). Contextual influences are 
once again brought to the foreground, and the unique contextual experiences occurring within 
South African society may be particularly pertinent in explaining the ambiguity of the results 
between cultural groups in this study.  
In South Africa, self-identity is constructed and re-constructed against the backdrop of 
structurally entrenched asymmetries (on the basis of race, class and gender), created and 
maintained through historical processes (such as apartheid, struggle politics, and the 
negotiated transition to a liberal democracy) (Franchi & Swart, 2003, p. 149).   
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Race, class, power, ethnicity, sexuality and local context probably intersect in the formation of 
identities. And yet, some critical theorists argue that a systematic examination of differences in 
constructions of self along these lines among women who occupy different socioeconomic and 
racial positions in society is sorely lacking (Collins, 1990). Critical feminists argue that the self 
is essentially a product of power relations between groups of individuals within particular 
sociocultural and historical contexts – and understanding the self requires analysis of the power 
relationship between dominant and subordinate cultures (Dongxiao, 2004). As such, the 
ambiguity of the results with respect to differences between and within race groups in the present 
study may be a function of the unique conflict experienced as a result growing up in a 
particularly conflicted environment.  
 
Yeh and Hwang (2000) investigated how individuals from minority groups construct their 
identities within the context of the majority culture when that culture is different from their own. 
They refer to the notion of bicultural competence (LaFromboise et al., 1993) to describe how 
individuals may negotiate the integration of two cultures without experiencing conflict through a 
process of behavioural adaptation to a given social or cultural context without necessitating the 
commitment to a specific cultural identity. While relational self theories allow for multiple ways 
in which the self can be expressed across multiple contexts, bicultural competence only 
recognizes two main cultural identities – dominant and culture of origin. This may explain why 
Black women and Black men scored lower than both White men and women on the Relational 
Interdependent Self-Construal scale: their experiences of self could be argued to center more on 
bicultural competence than on conventional notions of an interdependent or relational self-
concept, to which they are potentially less likely to relate.       
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This also points to a possible explanation for the lower than expected scores of Black women on 
the Relation subscale, and the lower than expected scores of both Black men and women on the 
RISC, particularly when compared with the scores of White men. It may be that the constructs 
that are typically used interchangeably – that is, relational interdependence and collectivist 
interdependence - are actually empirically separable. Cross et al. (2000) argue that the relational 
interdependence that is evident in women and even men in Western cultures is not the same as 
the collectivist interdependence that characterizes both men and women in non-Western cultures. 
This is also supported by Imamoglu and Karakitapoglu-Aygun (2004) who found that women in 
their non-Western sample actually had more independent self-construals than did men. In a 
similar finding to that of the current study that White women were significantly higher on the 
RISC than Black women, Imamoglu and Karakitapoglu-Aygun also found that American women 
tended to be more relational and other-directed than Turkish women. Other studies have shown 
that Western and non-Western men had markedly similar levels of connectedness between 
themselves and close friends – contrary to the theory that Western individuals and men in 
particular, are more independent than collectivist cultures on all dimensions of interpersonal 
relations. In Li‟s (2002) non-Western sample, men appeared to be closer to their friends than 
females were. However, while Li found no gender difference at the self-family connectedness 
level, there was a large cultural difference at this level.  
 
Contrary to previously drawn parallels between allocentrism and collectivism (cf., Triandis et al., 
1985; Triandis et al., 1995), these findings suggest that the cultural differences in collectivist 
versus individualistic self-concept do not correspond to gender differences between men and 
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women in interdependent versus independent self-construals, which may explain why the 
hypotheses regarding the differences between Black and White individuals in this sample were 
not supported. Further evidence for this comes from a comment made by one of the Black male 
participants in this study. While completing the RISC scale he commented that, for Black people, 
it is hard to answer questions in which family and friends are grouped together because family 
comes first and is more important. Watkins et al. (1998) found that a cultural difference existed 
between individuals from collectivist versus individualist cultures in the salience that they placed 
on family relationships in their self-concepts. However, this cultural difference did not extend to 
social relationships. Their findings are consistent with other studies that have shown that the 
salience of social relationships does not differentiate individuals from predominantly 
individualist countries from those from collectivist countries (Kashima et al., 1995).  
 
Consistent with the results of this study, there is further evidence that the gender difference 
between men and women in terms of independent and interdependent self-concepts appears to be 
supported in individualistic cultures, but not in collectivist cultures (Watkins et al., 2003). The 
RISC did not make any distinction between self-other relationships with friends and with family 
members, which could account for the unexpectedly lower scores of both Black men and women 
than White men and women on this scale. This seems to be consistent with the view that while 
both men and women define themselves in relation to others with equal frequency, their 
characterizations of the nature of these relationships is different (Lyons, 1983). There is some 
support in this, too, for the higher than expected scores of White men on the Relational 
Interdependent Self-Construal scale.   
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The lack of significant gender differences on the RISC in the Black group, as well as the finding 
that Whites were significantly higher than Blacks on the RISC, could be attributed, at least in 
part, to the fact that this was a sample of relatively well-educated, urbanized university students. 
As such, the distinction between men and women and Black and White in terms of independent 
and relational self-construals, could be argued to be more subtle in this environment, or absent 
altogether. Others have also noted this trend toward both individuation and relatedness among 
non-Western university students, particularly among women who, with higher levels of 
education and socioeconomic status (SES), show more autonomy and independence in their 
attitudes, values, and self-descriptions. Similarly, several investigators have noted that as women 
achieve higher levels of education and SES, they tend to show more autonomy and independence 
in their attitudes, values, and self-descriptions (Imamoglu & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 1999 in 
Imamoglu & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2004; Uskul et al., 2004).  
 
Indeed, Ma and Schoeneman (1997) found that the independent vs. relational divide that existed 
between men and women in rural Kenyan communities was absent in Kenyan university 
students, who were similar to the American university students in their predominantly non-social 
responses. They suggest that sociocultural factors of urbanization, education, and 
Westernization, appear to correlate with individualized self-conceptions. However, analyzing 
their data by gender revealed that women were consistently more likely than men to give social 
responses to the Twenty Statements Test, which continues to support the cultural feminist 
suggestion that women form a subculture that counters patriarchal society‟s gender biases 
through interdependent relationships (Sampson, 1988; Schoeneman, 1994). Hence the reason, 
perhaps, why the White women in the present study were significantly higher than White men on 
 199 
the RISC. But this does not account for why Black men were higher (though not significantly) 
than Black women on this measure. The results of this study seem to lend support to the 
contention that, in many collectivist cultures, women who reach higher levels of educational 
achievement tend to display more idiocentrism and male-like independence in their self-concepts 
than is typical of other women in their cultures – whereas predicted gender differences might be 
found in a wider cross-section of the community, or might not (Watkins et al., 2003).     
   
White men scored higher than expected on the RISC. While their scores were still significantly 
lower than those of White women, they were higher on average than the scores of both Black 
men and Black women. It is likely that men and women possess the capacity for both types of 
self-construal – independent and interdependent (e.g., Guisinger & Blatt, 1994). This may be 
accentuated by changing gender roles in society (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Eagly et al., 1991; 
Labott et al., 1991), which may be happening more in the White culture than the Black at this 
stage. Women, for example, now have more opportunities to wield power, and to be 
independent, competitive and aggressive – holding upper managerial positions in business world, 
for instance, and ministerial positions in government (Cross & Madson, 1997). Similarly, men 
are becoming more involved in child-care and family-based activities and, as they take on these 
more nurturing roles, they may internalize these roles as a part of their self-construals through 
self-perception processes (Cross & Madson, 1997).  
 
In Black culture in South Africa, on the other hand, there still seems to be a predominantly male 
dominated culture of power and superiority over women. Some have attributed this perpetuation 
of male dominance to the legacy of apartheid, which transformed male identity into something 
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typified by aggressiveness, risk-taking, sexual prowess and dominance over women – notions of 
masculinity that have now become entrenched (Abrahams et al., 2004; Jobson, 2005; Memela, 
2005; Sayagues, 2004; Sideris, 2004, 2005). While this, too, may be changing, the extent to 
which gender roles are being transformed may not be as pronounced within Black culture, as it 
appears to be among White men and women.   
 
Viewing these two self-construals as two dimensions of the self system raises additional 
questions about when, and in which contests, each construal determines of dominates behaviour 
(Cross & Madson, 1997). It raises, again, the question of context and the dynamics of power 
between men and women of different cultural groups. Chen and Welland (2002) are among those 
who have shown how interdependent versus independent self construals in men and women are 
influenced by power. It is possible that Black men and women did not differ significantly on the 
RISC because being in relationship has allowed both of these groups access to a certain type of 
power while they have been denied other forms of power due to the immediate and residual 
consequences of apartheid (Carli, 1999; Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001).  
 
It could be argued that the context described above - that of conflicting messages about gender 
role expectations and changing power differentials - could result in a degree of ambiguity in 
young individuals‟ self-concepts. An example of this ambiguity in Black women in particular is 
evident in the following attitudes within a local community towards church leadership. Amongst 
themselves, and other women in the church, Black women appear to be strongly in favour of 
empowerment and greater autonomy for women, but when given the opportunity to put this into 
practice, they tend to vote in the opposite direction, keeping men in and women out of key 
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leadership positions. Thus, their desire for autonomy seems to be verbal or theoretical, but does 
not translate to practical action (Personal communication with Carleen Richardson, minister‟s 
wife, 18 February 2006). This apparent ideological versus pragmatic schism in the self-concepts 
of Black females is evident in the finding that they scored lower than Black men on Autonomy 
but also lower than Black men on both Relation and the RISC. It is perhaps also reflected in 
Majoribanks and Mboya‟s (2001) findings that Black male adolescents had more positive self-
concepts than did Black females.   
 
5.3 The Association between Moral Orientation and Gender (and Race) 
 
The Moral Orientation Scale (MOS, Yacker & Weinberg, 1990) was designed to measure two 
distinct moral orientations as defined in the literature and, as such, consists of a Justice subscale 
and a Care subscale based, respectively, on the theories of Kohlberg and Gilligan. Individuals 
with high scores on the Justice subscale show a greater tendency to emphasize individual rights 
and duties over relationships, while those scoring higher on the Care subscale place greater 
emphasis on the preservation of relationships and responsibility towards others (Yacker & 
Weinberg, 1990). It was hypothesized the men would score higher than women on the Justice 
subscale, and women higher than men on Care. Similarly, White participants were expected to 
score higher on Justice than Black participants, while the Black group would be higher than the 





5.3.1 Moral Orientation and Gender 
Non-significant findings 
There were no significant gender differences on either subscale of the Moral Orientation Scale 
(MOS). On the Justice subscale of the MOS, men scored marginally higher than women, while 
the converse was true for the scores on the Care subscale, where women‟s scores were negligibly 
greater on average than men‟s. Because neither of these differences was significant, the fact that 
they were consistent with the hypothesized differences does not allow for any conclusions to be 
drawn. The non-significance of the findings with respect to gender on the Justice and Care 
subscales, in itself, warrants some discussion.  
 
This study‟s findings were contrary to the findings of the original study which developed and 
validated this instrument – where significant gender differences were found and appeared to be 
even more pronounced with the influence of experience factored in (Yacker & Weinberg, 1990). 
However, Yacker and Weinberg (1990) also point out that they did not use cut off scores on this 
instrument precisely because they posited that both types of moral orientation – care and justice- 
are not mutually exclusive polar opposites, but are exhibited as stronger or weaker tendencies in 
all individuals. Similarly, Lyons (1983) found distinct differences between men and women in 
moral orientation, contrary to the current results, but goes on to qualify her findings by saying 
that the gender-related differences that are evident in her results are not absolute, since men and 
women use both types of considerations.  
 
Studies that support the null hypothesis – that no gender differences exist – are generally not 
published, so the theory that men differ from women in fundamental ways in moral orientation 
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goes unchallenged, despite the fact that men and women have been observed to be more similar 
than different (Brabeck, 1993). A similar argument has been put forward by Lifton (1985), who 
highlights the absence of publications of the null hypothesis, and lack of discussion about 
gender-related differences (or lack thereof) when gender was not the focus of the study. Upon 
reviewing the literature – including unpublished studies – she concludes that sex differences in 
moral reasoning are more the exception than the rule. Schminke et al. (2003) also present 
findings for and against the differences between men and women and suggest that the vast 
amount of literature dedicated to the exploration of differences between sexes may be more a 
result of perceptions of gender differences than actual gender differences, and go on to suggest 
the importance of context in determining difference.  
 
That the current findings on moral orientation between men and women were not significant 
seems to be consistent with a growing body of research that has failed to find significant gender 
differences in moral reasoning (Aldrich & Kage, 2003; Gibbs et al., 1984; Krebs et al., 1994). 
Forsyth et al. (2001) found no significant gender differences and postulated that this could have 
been because their sample, like the one in the present study, was younger than Gilligan‟s, or 
because they used questionnaire methods that differed from Gilligan‟s interview technique. This, 
arguably, could have revealed more subtle gender differences. They also suggest, however, that 
gender differences in moral orientation may not be as pervasive as previously thought, and 
present other studies that have failed to replicate Gilligan‟s findings of gender differences. In a 
repeated series of studies, including a meta-analysis of existing research, Walker and his 
colleagues concluded that the moral reasoning of males and females appears to be more similar 
than different (Walker, 1984, 1989; Walker et al., 1987). Indeed, not only did they find that most 
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individuals seem to use a considerable mix of both justice and care orientations, they also 
discovered that male adolescents tended to use more care responses than adolescent girls 
(Walker et al., 1987).  
  
Studies that failed to find significant gender differences in moral orientation have suggested 
other factors that could account for differences that emerge. Some have argued against viewing 
men and women as homogenous masses, and point to within-group differences. Weinberg et al.‟s 
(1993) finding of a difference between genders was statistically weak enough for them to seek 
other possible explanations for the difference, suggesting that moral orientation is a complex and 
fluid phenomenon that is influenced by a range of factors, including social, cultural, and 
intrapsychic variables. Similarly, others have found that the variance in moral orientation could 
be accounted for by other factors like, for instance type of dilemma presented (Wark & Krebs, 
1996), role of personality (Glover, 2001), age (Aldrich & Kage, 2003; Gump et al., 2000; Walker 
et al., 1987), and social status (Puka, 1989; Tronto, 1987).  
 
Pratt et al. (1988) also investigated sex differences in moral reasoning and found that, while there 
were significant differences between men and women in the middle-adulthood group, the moral 
orientations of their younger sample were virtually identical. Furthermore, they found that the 
type of orientation that was elicited seemed to be at least in part dependent on the type of 
situation or dilemma that was presented. They concluded that the link between gender, self-
concept and moral orientation seems to be considerably weaker than Gilligan (1982) and others 
have suggested. Thus, while most researchers no longer refute the notion that more than one 
mode of moral orientation exists, there is considerable disagreement about whether these 
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orientations can be reliably associated with gender, as suggested by the lack of significant 
differences between men and women on the Care and Justice subscales in this study.   
 
Jaffee and Hyde (2000) conducted an extensive review of the literature, compensating for the 
absence of null hypothesis publications, and concluded that gender differences in moral 
reasoning were small to non-existent, lending support to the current findings. However, the 
marginal differences found in their study were in the expected direction, with men showing a 
greater tendency towards justice, and women a greater tendency towards care. This supports the 
results of the present study, since the expected direction of differences between men and women 
were found on both Justice and Care, but were not significant. Friedman et al. (1987) also found 
no sex differences and the differences they did find were frequently in a direction inconsistent 
with theory. It may be, as some have suggested, that men and women possess equal capacities 
for using care and justice orientations or, possibly, that some men are more articulate in care than 
women and some women more articulate in justice than men (Cook et al., 2003; Smetana et al., 
1991).  
Both Lyons and Gilligan found women in their samples who clearly articulated a justice 
morality and men who spoke of an ethic of care. Indeed, Broughton (1983) points out that 
some of Gilligan‟s (1977) best examples of a different voice were men‟s voices (Berlin & 
Johnson, 1989. p. 82).  
 
 
If both care and justice do co-exist in males and females alike, one implication is that what 
brings each orientation out, or the way in which they are applied, depends on the context in 
which moral experiences are articulated (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; Weinberg et al., 1993). For 
example, Layton (2004, p. 368) contends that the new version of patriarchal capitalism that 
typifies society today “often has women identifying with the work ethic of their fathers and 
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disparaging or not having time for the ethic of caring represented by the traditional relational 
female.” This view is supported by the finding in the present research that women were not 
significantly different from men on the Care subscale of the Moral Orientation Scale. Similarly, 
the finding that women‟s Justice scores were also not significantly different from men‟s Justice 
scores, is supported by studies that have shown women to use a justice orientation as much as or 
more frequently than men (Cook et al., 2003; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; Self & Olivarez, 1993; Wark 
& Krebs, 1996).  
 
Although Self and Oliveraz (1993) found that men tend to use justice reasoning more than 
women, they also found evidence to suggest that, if women do use or are required by the social 
system to use, a justice orientation, they do so better than men, which is perhaps because women 
experience more pressure from the social context to become more masculinized and exhibit more 
male characteristics in order to succeed in the male-dominated professional world. Another 
reason why women did not score significantly lower on Justice than men in the current study 
could be that the low social status experienced by oppressed groups – in this case, women - 
promotes a concern with fairness, rights and justice because these are more likely to rectify the 
social inequalities that they experience (Beal et al., 1997). This is particularly pertinent in the 
South African situation, where there is a long history of injustice against women and other 
groups. What seems evident from the above discussion is that “the truth about different moral 
orientations of the sexes is a mythical truth rather than an empirical truth” (Brabeck, 1993, p. 
45). Indeed, the lack of significant gender differences in the current sample on Justice and Care 
add weight to this possibility.     
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5.3.2 Moral Orientation and Race 
 
5.3.2.1 Gender differences within race groups 
Non-significant findings 
There were no significant differences between White men and White women on the Justice and 
Care subscales of the Moral Orientation Scale. As hypothesized, White men had higher scores on 
the Justice subscale than White women, but this difference was not significant. Similarly, as 
expected, White women scored higher on average on the Care subscale than did White men, 
although not significantly so. The findings for gender in the White group, although not 
significant, were more consistent with the predicted hypothesis than were the findings for gender 
in general on both the Justice and Care subscales, which were in a direction contrary to the 
hypothesized direction of difference between men and women.     
 
Neither the Justice subscale nor the Care subscale scores for Black men and Black women were 
significantly different, lending no support to the hypothesis about gender differences within this 
group. Furthermore, the direction of difference on both subscales was contrary to what was 
expected: Black women‟s scores on the Justice subscale were higher than Black men‟s scores, 
while Black men‟s Care scores were higher than Black women‟s Care scores. This finding may 
be linked to the results of the previous sections on Relation, where Black women appeared to 
score lower than expected, and lower than Black men, on Relation and on the RISC, which 
would then be consistent with these results on Care. In combination, these results seem to 
contradict the notion that Black women are more relational and focused on interpersonal caring 
and Black men more autonomous and focused on individual rights.  
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These findings contradict previous research reporting that gender differences in moral 
preferences are consistent across cultures – that is, that women exhibit stronger tendencies 
toward an ethic of care, and men towards an ethic of justice, is applicable across cultures. On 
finding a gender difference in moral orientation that seemed to be consistent across cultures, 
Stimpson et al. (2001), for instance, claimed that a caring morality is first biologically rooted and 
then culturally learned, and is more prevalent in women across cultures. The results of the 
current study do not support this claim. Conversely, Maqsud (1998) investigated differences in 
moral reasoning by asking a group of South African Batswana high school students to complete 
a measure of justice and caring attitudes, and found no significant gender differences in this 
sample on either care or justice principles. He suggested that this lack of gender differences was 
a result of socialization practices in Batswana society. According to Maqsud (1998), Batswana 
parents, teachers, and other significant adults, tend to treat boys and girls equally, and do not 
expect different moral behaviours from boys and girls. The finding in the current study that the 
differences between Black men and women on Care and Justice were not consistent with 
expected gender differences may therefore be partially attributable to differential socialization 
practices within Black cultures in South Africa. This, too, points to the importance of cultural 
context in the development and manifestation of moral orientation.  
 
Black women‟s lower-than-expected scores on the Care subscale supports arguments about the 
contested nature of the care concept. It has been argued that the care orientation is based on the 
perspective of White middle class women and does not extend to Black women‟s experiences 
(Cockburn, 2005). In South Africa, Black women‟s experiences have been historically shaped by 
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the apartheid system, where poverty and legally-entrenched racial inequality forced Black 
women to take work that led them away from their families. Necessity thus dictated that work 
outside of the family had to take precedence over the needs of their families, and overshadowed 
interpersonal relations. “For Black women, it is the absence rather than the presence of the 
ability to care for one‟s own family that structures their experiences” (Cockburn, 2005, p. 80). 
To some extent, this may also explain the higher-than-expected scores of Black women on 
Justice, as they have been the victims of consistent and extreme injustice on both a gendered and 
cultural level.  
 
Indeed, the finding that women, and Black women in particular, scored higher than expected on 
the Justice subscale, is supported by other research reporting similar findings. Cook et al. (2003) 
found that an ethic of justice was articulated more frequently than an ethic of care by the 
majority of women in their study. However, they also reported that women view‟s tended to be 
more mixed than men‟s, with a combination of care and justice occurring more frequently in 
women. The lack of significant gender differences on the Care and Justice subscales in this study 
could also be due to a greater combination of both care and justice in women, resulting in a less 
distinguishable difference between women and men in moral orientation.    
 
Black men‟s scores on the Care subscale, although not significantly so, were higher than 
expected and unexpectedly higher than Black women‟s scores on this subscale. Some have 
argued that membership in a low status minority or oppressed group enhances social 
identification (Cameron & Lalonde, 2001) which, in turn, leads to greater relational tendencies. 
This may explain the results of Black men on the Care subscale. It is not supported, however, by 
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the current results of Black women, who, arguably, are in an even more inferior position in 
society than Black men. Baumeister and Sommer (1997) claim that the apparent difference in 
interdependence between men and women is not so much a difference in how much or whether it 
is valued or desired, as it is a matter of the type of interdependence that is sought.  
 
Building on the idea that all individuals have a fundamental need for belonging, they suggested 
that men do seek and value interdependence but that men tend to be oriented toward larger social 
groups/spheres, while women focus more on one-to-one bonds. It is possible that the constructs 
measured by the Moral Orientation Scale tapped into larger-scale, collective group notions of 
care and justice for Black women and men. As a result, Black men who, arguably, value larger 
social group connections, scored higher on the connectedness measure of the Care subscale, 
while Black women rated items on the Justice subscale more highly because of the experienced 
injustices that impacted on their more intimate interpersonal relationships. This seems to be 
consistent with other research that has found that both men and women value interpersonal 
connectedness, but women focus more on relational interdependence, and men more on 
collective interdependence (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Extending this to the results on the Moral 
Orientation Scale, if both men and women seek interdependence but in different forms, this 
could explain the lack of significant differences between men and women across both racial 
groups on the Care and Justice subscale – particularly if, as suggested above, these subscales do 
tap into these different forms of interdependence in different ways for men and women.            
 
This theory also has implications for previous discussions of power and its impact on self-
construal and individual autonomy. While previous research has suggested that men seek power 
 211 
as means of obtaining independence from others, Baumeister and Sommer (1997) propose that 
power actually binds a person to those over whom power is held. “Thus, striving for power 
reflects a desire for, rather than avoidance of, interdependence, albeit of a particular form” (Chen 
& Welland, 2002, p. 255). Furthermore, striving for and holding positions of power may actually 
be men‟s way of reconciling their desire for independence with their need for human connection 
(Baumeister & Sommer, 1997). Chen and Welland‟s (2002) research supports this view, and 
further highlights the connection between gender, self-construal and power. “…power involves 
relationship between the powerful and powerless, and self-construals speak to if and how the self 
is related to others” (Chen & Welland, 2002, p. 265). Because the Care subscale of the MOS 
reflects concepts associated with connection and relatedness, these theories of power may 
explain to some extent the higher scores of Black men than Black women on Care in this study.      
 
The connection of power and relationship is further supported by Carli (1999). It is proposed that 
Carli‟s (1999) theory about the inequalities in social power between men and women can be 
extended to explain the effects of inequalities in social power between White and Black groups 
in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. Carli contends that power derives from the 
possession of structural and external advantages that one group or individual possess over 
another. Thus, because men have historically possessed more of these advantages of than 
women, they hold more power. It could be argued that the same can be said for the advantages – 
and therefore the power - possessed by White groups over Black groups in South Africa. Carli 
(1999, p. 83) goes on to suggest that “power can be based on the need or desire to maintain 
relationships, and not just on the possession of external status or resources.” She extends this 
theory to show how groups and individuals who lack access to typical forms of power, can 
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possess a form of power that derives from their domestic roles and involvement in relationships 
with others. She uses this to explain why women tend towards a care perspective. Because they 
have been denied more traditional forms of power, women‟s power is limited to referent power, 
which is a product of their involvement in relationships. Similarly, Black groups in South Africa 
can be argued to have been denied access to many of the traditional forms of power that White 
individuals have possessed. This could explain why the Black men in this sample scored higher 
than expected on the Care subscale. It is not supported, however, by the lower scores of Black 
women on this subscale.    
 
Black women‟s low scores on the Care subscale do no support the above claims about power and 
relationships, perhaps because the feminine ethic of care is rooted in a long history of women‟s 
social and economic subordination and thus reflects more moral damage than moral virtue 
(Chang, 1996). Following Carli‟s (1999) suggestion that women have access to limited forms of 
power that are based and sustained by their involvement in relationships, it could be argued that 
a voice of care arises not from women‟s moral concern for sustaining human connection, but out 
of necessity for survival in oppressive relationships with men (Card, 1988). Those who argue 
that the ethic of care was created out of a society of subordination draw parallels between 
feminine and African moralities, locating an ethic of care within power-laden contexts of human 
relationships (Chang, 1996). This seems to imply that the apparent gender differences in an ethic 
of care and an ethic of justice have less to do with choices that men and women make, or 
preferences that they have, and more to do with ways of dealing with the power disparities in 
social relationships, both on a cultural and a gendered level.  
Like the Chinese students in this study, the girls and women who speak from the pages of 
Gilligan‟s books face a world in which their voices are often silent or go unheard next to 
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the powerful Western/male voice justice. Yet as the narratives of Chinese students 
demonstrate, such silence should not be mistaken as merely a sign of moral difference 
between men and women. Rather, it more probably signals a disparity in the social value 
and status attached to the sexes (Chang, 1996, p. 154).    
 
Other studies lend support to this conclusion, reporting that differences in moral reasoning 
appear to result from differences in current life situations than from stable gender characteristics 
(Clopton & Sorell, 1993; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988; Mednick, 1989). These and other 
theorists caution that current theories of gender differences in moral orientation may exaggerate 
inherent differences in men and women‟s dispositions, and underplay the differences in social 
structures that influence men‟s and women‟s behaviours. Because men are in the dominant 
position in society – as Whites have generally been in South Africa – they tend to support the 
rules, discipline, control and rationality (i.e., the justice approach) that maintain their position, 
while those in subordinate positions – Black people and women – appeal to mercy, sympathy and 
understanding (i.e., the care approach) (Clopton & Sorell, 1993). Similarly,  
Harding (1987) and Stack (1986) have argued that Black males who live in conditions of 
economic deprivation develop a self-concept that emphasizes profound interpersonal 
connection and that closely resembles the care orientation. Thus the care orientation may 
be more a reflection of lack of power in current situations than a gender-related 
difference resulting from mother-only parenting (Clopton & Sorell, 1993, pp. 86-87).  
 
The results of the current study, although not significant, are partially supported by this view, as 
White men scored higher on Justice than White women, White women scored higher on Care 
than White men, and Black men obtained higher scores on the Care subscale. However, the result 
that Black women scored higher on Justice and lower on Care than Black men seems to be 
inconsistent with the argument presented above. 
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Other power theories have been presented that may help to explain the higher than expected 
scores of Black women on the Justice subscale, contrary to the hypothesis. Women – and Black 
women in particular – have historically been denied equal advantages to men in the South 
African workplace (Carli, 1999). In spite of their more recent advances in the workplace, women 
continue to face obstacles because they lack access to the sources of power that their male 
colleagues possess. Although a woman more behave in a competent and assertive manner, she is 
often less influential precisely because of this type of behaviour, particularly with men, because 
she is not perceived as having legitimate power (Carli, 1999). At the same time, however, when a 
woman masks or does not exhibit exceptional ability, her competence is doubted by both genders 
and she is less able to influence even women. Black people in the South African workforce, and 
Black women in particular, are increasingly finding that, because of these perceptions, mere 
competence is not enough, while exceptional competence appears to undermine their legitimacy. 
These double standards may be a particular source of frustration and injustice. In South Africa, 
Black Economic Empowerment programmes have seen the advancement of Black women in the 
workplace. However, Black women may be encountering explicit and implicit barriers to their 
advancement because of the perceptions outlined by Carli (1999) above. They may thus be likely 
to value justice more highly as a means of overcoming the injustices they continue to encounter, 










5.3.2.2 Gender differences between race groups 
Significant findings 
As was expected, White participants scored significantly higher on the Justice subscale than 
Black participants. The scores of White men on Justice were significantly higher than the scores 
of both the Black male and Black female group, as well as the scores of White women.  
 
The mean scores of the Justice subscale scores showed that the scores White men were 
significantly higher than the scores of Black men. This difference is in direct contrast to the 
hypothesis. The finding that the White group scored significantly higher than the Black group on 
Justice, and that White men scored significantly higher than Black men on Justice, carries certain 
implications about Black versus White experiences in South Africa. These findings will be 
discussed in further detail below.   
 
Consistent with previous research suggesting that moral development is determined by social, 
cultural, and historical factors (Gielen & Markoulis, 1994; Huebner & Garrod, 1991; Miller, 
1994 in Ferns & Thom, 2001; Tappan, 1997), the investigation by Ferns and Thom (2001) lends 
support to the hypothesis that Whites would be significantly higher than Blacks on Justice, and 
offers some explanation for this. Ferns and Thom (2001) applied Kohlberg‟s justice model to a 
South African sample and found that, while White South African adolescents‟ moral 
development was in line with Kohlberg‟s theory, Black adolescents exhibited a different pattern. 
(It should be noted that the current research, while also testing a measure of justice attitudes, did 
not explicitly use Kohlberg‟s model as Ferns and Thom (2001) did, so it could be argued that 
only limited comparisons can be drawn). Like the findings in the current study, their Black group 
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seemed to score lower on Justice than the White group (Ferns & Thom, 2001). They attribute this 
to the influence of Western and traditional norms and values, parenting styles, the socialization 
of Black adolescents to be concerned with the welfare of the group, and the possible effect of 
historical factors, such as the previous apartheid government system and the current democratic 
system. Because of the exposure of Black individuals in South Africa to discrimination, where 
they were regarded as inferior on account of their ethnic identification and their individuality was 
not recognized, they had to turn to their cultural group on order to experience a sense of 
belonging and security within the traditional values and norms of their group (Ferns & Thom, 
2001).  
 
Although apartheid has been over for more than a decade, the effects of racial separation and 
discrimination will probably continue for many years to come (Smith & Parekh, 1996). These 
effects include disorganization of the family and erosion of traditional family values, conflicting 
family relationships, and loss of respect for parents and other adults (Ferns & Thom, 2001; 
Wilson & Ramphele, 1989). This, in turn, could have resulted in the loss of suitable role models 
for Black adolescents, which are necessary for the transfer of moral norms and values (Burman, 
1986) – another possible reason for the significantly lower scores of Black participants on 
measures of the justice orientation than White participants. Educational disparities, another result 
of the apartheid era, may also explain the variation in moral development found in the current 
study and by Ferns and Thom (2001), since education and logical capacity are associated with 
moral development (Colby et al., 1983). Exposure to political violence could also have 
influenced the moral reasoning of Black adolescents in South Africa in a similar direction 
(Dawes, 1994; Smith & Parekh, 1996). These views are consistent with the results of the current 
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study and offer possible explanations for why the results of the Black group were significantly 
lower than those of the White group on Justice.  
 
Given these views, Smith and Parekh‟s (1996) finding of the absence of significant differences 
between Black and White South African children is surprising. They propose that this may have 
been because all of the students in their sample, both Black and White, were middle-upper class. 
Since there is research to suggest that lower scores on Kohlberg‟s tests are associated with 
occupying lower social and economic classes (De Vos, 1983 in Smith & Parekh, 1996), the 
absence of racial differences in Smith and Parekh‟s (1996) sample could be because they 
compared children who were all from the middle to upper classes. The one group in Smith and 
Parekh‟s (1996) study that did have significant differences in moral reasoning was the 19-28 age 
group, where White students scored higher on Kohlberg‟s measure of justice moral orientation 
than Black students. They attribute the differences in moral reasoning in this age group to 
disparities in primary and high school educational experiences, with Black students having had a 
more disadvantaged educational experience.  This may be true for the Black and White 
participants in the current study, and is consistent with the significant differences on the Moral 
Orientation Scale between Black and White groups.  
 
In contrast, Tudin et al. (1994) hypothesized that a South African sample would show 
accelerated moral development compared to those growing up in more peaceful, less conflicted, 
and less socially and politically complex societies. They also hypothesized that increased 
exposure to social and political complexity within this South African sample would demonstrate 
higher moral development. Although their results showed trends in this direction, the hypothesis 
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was not statistically supported. They also found that their Black sample appeared to achieve 
higher levels of moral reasoning than did Whites on Kohlberg‟s measure, despite their lower 
socioeconomic status, which seems to contradict the cultural differences found in the current 
study.   
 
Some have argued that, while cultural experiences may have resulted in a greater emphasis on 
care and connection in non-Western cultures, these traditional values may have been undermined 
in the past few decades by, among other things, acculturative influences (Ward, 1995). Knox et 
al. (2004) extend this to argue that, given the social injustices experienced by oppressed groups 
such as women and Black people, they may have developed a greater concern with fairness, 
rights and justice. This may be particularly true for Black communities in South Africa, a 
country with a long history of oppression and injustice against non-White groups. (It should be 
noted that while Black groups in South Africa are not a minority numerically, they have, until 
recently, been a political and social minority as a result of the long history of oppression and 
racial segregation in this country). There is evidence to support this view. Aldrich and Kage 
(2003) found that the women in their non-Western samples were consistently less tolerant of 
corruption than men, and that female judges enforced the death penalty more consistently than 
their male colleagues, which is consistent with the results of this study that Black women scored 
higher than Black men on Justice. Similarly, Coon (1997 in Knox et al., 2004) found that, despite 
a significantly lower SES, the scores of Black women university students on a measure of justice 
moral reasoning were significantly higher than White university students.   
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According to the widely-held theory that traditional Black groups are more care-oriented than 
White, Knox et al. (2004) hypothesized that Western populations, African-American and African 
men should be at least as care oriented as White, African American and African women. Using 
Yacker and Weinberg‟s (1990) Moral Orientation Scale (the instrument used in the current 
study) to test this assumption, they found no gender differences in moral orientation. In addition, 
while predicting that traditional African American cultural groups would exhibit a greater 
propensity for care, they found instead that most of their African American sample had a justice 
focus and were significantly more justice oriented than the male law students in Yacker and 
Weinberg‟s (1990) original study. This is consistent with Gilligan and Attanucci‟s (1988) finding 
that minority students were more likely to exhibit a justice orientation than White students. 
However, the current study‟s finding that the White group scored significantly higher than the 
Black group on Justice challenges theories presented above – i.e., that minority and oppressed 
groups tend to be concerned with fairness and rights, and score higher on measures of justice.  
Given these arguments, it is not clear why this would be the case in South Africa, where Black 
cultures have been consistently subjected to high levels of injustice and would be expected to 
exhibit a high degree of concern with justice. Further research is needed to explore this, possibly 
using alternative measures of the justice orientation.   
 
The contradictory findings on these measures in the current study may be partially explained in 
accordance with the following research: Many of the subjects in Tudin et al.‟s (1994) study, as 
well as samples from previous studies (Kohlberg, 1973 in Tudin et al., 1994), showed a bimodal 
pattern of reasoning – i.e., they demonstrated moral reasoning consistent with two different 
levels of Kohlberg‟s stages of moral development. Kohlberg suggested that the use of bimodal 
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reasoning is a means of self-protection as the individual begins to re-evaluate his or her 
previously held level moral reasoning. This would be consistent with the conflict that students in 
Tudin et al.‟s (1994) study and in the current study may be experiencing as they enter university 
and their modes of moral reasoning begin to be challenged. It is also likely to be a function of the 
politically and socially conflicted context in which these students have lived, contexts where 
physical self-protection often becomes a priority and has, of necessity, to be considered in 
deliberation about complex moral problems (Tudin et al., 1994). Such a situation creates a split 
in individuals who have to choose between what they consider to be a moral solution to a 
problem, and what they are in reality able to do given the threats to their personal well-being, 
leading, potentially, to bimodal moral reasoning. While this cannot be confirmed by the results 
of the current study, because Kohlberg‟s measure was not employed to test moral orientation, it 
can perhaps partially explain the ambiguous and contrary findings on a number of measures, for 
the Black students particularly.         
 
The difference between White and Black individuals on the Care subscale was significantly 
different, as expected, with the Black group scoring consistently higher on this dimension than 
the White group. It was expected that the Black group would score significantly higher than the 
White group on Care, so it is consistent with the hypothesis that Black men were significantly 
higher than White men on Care. Black women, however, while higher than both White women 
and White men, were not significantly different from either of these two groups on Care. It was 
also not expected that Black men would score higher on average than Black and White women 
on this subscale. This can perhaps be linked to the scores of Black women and of Black men on 
the Relation and Autonomy subscales, and on the RISC. Evidence of conflict within Black 
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women and Black men in South Africa could explain the ambiguous Relation versus Autonomy 
scores and Justice versus Care scores within this group.  
 
The femininity that is linked to the home and mothering is now in conflict with the new 
femininity outside the home, which depends on masculine values (Orbach, 1986). Faced with 
demands to be active mothers and active career women, many women appear to use their bodies 
as a means through which they can simultaneously fulfill their traditional roles and assert their 
independence – i.e., rejecting traditional values by becoming thin and thereby defeminizing their 
bodies (Orbach, 1986). This shift appears to be reflected cross-culturally: in a cross-cultural 
study of gender roles, it was found that, for both men and women across all cultures, the ideal 
self was relatively more masculine than the actual self (Williams & Best, 1982 in Williams & 
Best, 1990).   
 
Furthermore, in cultures that are in transition, Westernizing individuals from traditional cultures 
may be exposed to norms, values, and beliefs that are in conflict with their own. The amount of 
psychological distress that these individuals experience is a function of their perceptions of the 
environmental demands, and their appraisal of their ability to cope with the threats to their 
psychological well-being (Lazarus, 1984 in Anderson, 1991). But this process of coping is 
complicated by the conflicting values and attitudes that an individual caught in the juxtaposition 
of two cultures has available as resources. The post-apartheid social and political transition in 
South Africa presents a number of challenges to previously oppressed cultures, including 
urbanization and the upward socioeconomic mobility (Stevens & Lockhat, 1997; Szabo & Le 
Grange, 2001). Black cultures have also come increasingly into contact with White cultures as a 
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result of the integration of schools and the dissolution of segregation in general. This could result 
in the internalization by Black individuals of Western cultural norms, leading to the erosion of 
traditional values and structures. Black adolescents growing up in apartheid South Africa were 
exposed to the values of the dominant White culture that encouraged individual achievement and 
social mobility, but were simultaneously denied access to the resources that would enable them 
to strive for such goals. This contradiction may in itself have impeded healthy identity 
development (Stevens & Lockhat, 1997).  
 
Nonetheless, it may have been the shared political consciousness provoked by the pervasive 
racist sentiment may have fostered a collective racial identity that resisted the negative impact of 
racism and discrimination in many young Black people (Stevens & Lockhat, 1997). This 
supports significantly higher Relation and significantly higher Care scores of the Black group 
over the White group in the current study. The ambiguity of the results in the Black group, 
however, may be because these individuals are now coming into contact with new role models, 
economic structures and Western values, and are encouraged to embrace the individualistic 
social norms and values that many of them were opposed to in the mid-1980s (Stevens & 
Lockhat, 1997). Stevens and Lockhat (1997) refer to this post-apartheid culture as a „Coca-Cola‟ 
culture, and contend that such contradictions may be contributing to role confusion, rather than 
healthy identity integration. The problems of role confusion and gender identity that are common 
among adolescents (Kroger, 2002; Streitmatter, 1993) are thus exacerbated in South Africa, 
where young Black men in particular have historically been confronted with more social 
limitations than opportunities, both by Black cultures and by the dominant White society in 
South Africa (Bloom, 1994).  
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Furthermore, because the parents are the first representative of a specific cultural group, one can 
expect that they play a crucial role in the adolescent‟s identity formation (Myburgh & Anders, 
1989). It follows from this that family dysfunction may result in identity confusion – particularly 
when the values that are transmitted by the parents are in conflict with the dominant socio-
cultural value system. Accompanying the pressures of urbanization and modernization, family 
ties are clearly loosening, and the extended family model is being abandoned in the search for 
the values of the „Coco-Cola‟ culture. In search of their own individuality, the younger 
generation is rejecting the emphasis on tradition inherent in the African culture. Le Grange et al. 
(1998) hypothesize that Black individuals, and Black males in particular, are facing new social 
pressures in South Africa. As a result, this group may be vulnerable to the symptoms of distress, 
racial identity confusion and conflicting attitudes and values associated with acculturative stress. 
This has been associated with suicidal behaviours (Wassenaar et al., 1998; Wassenaar, Pillay, et 
al., 2000). Although Black individuals were found to have significantly lower scores on Justice 
and higher scores on Care than White individuals, as hypothesized, the differences within the 
Black group were contradictory and contrary to the expected gender differences. This, and the 
similar ambiguity in the Relation and Autonomy subscale and the RISC scale results for this 
group, could be partially explained by the role confusion and conflict described above.   
 
Marais et al. (2003) investigated the association between acculturation and eating disorder 
symtomatology in Black men and women in South Africa. They found that Black men scored 
significantly higher than White men on the psychological dimensions of the Eating Disorders 
Inventory (EDI, Garner et al., 1983), which suggests that there was a higher prevalence in Black 
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men of the psychopathological traits associated with anorexia nervosa. On the Perfectionism 
subscale, Black men scored significantly higher than both Black women and White men. Studies 
that have found a corresponding higher prevalence of perfectionism in Black women in 
comparison to their White counterparts, have suggested that the social, political and educational 
inequalities in apartheid South Africa have required Black women to achieve extremely high 
standards in order to reach the tertiary education level (Wassenaar, Le Grange, et al., 2000). It 
could be argued that these individuals would show a greater tendency to value justice over care, 
given the injustices they have encountered in their struggle to achieve equality. This can perhaps 
be true of all individuals who had to struggle to achieve against the climate of discrimination in 
this country. But, while this may be part of the reason why Black women obtained higher scores 
on the Justice subscale than Black men, it does not account for the lower-than expected scores of 
Black men on Justice. Nor does it explain why the Black group as a whole scored significantly 
lower than the White group on Justice.  
 
The results of Marais et al.‟s (2003) study also suggest that the demands facing Black men and 
women in South Africa's rapidly changing society are more overwhelming than those facing 
White men and women. Black men and Black women have scored consistently higher than 
White men and women on an Interpersonal Distrust subscale (Hooper & Garner, 1986; 
Wassenaar, Le Grange, et al., 2000), which is indicative of a sense of alienation and general 
reluctance to form close relationships, consistent with the context of racism and discrimination 
that have punctuated the lives of Black individuals in South Africa (Marais et al., 2003; Szabo & 
Le Grange, 2001). This would suggest that Black individuals may not score as high on measures 
of connectedness and care than would be expected, which is contrary to the results of the current 
 225 
study.  However, the fact that the White men in Marais et al.‟s (2003) South African sample had 
higher scores on the psychological dimensions of the EDI than a Canadian sample (Garner & 
Olmsted, 1984) may be indicative of a greater degree of psychological distress amongst all South 
Africans, associated with post-apartheid social and political transition. This could account for 
why White men scored significantly higher than Black men, and higher on average than all other 
groups, on Justice, and significantly lower than all other groups (Black men, Black women, 
White women) on Relation – but higher than Black women and Black men on the measure of a 
relational interdependent self construal, which suggests a degree of conflict in this group.  
 
5.4 Correlations between Autonomy, Self and Ethical Orientation and Gender (and Race) 
 
5.4.1 Correlations by Gender 
Significant findings 
In direct contrast to what was expected, there was a significant positive correlation between 
men‟s scores on the Autonomy subscale and the RISC scale. The correlation between men‟s 
Relation subscale and the RISC scale was also significant and positive, consistent with the 
hypothesis. Taken together, however, these findings could be indicative of problematic 
constructs as measured by the Autonomy and Relation subscales of the RBS. As was expected, 
there were significant negative correlations between the Justice and Care scores of both men and 
women. The lack of significant positive correlations between the relevant subscales of the RBS 
and MOS, and between the relevant subscales of the MOS and the RISC for both men and 
women suggest that the expected correlations between autonomy, self and moral orientation 




There were no significant correlations, positive or negative, between subscale scores of the RBS, 
MOS and the RISC of women, which again suggests that the constructs measured by each of 
these scales were not as strongly associated as had been expected. There were also no significant 
correlations between the measures of relation / autonomy and justice / care for men, as well as 
contradictory correlations between measures of self and relation / autonomy for this group. The 
problem may lie in the construct validity of the individual scales, or in the combination of these 
particular scales and the associated assumptions about the potential interrelation of the constructs 
measured.   
 
5.4.2 Correlations by Race 
Significant findings 
Significant positive correlations between Autonomy subscale scores and RISC scores were found 
for Black men, White women, and White men. This is contrary to the hypothesis that Autonomy 
scores would correlate negatively with Relational Interdependent Self Construal scores. The 
Relation subscale scores and RISC scores of White men, and of the White group as a whole, 
were significantly positively correlated. However, the Autonomy and Relation subscale scores of 
the RBS for White women and Black men, as well as for the Black group as a whole, showed a 
significant positive correlation. Considering that these are polar subscales on the same scale, this 
result suggests that findings associated with this scale require further investigation and should be 
interpreted with caution. Significant negative correlations between Justice and Care were found 
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for all groups, which lends further support to the satisfactory reliability and validity of the Moral 
Orientation Scale.  
 
Non-significant findings 
There were no significant correlations between the scores of Black women on all three scales.  
There were also no significant correlations between the Justice and Care subscales and any of the 
other subscales (Relation and Autonomy, and RISC). In summary, there was little support for the 
assertions made at the beginning of this study that the Autonomy and Justice subscale scores of 
men would be significantly positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with 
men‟s RISC scores. Conversely, the assumption that women‟s scores on Relation, Care, and the 
RISC would all be significantly positively correlated was not sufficiently supported by the 
results of this study.  Possible reasons for this could lie in potential problems with individual 
measures; in the attempt to combine measures that are not sufficiently linked in terms of their 
constructs; or in poor comprehension by participants of various items on each of the scales, 
particularly the RBS which showed low reliability. These limitations will be discussed in further 
detail below.   
 




Keeping ethics at the forefront of health research means ensuring that the bioethical principles 
developed in the Western world are relevant in the developing world. This means not simply or 
 228 
unconsciously employing standard conceptions of autonomy and informed consent, but paying 
careful attention to context and the unique particularities that individuals in developing countries 
bring to the research setting. Ultimately, context plays a major role in the interpretation and 
meaning of bioethical principles, particularly the sociocultural context in which women in 
circumstances of poverty and vulnerability live, where they are disempowered on a number of 
levels, with limited personal, social, economic freedom. It is among this population that the risk 
of HIV is particularly high, and it is thus with non-Western women that much HIV vaccine 
research should be conducted. This makes it particularly important to ensure that all research that 
is conducted is ethical and respectful of each individual within their own lived realities. 
Conventional conceptualizations of the principle of autonomy have been criticized for being too 
individualistic. It is a principle which seems to encapsulate isolation and detachment - concepts 
which, research has shown, are foreign to many women and to women in non-Western cultures 
in particular.  
 
This study has attempted to make a contribution to the re-conceptualization of the principle of 
autonomy to ensure its applicability in these contexts – to help rectify the gender and 
Westernized bias of the conventional principles employed in human subjects‟ research by 
supplementing it with feminist approaches, where care and connectedness are primary concerns. 
In this study‟s critique of the individualism underlying standard principles of autonomy, it has 
critiqued the individualistic concepts of the self and the ethic of justice / moral orientation that 
are closely related to principled notions of autonomy. The primary focus of this research was to 
examine gender and how autonomy, self and moral orientation are experienced. A secondary 
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investigation looked at how race influences the experience of autonomy, self and moral 
orientation.  
 
In the analysis, the only significant gender differences that were found were on the Relation 
subscale and the RISC scale, with women scoring significantly higher than men in both cases. 
This seems to support the notion that women have a more relational sense of autonomy and a 
more interdependent, relational self construal than men, who have more independent self 
construals and a more independent sense of autonomy. However, no evidence was found to 
support the hypothesis that men exhibit a more independent sense of autonomy than women, 
lending somewhat contradictory evidence to the gender differences on Autonomy / Relation 
hypothesis. No support was found for the hypothesis that women have a greater tendency 
towards a care moral orientation compared with men, who were expected to have a more 
independent sense of autonomy than women, combined with a greater tendency towards a justice 
orientation.  
 
Significant differences between the Black and White groups on the RISC were contrary to 
expectation, with Whites scoring higher than Blacks, suggesting that White (Western) 
individuals have a more relational interdependent self-construal than Black (non-Western) 
individuals, in direct contrast to predictions based on previous research. As expected, Whites 
showed a greater tendency than Blacks towards a justice orientation, while scores of the Black 
group indicated a stronger tendency towards a care orientation. The contradictory findings on the 
Relational Being Scale, with the significant difference between Black and White individuals on 
the measure of relational autonomy and the absence of significant differences between race 
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groups on the measure of independent autonomy, do not allow for any conclusions to be drawn 
about what differential experiences these groups may or may not have of these particular 
variables.  
 
In summary, the notion that relational autonomy, interdependent self-construal and a care 
orientation would be significantly positively correlated for women, and significantly higher than 
these parallel dimensions in men, was not supported by this study. However, given the 
limitations of this study discussed below, the lack of significance in expected differences does 
not mean that there are not some implications that can be drawn from this study, as discussed in 
the following section. The findings suggest that although there are gender differences in the 
experience of autonomy, self-construal, and ethical orientation, these differences may not be as 
distinct in South Africa tertiary education populations as much research suggests. It is likely that 
including race as a variable, albeit in a secondary analysis, impacted considerably on the results.        
        
5.5.2 Limitations of this Study 
 
Treating the variables as too distinct and the groups as too homogenous may have produced 
problematic results. As suggested by some researchers, the similarities between men and women 
may actually be greater than their differences, while there may be more differences within each 
group than is usually alluded to. Furthermore, the poor reliability and validity of the Relational 
Being Scale may have negatively influenced the results of this study. Concepts for the Autonomy 
subscale of this scale were not defined directly from theories of autonomy but were instead 
inferred from work on relatedness, based on the assumption that autonomy and relation are 
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disparate concepts. This raises questions about the validity of the Autonomy subscale. It is 
noteworthy that the two subscales on which the majority of unexpected and often contradictory 
results were found, were the Autonomy and Relation subscales of this Relational Being Scale. 
This suggests, primarily, that results based on this scale in particular should be interpreted with 
caution, and secondly, that an alternative measure could yield richer and more reliable results 
with respect to autonomy and relationality. Moreover, because all of the measures used were 
developed and tested for reliability and validity on populations from Western, developed 
countries, the applicability of the measures used in the South African context may also have 
affected the validity of the results.          
 
A relatively poor response rate was a major factor in the difficulty in obtaining a larger sample of 
questionnaires for this research. Furthermore, there were hundreds of incomplete or incorrectly 
answered (scored) questionnaires that were returned and could not be used. Two hundred and 
fifty spoiled questionnaires were returned. The response rate was 45%, and of the 1500 sets of 
questionnaires that were distributed, 346 were returned fully completed. The author found that 
giving out the questionnaires herself was valuable in itself in that it brought to her attention a 
number of problems with the questionnaire which, in retrospect, if altered would have yielded 
more valid data. The biggest confounding factor appeared to be understanding, particularly with 
respect to comprehension, of some of the terminology by second language English speakers. A 




While administering the questionnaires in the data collection stage, a number of observations 
were made about the responses of each group to aspects of the questionnaires, and to the research 
process itself. In response to the description of the research, the potential gender differences in 
findings seemed to spark the most interest in both male and female groups. White men were, on 
the whole, the most unresponsive group. The majority of this group appeared reluctant and 
apathetic about completing the questionnaires, and generally spent little time filling them out, as 
reflected in response rates. Male students from Agriculture were more responsive and more 
verbal amongst themselves while filling in the questionnaires. It is possible that the sex of the 
researcher may have influenced these behaviours to some extent.  Black men appeared to take 
the task more seriously but had the highest percentage of spoiled questionnaires.  
 
Language was a major contributing factor: second language English speakers seemed to have 
difficulty understanding particular words (adolescent; detachment, prone), phrases (As an 
adolescent, my growing sexuality was a source of satisfaction to me), and ranking choices (for 
example, the visual analogue scale). The researcher was available for the duration of the task to 
answer questions, but Black men seemed more reluctant than Black women to request assistance, 
preferring instead to turn to their peers for clarification. It is believed that this language barrier 
was a major confounding variable on the results of this study and could seriously have impacted 
on the validity of the results. The length of the questionnaire was also a confounding factor – 
students complained that it was too long and many semi-completed questionnaires were returned. 
The contradictory correlations found on many of the subscales could be accounted for by the 
length of the questionnaires, as students may have checked off responses without properly 
attending to the questions, simply to finish the task more quickly. Various qualitative comments 
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that students from each subgroup made to the researcher after completing the questionnaire 
highlighted certain ambiguities in responses to some of the questions.  
 
5.5.3 Implications of this Study 
 
The findings of this study have been discussed in relation to the theories and research presented 
in the literature review. It is hoped that the arguments presented in this study, particularly the 
critique of principled autonomy, will be of value in improving components of informed consent 
procedures in clinical health research, and, specifically, in HIV vaccine trials. A comprehensive 
understanding of how people perceive their own agency, and the conditions that must be in place 
for them to be able to make fully autonomous decisions should guide a revision of the principled 
autonomy that is currently employed in most informed consent procedures. It is hoped that the 
findings of this study will facilitate further research that will ultimately inform a more gender- 
and culture-sensitive approach to the ethical resolution of autonomy issues – one that maximizes 
the protection of participants‟ rights and ensures that participation in health research is in 
participants‟ best interests. This may involve a revision of many of the components of the 
informed consent process, including the relationship between researchers and participants, and 
between science and society. In addition, reviewing notions of autonomy from mainstream and 
feminist perspectives necessarily involves exploring participants‟ conceptions of themselves in 
relation to others, and how this impacts on their decision-making processes.  
 
This study has yielded information about how women and men experience themselves which, in 
turn, is likely to influence whether they experience autonomy more relationally, or more 
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independently of interpersonal relations. It has also shown that an individual‟s gender and race is 
likely to influence his or her ethical orientation towards justice or care. Similarly, this study has 
demonstrated that the extent to which individuals view significant others as integral parts of their 
self concepts could affect whether they approach moral or ethical dilemmas from a justice or a 
care perspective. When viewed in the context of individual informed consent, these could make a 
valuable contribution to understandings of how potential participants make the decision to 
participate in clinical trials, which will further enhance the informed consent process. This 
research has made a step towards examining autonomy, self, and moral orientation in the South 
African context. The contrary findings, particularly with respect to racial differences, suggest 
that South Africa may offer a unique amalgamation of Western and non-Western cultures where 
men and women from both groups have a somewhat idiosyncratic experience of these concepts: 
autonomy, relation, self, justice and care. Further research is needed to illuminate these 
differences.   
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6. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Key Conclusions  
 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that women do appear to be more 
relational than men, based on their significantly higher Relation and Relational Interdependent 
Self Construal scores than men. However, none of the other predicted gender differences in 
terms of autonomy, self construal and moral orientation were significant. Consequently, the key 
finding of this study was that, contrary to the central hypothesis, women do not appear to exhibit 
a more relational sense of autonomy, combined with a greater tendency towards a care moral 
orientation, compared with men, who were expected to have a more independent sense of 
autonomy, combined with a greater tendency towards a justice orientation.  
 
In the secondary analysis of race and gender, White individuals appeared to have a significantly 
and unexpectedly more relational interdependent self-construal than Black participants. This was 
in direct contrast to the significantly higher scores of the Black group on the Relation subscale of 
the MOS than the White group. However, no significant differences were found between White 
and Black groups on independent autonomy, as measured by the Autonomy subscale of the 
MOS. No categorical conclusions can thus be drawn about gender or racial differences in the 
experience of an independent or relational autonomy, or in the tendency of men and women 
(both Black and White) towards a justice or a care moral orientation.     
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6.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Further research is required to determine the exact nature of the association between gender and 
autonomy, self-construal, and ethical orientation, and the effect of race on these variables. 
However, it is recommended that initial investigations examine gender and race separately, and 
not include them as independent variables in the same study. It is thus suggested that the 
association of gender with autonomy, self construal and moral orientation be given further 
attention in future research. This is particularly important given that the gender differences in the 
White group in this sample were consistent with other Westernized populations on all of the 
variables, while the gender differences in the Black group on almost all of the variables were 
contrary to the expected differences. This, in turn, suggests a significant influence of race on the 
findings. It would therefore be of value to investigate similar measures treating race as the 
primary variable. Further research which looks at the differences within each group – male and 
female – with respect to the variables above is also expected to be particularly illuminating. This 
would require research that treats women and men as heterogeneous groups and examines how 
women and men may differ amongst themselves with respect to autonomy and relatedness, 
independence and connection, justice and care.  
 
Given the contradictory findings within the Black group on many of the variables, further 
investigation is recommended on the experience of autonomy and interpersonal connection 
within this group. Against the backdrop of the historical legacy of apartheid and South Africa‟s 
unique political and social situation, it is expected that the results of such an investigation could 
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be particularly revealing – and provide a unique example of a non-Western population that may 
not behave in a way that other non-Western groups have been found to behave. The finding in 
the current study, for example, that the White group exhibited a significantly greater tendency 
towards a relational interdependent self than the Black group - contrary to expectation - requires 
further investigation and analysis. Further research could also test Kohlberg‟s model and 
Gilligan‟s model on Black and White South African adolescents to see what trends are revealed 
in their moral development. In particular, further research is needed to investigate further why 
the Care scores of Black men were higher than expected and higher than all other groups in this 
sample. Perhaps a study using cross-culturally adapted and validated measures of Gilligan‟s care 
orientation and Kohlberg‟s justice orientation would be useful in confirming or refuting the 
results of the current study that Black men seem to be more care-orientated and more relational 
than Black women. Conversely, further examination of Black women‟s responses on these 
measures of care versus justice is needed, given their tendency in this study to be higher on 
Justice than Black men.  
 
Replication of this study in an urban population that is not at a tertiary education level, as well as 
in a rural population, is expected to yield different results. The specific changes that accompany 
increased contact between cultures may have had a greater acculturative effect on the results of 
the more urbanized, Westernized sample in the current study than they would on a more rural 
population. The inclusion of a measure of acculturation could have yielded more conclusive 
support for this hypothesis. Separating the variables out and studying each of them separately – 
autonomy, self, and moral orientation - would be of great value, as it is possible that the 
combination of all these dimensions in the current study could have confounded the results. 
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Furthermore, finding and using alternative measures of each of these variables may be necessary, 
since the findings of the current study suggest that the validity of the measures employed may 
have been questionable. Furthermore, validating different measures within the South African 
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I have given you each a lecture schedule for you to see which lectures we have been given permission to go 
into for the last 10 minutes to give out the questionnaires. Please go only to the lectures on your schedule 
because other assistants have been assigned to other lectures and we don’t want the questionnaires to be 
repeated at the same lectures.  
 
However, this doesn’t mean that you only have to give the questionnaires you have out at the lectures you 
have been assigned to. I am not being specific about what fields of study students are doing – so you can 
give the questionnaires out to anyone (as long as they match the race & gender criteria) you come into 
contact with – in res, elsewhere on campus, undergrad or postgrad. But please do make sure that the people 
you give them to ARE STUDENTS here at UKZN.  
 
VERY IMPORTANT: When you give the questionnaires out in the lectures we’ve got permission for, please 
make sure you are there 15 minutes before the lecture and indicate to the lecturer concerned that you are 
there. We will have informed the lecturer in advance that you are coming to that specific lecture. We are 
allowed to use the last 10 minutes of those lectures to briefly explain to what the research is about and get 
them to fill out the questionnaires. PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU STAY AT THE LECTURE AND GET EVERY 
QUESTIONNAIRE BACK FROM THE STUDENTS YOU GIVE IT TO. Try not to let them leave with the 
questionnaire (even if they promise to bring it back) because we will never get it back. This also applies to 
questionnaires you give out to people outside of lectures – make sure that they sit and do it while you wait.  
 
Instructions / Explanation for students about the research:  Please give a brief explanation to the students in 
the lectures you go to before asking them to fill out the questionnaire. You can tell them something along the 
lines of:  
 
“Hello – my name is xxx. I am helping one of the Psychology Masters students with the research for 
her thesis. The broad topic of her research is: "(Re)constructing the autonomous self: A feminist 
inquiry into gender and the autonomy ideal." Her research is broadly situated in the context of the 
ethical conduct of research (specifically, HIV vaccine trials) involving women in developing countries.  
The main focus of her study is to investigate how men and women experience their own autonomy. 
Once her study is completed, she will come to your lecture and give you feedback on the results.  
 
As part of this research, we are asking students to complete a questionnaire and I would like to use 
the last 10 minutes of your lecture to ask you to each take a questionnaire, complete it here, and give 
it back to me. This is not compulsory and will not affect your evaluation for this course in any way. If 
you agree to complete a questionnaire, please do not leave the lecture theatre before returning it to 
me. Important note: If you have received one of these questionnaires at another of your lecture and 
already completed it, PLEASE DO NOT TAKE ANOTHER ONE TO COMPLETE. If you have any 
questions about this research, or would like to know more about it, you can find Debbie Marais 
downstairs in the psychology department. Thanks very much.” 
 
Payment to my research assistants (you!): R2 per completed questionnaire. You will each get 100 
questionnaires to give out. Please bring them back to me as you collect small piles so I can see how many of 
each of my sample groups we’ve collected and how many more we need. I need questionnaires completed 
by: 100 Black Men, 100 Black Women, 100 White Men and 100 White Women. Please be aware of this and 
keep checking how many you’re getting back from each of these groups – I don’t need to get 400 
questionnaires back from Black Women only!!  
 
Thanks for helping me with this!  If you need to get hold of me about questions students are asking, or about 
the lecture schedules, my office number is 260 6162. You can also pop in at any time or email me at 




APPENDIX C: AUTONOMY-SELF QUESTIONNAIRES 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. You are assured that all the details and responses that you give 
will be treated as confidential. I will be looking at overall (group) trends and will not focus on individual 
responses / questionnaires. You are not required to put your name on this questionnaire. The following data 
will be of great value to me, however. Before turning over, please complete the following details. Thank you 
for your assistance.     
 
 Sex: 
Male   Female    
                        
 
Age in Years:  
 
 












Place of Residence: 
 
 
Current Course of Study (if student): 
 
 




A) Relational Being Scale (McChrystal, 1994) 
The following pages contain 28 statements. Please look at each one and then put a cross at the place 
on the line which indicates how accurate or inaccurate you feel the statement is for you.  There are no 
right or wrong answers since everyone’s attitudes about themselves and others vary considerably. 
Try not to think for too long about each statement, just answer what is right for you.  
A1. As a child I was encouraged to consider other people's feelings.  
  






A2. In my professional capacity, I can do my best for my clients/customers when they are aware of my 
professional status.  
  






A3. It is easy for me to put myself in other people's shoes.  
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                    Very Accurate 
 
              Very Inaccurate 
 
 A4. I can usually achieve important goals for myself.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A5. On the whole I find people very forgiving.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A6. As an adolescent my growing sexuality was a source of satisfaction to me.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A7. I am not usually assertive.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A8. I find it hard to do what I know to be morally right if my action will hurt others.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A9. As a child my attempts at independence were usually encouraged.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A10. It is difficult for me to make amends when I have had a disagreement with a friend.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  






A11. I get most out of life when everything is going well with family, friends and colleagues.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A12. I am generally confident about myself and my abilities.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A13. When a friend lets me down, I usually feel as if I were to blame in some way.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A14. I find it easier to achieve things for others than for myself.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A15. I expect other people to be able to put themselves in my shoes.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A16. As a child my friends of the same sex as me were very important.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A17. I strive for autonomy in all areas of my life.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  






 A18. During my adolescence the possibilities of life opened up before me.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A19. I find that a good argument clears the air.  
 
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A20. I am prone to feelings of depression.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A21. I value my ability to be objective.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A22. As an adolescent my growing sexuality caused problems for myself and others.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A23. When I am in a dispute with another person I am usually very clear about who is in the wrong.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A24. I have feelings of self doubt.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  






A25. A sense of detachment helps me to function better in a stressful situation.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A26. During adolescence I became increasingly aware of the future limitations of my life.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
 A27. I find it difficult to lose my temper as I know this will hurt those around me.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  
             Very Inaccurate 
 
 
A28. I am usually satisfied with the way I solve interpersonal problems if I know I have acted justly.  
  
                    Very Accurate 
 
  





B) Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale (Cross et al., 2000) 
 
Please read the 11 statements below and indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
of the statements. Your responses can range from “strongly disagree” (score = 1) to “strongly agree” 
(score = 7), as shown on the scale here:  














B1. My close relationships are an important reflection of who I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B2. When I feel very close to someone, it often feels like that person is an important part of who I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B3. I usually feel a strong sense of pride when someone close to me has an important accomplishment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B4. I think one of the most important parts of who I am can be captured by looking at my close friends 
and understanding who they are. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B5. When I think of myself, I often think of my close friends and family also. 





B6. If a person hurts someone close to me, I personally feel hurt as well. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B7. In general, my close relationships are an important part of my self image. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B8. Overall, my close relationships have very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B9. My close relationships are unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B10. My sense of pride comes from knowing who I have as close friends. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B11. When I establish a close friendship with someone, I usually develop a strong sense of identification 
with that person. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
C) Yacker & Weinberg’s Scale (1990) 
The following scale is a measure of moral reasoning style for adults using 12 dilemmas encountered 
by children between the ages of 8 and 10 years. In completing the scale, it is important that you 
imagine yourself to be the parent of an 8-to-10 year old child. As you respond to each dilemma, think 
about how you would help your child (imaginary or real) decide what to do. That is, what you would 
most want your child to consider when deciding what to do.  
 
After each dilemma, there are four options you might consider when helping your child decide what 
to do. Please rank them from 1 to 4 in order of your preference. Specifically, assign the ranking of 1 to 
that option which comes closest to your own thinking on the matter, the one you most likely want 
“your child” to consider. Assign a ranking of 2 to that option you would next want your child to 
consider and so on. The ranking of 4 would be assigned to that option you would least likely want 
your child to consider.  
 
Please place your ranking of each possible option in the boxes along side each option. Even if none 
of the options matches exactly what you would say or do, please rank them to fit your thinking as 
closely as possible. Be sure to rank each option. Of course, there are no right or wrong answers for 
any question. All responses will be kept confidential.  
 
C1. Your child is having a birthday party and wants to invite most of the children in the class. One 
classmate, who lives down the street, is not popular with your child, or the other children in the class. Your 
child does not want to invite the neighbour child.  
RANK  
 Since the other child lives on the block, I would explore how my child would feel when he /she saw 
the child in the future if the child were not invited to the party, and how the other child would feel 
after being left out 
 I would explain to my child that if most of the class is invited, the unpopular child must be as well. It 
is not fair to leave our one or two. 
 I would remind my child that there are times when neighbours help each other. Especially because 
the child is unpopular, it would be best to be friendly with the neighbour child and invite him / her to 
the party. 
 I would want my child to consider the reasons why the child is not popular. If the child is just shy, 
she / he should be invited. If the child is out of control or abusive, it would be unfair to the other 






 C2. Your child accidentally broke a toy that belonged to another child. No one saw your child do 
this and your child does not wish to confess. 
RANK  
 I would explain to my child that honesty is the best policy and that the thing to do is to admit having 
broken the toy. 
 
 I would want my child to consider that by not confessing, someone else might get blamed and 
punished for breaking the toy.  
 I would discuss how difficult it might be for my child to play with the other child in the future, having 
to live with the guilt about the toy.  
  
I would want my child to know that in this case there are no questions. If you break it, you offer to 
replace it.  
 
 
 C3. Your child and another child were misbehaving in school while the teacher was out of the 
room. When the teacher returned, your child was caught misbehaving, but the other child was not. Your child 
wonders what to do.  
RANK  
 I would want my child to be concerned about his / her own behaviour only, and to understand that 
this would not have happened if my child had behaved properly in the first place.  
  
I would expect my child not to tattle. As for the other child, it is a matter between that child and the 
teacher.  
 I would help my child understand that it would be unkind to get the other child in trouble and that the 
upset and anger at the other child for not being caught will not last long.  
  
I would explore with my child what would happen to their relationship if my child told on the 
classmate. 
 
 C4. Your child agreed to participate in an extra-curricular event which requires after-school 
preparation. As the day of the event nears, the weather becomes better for outdoor play. Your child no longer 
wishes to participate in the event or help in its preparation.  
RANK  
 I would want my child to consider the potential disappointment of others, as they are depending on 
his / her participation in the event.  
 I would help my child understand that a commitment is a commitment and that one must honour 
responsibilities that one agrees to. 
 My child made a promise. I would want my child to consider how he /she would feel if someone 
broke his / her word to my child. 
 I would want my child to be concerned with the selfishness of his /her wishes and I would point out 
that acting this way can make a person feel bad about herself / himself later.  
 
 
 C5. Your child often plays with two other children and all three are close friends. For some 
reason, one of the friends becomes unhappy with the other, and wishes your child to break off relations with 
that friend also. Your child feels caught in the middle and wonders what to do. 
RANK  
 I would encourage my child to remain friends with both children, even if all three do not play 
together at the same time.  
 I would want my child to consider whether the two children could become friends again by helping 
my child understand what went wrong.  
  
I would want my child to consider whether it is fair for someone else to determine who his/her 
friends should be. 
 I would want my child to consider how she / he would feel if she / he were in the position of the third 





 C6. Your child agrees to pay for a relatively inexpensive household item that she / he broke 
despite warnings “not to touch.” Your child is saving a portion of his / her allowance to do this. As the savings 
increase, your child wishes very much to spend the money on something he / she has wanted for a long time.  
RANK  
 I would explain to my child that life is like this sometimes; we often have to do things we don’t want 
to do. It’s not always easy to play by the rules.  
 I would want my child to know that we can accommodate each other. I would allow a small portion 
of the saved money for his / her own purchase, even though it will take a little longer to pay back for 
the broken item. 
 I would want my child to consider the importance of priorities and to understand that the prior 
obligation must be satisfied before his / her wishes.  
 I would impress upon my child that even though the item was small, it was important to me and that 
for the sake of my feelings, I would like him / her to replace it before making his / her own purchase.  
 
 
 C7. Your child admires a toy that belongs to a friend. The friend accidentally leaves the toy at 
your house. Because the friend does not seem to miss the toy or ask for its return, your child wants to keep 
the toy.  
RANK  
 I would want my child to consider how the child who owns the toy feels about now having it. I would 
point out that just because the other child doesn’t seem to care about the toy, this may not be the 
case.  
 I would want my child to consider how she /he would feel if someone kept a toy that was his /hers. 
The principle of not doing to others what you would not want them to do to you is key in this case.  
 I would want my child to consider who owns the toy. Regardless of the circumstances, the toy still 
belongs to someone else and the important thing is to return it.  
 I would want my child to consider the good feelings she / he would get from returning the toy, and 
the problems that might occur between the children if the friend remembers the toy later and it 
wasn’t returned.  
 
 
 C8. An afternoon has been set aside for the whole family to give the home a thorough cleaning. 
On the appointed day, your child wishes to watch a special programme on television. There is no video 
recording machine in the household.  
RANK  
 I would want my child to realize that watching the TV show would not be very considerate to the 
other members of the family, and to imagine how they might feel.  
 I would want my child to understand that she / he is no more privileged than any other member of 
the family, and that therefore, he / she has to participate in the family chores. 
 I would stress all the important aspects of responsibility, togetherness, and belonging that go with 
“family” as well as the need to be able to depend on one another. 
 I would want my child to consider that a commitment has been made to the family in an almost 
contractual way. And that It would not be fair to change his / her mind at the last minute.  
 
 
 C9. Your child finds a bag in the street containing some small items that Intrigue her /him. Your 
child wishes to keep some or all of the contents of the bag.  
RANK  
 I would want my child to understand that ownership is an important concept. People have a right to 
their belongings, even though kids often say, “Finders keepers, losers weepers.” 
  
I would remind my child of the “Golden Rule”: do unto others as you would have them do unto you.  
 I would want my child to consider that if he / she kept the bag without trying to locate the owner, she 
/ he might feel guilty about keeping something that somebody else might need.  
 I would remind my child that these items are probably considered special to the person they belong 




 C10. Your child promises another child to help him / her with a school project due the next day. 
When your child tells you this, you remind your child that this was the day that the family had planned to visit 
friends who live in a town an hour away. Your child does not know what to do. 
RANK  
 I would want my child to consider that promises made are promises kept unless good reasons 
prevent you from keeping your word. Since the commitment to the other family was made first, it 
takes precedence.  
 I would want my child to consider that membership in the family is important and that when the 
parents make plans, I would like for us all to be together. 
 I would discuss the problem of an individual’s freedom within the group and that when the family 
makes plans, one family member does not have the right to make separate plans. 
 I would want my child to consider the predicament of the other child. If the friend really needs help, I 
could see where my child might have to stay home and help the friend.  
 
 
 C11. Your child has made long standing overnight plans with a good friend who moved out of 
town and who your child sees infrequently. On the afternoon of the appointed evening, a neighbour calls to 
say there is an extra ticket to the Ice Capades (or other special event) that night and invites your child to 
attend. Your child does not know what to do.  
RANK  
 I would want my child to consider that not only is the friend looking forward to the visit, the adults in 
the families had to make special plans for the overnight.  
 I would want my child to consider the friend’s feelings and find out if it might be possible to change 
the overnight plans without upsetting the friend.  
  
I would want my child to understand that the first commitment takes precedence. 
  
I would want my child to consider his / her priorities. Which is more important – friend or event? 
 
 
 C12. Your child was punished by one of the teachers in the school for a perceived misbehaviour 
that your child really did not commit. Your child wishes to explain, but fears being further scolded for “talking 
back.” 
RANK  
 I would want my child to understand that justice is justice and that taking blame unnecessarily need 
not be tolerated.  
 
 I would want my child to consider how important it is to communicate with the teacher, not only to 
clear him / herself, but to maintain integrity and self-esteem. 
 I would want my child to consider that teachers are human beings and they sometimes make 
mistakes. Unless my child was very upset, I would advise him / her to leave things alone this time.  
 I would want my child to consider the importance of having the truth be known even when you think 







































APPENDIX E: TABLES OF MEAN SCORES BY RACE  
 
Means for Relational Being Scale Subscales by Race 
               RACE 
 
 
  Black White 
 
AUTONOMY Mean 90.83 88.93 




RELATION Mean 94.46 91.57 






Means for Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale Scores by Race 
               RACE 
 
 
  Black White 
 
RISC Mean 54.82 58.8 















Means for Moral Orientation Scale Subscales by Race 
 
               RACE 
 
 
  Black White 
 
JUSTICE Mean 6.71 7.26 




CARE Mean 5.28 4.76 























APPENDIX F: CORRELATION MATRIX TABLES  
 
 Table 4.19 
Correlations between RBS, RISC & MOS Scores by Race 
 












1 .183(*) .124 .037 -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .010 .085 .607 .785 
N 195 195 195 195 195 
Relation Pearson 
Correlation 
.183(*) 1 .062 -.003 .023 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 . .388 .971 .753 
n 195 195 195 195 195 
RISC Pearson 
Correlation 
.124 .062 1 -.140 .113 
Sig. (2-tailed) .085 .388 . .051 .115 
n 195 195 195 195 195 
Justice Pearson 
Correlation 
.037 -.003 -.140 1 -.941(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .607 .971 .051 . .000 
n 195 195 195 195 195 
Care Pearson 
Correlation 
-.020 .023 .113 -.941(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .785 .753 .115 .000 . 










1 -.147 .201(*) .118 -.117 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .071 .013 .149 .153 
n 151 151 151 151 151 
Relation Pearson 
Correlation 
-.147 1 .338(**) -.035 .040 
Sig. (2-tailed) .071 . .000 .670 .623 
n 151 151 151 151 151 
RISC Pearson 
Correlation 
.201(*) .338(**) 1 -.024 .022 
Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .000 . .767 .784 
n 151 151 151 151 151 
Justice Pearson 
Correlation 
.118 -.035 -.024 1 -.997(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .149 .670 .767 . .000 
n 151 151 151 151 151 
Care Pearson 
Correlation 
-.117 .040 .022 -.997(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .153 .623 .784 .000 . 
n 151 151 151 151 151 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 302 
 Table 4.20 
Correlations between RBS, RISC & MOS Scores by Gender and Race 
 
Gender by 
Race     












1 .213(*) .205(*) -.059 .061 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .038 .046 .569 .560 
n 95 95 95 95 95 
Relation Pearson 
Correlation 
.213(*) 1 .058 -.146 .143 
Sig. (2-tailed) .038 . .579 .159 .168 
n 95 95 95 95 95 
RISC Pearson 
Correlation 
.205(*) .058 1 -.123 .133 
Sig. (2-tailed) .046 .579 . .233 .200 
n 95 95 95 95 95 
Justice Pearson 
Correlation 
-.059 -.146 -.123 1 -.995(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .569 .159 .233 . .000 
n 95 95 95 95 95 
Care Pearson 
Correlation 
.061 .143 .133 -.995(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .560 .168 .200 .000 . 













1 .154 .047 .132 -.096 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .126 .643 .192 .341 
n 100 100 100 100 100 
Relation Pearson 
Correlation 
.154 1 .063 .145 -.098 
Sig. (2-tailed) .126 . .534 .150 .332 
n 100 100 100 100 100 
RISC Pearson 
Correlation 
.047 .063 1 -.154 .092 
Sig. (2-tailed) .643 .534 . .125 .361 
n 100 100 100 100 100 
Justice Pearson 
Correlation 
.132 .145 -.154 1 -.887(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .192 .150 .125 . .000 
n 100 100 100 100 100 
Care Pearson 
Correlation 
-.096 -.098 .092 -.887(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .341 .332 .361 .000 . 






1 -.222(*) .244(*) .067 -.055 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .038 .022 .532 .612 












-.222(*) 1 -.002 -.024 .030 
Sig. (2-tailed) .038 . .984 .824 .782 
n 88 88 88 88 88 
RISC Pearson 
Correlation 
.244(*) -.002 1 .002 -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .022 .984 . .987 .953 
n 88 88 88 88 88 
Justice Pearson 
Correlation 
.067 -.024 .002 1 -.998(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .532 .824 .987 . .000 
n 88 88 88 88 88 
Care Pearson 
Correlation 
-.055 .030 -.006 -.998(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .612 .782 .953 .000 . 













1 .012 .276(*) .139 -.152 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .924 .029 .278 .233 
n 63 63 63 63 63 
Relation Pearson 
Correlation 
.012 1 .489(**) .016 -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .924 . .000 .902 .956 
n 63 63 63 63 63 
RISC Pearson 
Correlation 
.276(*) .489(**) 1 .000 .003 
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .000 . 1.000 .982 
n 63 63 63 63 63 
Justice Pearson 
Correlation 
.139 .016 .000 1 -.995(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .278 .902 1.000 . .000 
n 63 63 63 63 63 
Care Pearson 
Correlation 
-.152 -.007 .003 -.995(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .233 .956 .982 .000 . 
n 63 63 63 63 63 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
